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Introduction 
Peter Larmour and Nick Wolanin 
New attention to the old problem of corruption has several characteristics. 
First it is international. Previously corruption was mainly the concern of 
domestic agencies, like the police or auditors. Now it appears on the agenda of 
international organisations , like the World Bank or the OECD. The 
internationalisation of controlling corruption has been led by a non-government 
organisation, Transparency International (TI), which has campaigned to outlaw 
the bribery of foreign officials . Transparency International devised a 
~ontroversial 'Corruption Perceptions Index', which ranked countries according 
to how corrupt they were perceived to be. It followed this up with a Bribe 
Payers Index, which ranked countries according to their propensity to offer 
bribes (Transparency International 2000: 13-14). 
Second, it is economic. Previously, corruption was largely the concern of 
lawyers and criminologists. Now the lead is being taken by economists. They 
look at the costs of corruption, and its effect on economic development (Rose-
Ackerman 1999) . They also apply the methods of economic analysis to the 
problem of corruption-the assumption that people are rational and 
calculating, and will respond to incentives and disincentives. This approach is 
well summarised in Robert Klitgaard's (1988) formula 
Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability = Corruption 
Third, the new interest in corruption is less patient with cultural 
explanations. Previously corruption in developing countries might be explained 
by traditions of gift giving, or the obligations of kinship. Now many people in 
these countries are less tolerant of such excuses. A draft bill to establish an 
anti-corruption commission in Papua New Guinea, for example prescribes 
bluntly 'custom [is] not to be a defence' (Papua New Guinea 1998, s.40) . A 
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brisk distinction between gifts and bribes has been given by the Nigerian 
President, Olusegun Obasanjo, who said that 
_ .. the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded. The value is usually in the 
spirit rather than the material worth. It is usually done in the open, and 
never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an embarrassment and it is 
returned. If anyrhing corruption has perverted and destroyed this aspect of 
our culture (quoted in Pope 1997:5) 
Fourth, it is suspicious of state action. Previously, a corruption scandal 
might lead to a government sponsored crackdown or inquiry. An 'independent' 
commission might be established, but it would report directly to the Prime 
Minister or the President. Now there is more suspicion that those at the top 
may also be involved. The Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) in New South Wales, for example, reports to a bipartisan committee 
of the legislature, rather than to the government which established it. It went 
on to investigate the State Premier, leading to his resignation (though the 
Supreme Court later found the ICAC Act did not apply to the Premier in the 
circumstances). 
Suspicion of state action has led to greater emphasis on the role of civil 
society, and the private sector in preventing corruption. Transparency 
International has supplemented its international action against business 
corruption by franchising national chapters, constituted like other domestic 
non-government organisations, each campaigning in a different way-
monitoring the privatisation program in Panama, for example, or establishing 
advice centres in Bangladesh. Transparency International has also attracted 
financial support from (among others) large international companies who are 
tired of paying bribes. Where the private sector used to be regarded as one of 
the causes of corruption, it now casts itself as a victim. 
Fifth, it is as much concerned with education and prevention as with 
investigation and prosecution. Corruption is difficult to investigate. It typically 
takes place in secret, without witnesses, between willing partners. Prosecutions 
are hard to bring, and there is sometimes suspicion that governments are 
selectively targeting their political enemies. Like other crime, more corruption 
probably takes place than is ever investigated or prosecuted. Additional resources 
might therefore be better spent 'upstream', in reforming administrative systems 
to reduce opportunities for corruption, and in educating citizens against 
accepting it. Transparency International's mandate specifically precludes it from 
taking up individual cases. 
These five characteristics of the new interest in corruption are linked to 
broader tendencies. The rapid rise of Transparency International is part of a 
process of globalisation. The involvement of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the private sector is characteristic of modern forms of governance, 
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in which order is seen as the result of the interaction between hierarchies, 
markets and communities. The economic analysis of corruption is part of a 
wider intellectual movement to apply the assumptions of rational choice to social 
and political institutions. There are links between the characteristics, but also 
tensions between them. Neoliberal economists and NGO activists, for example, 
may share a suspicion of state action, but differ over the value of moralistic 
appeals. Disciplined secretive organisations like the police force may be 
uncomfortable with the new emphasis on management reform and civil society. 
This book reflects these new approaches to corruption, bur it is also critical 
of them. It deals with the international dimensions of corruption, as a human 
rights issue (Pearson), in the recovery of assets that corrupt leaders have hidden 
abroad (Chaikin), and in the links between corruption and transnational 
crime (McFarlane). It includes an original piece of economic analysis 
(Menezes). It is designed to be read by people withour formal training in 
economics, and provides a guide to further reading. Other chapters draw on 
different intellectual and professional traditions, particularly criminology 
(Grabosky). Angela Gorta's research for the ICAC draws on broader social 
science methodology. Hindess' initial chapter is critical of the narrowness of 
current economic approaches to understanding corruption, while Warburton's 
final chapter on corrupt networks draws on politics, sociology and social 
psychology. 
The title of the book comes from a four-week short course, designed and 
taught jointly by academics at the Australian National University and public 
servants at the New Sourh Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption. 
Its creation was stimulated by Transparency International, on behalf of 
Indonesian NGOs looking for anti-corruption training before the fall of 
Soeharto. It has been taught annually since 1998 as part of a Masters in 
Development Administration degree, taken by students from audit offices, 
public service commissions, anti-corruption commissions and NGOs from a 
range of countries in East Asia, Africa and the South Pacific. 1 Versions have 
been taught in shorter training courses in Jakarta, Phnom Penh, and Manila. 
These workshops were sponsored by the Centre for Democratic Institutions at 
the Australian National University, which also commissioned Zoe Pearson's 
chapter on corruption and human rights. 
Most of the aurhors have taught in the course, and the chapters are based 
on lectures and workshops they designed for it. Peter Grabosky's involvement 
led to the publication of this volume jointly with the Australian Institute of 
Criminology. The three case studies-of Calcutta, the Philippines and 
Thailand-were originally presented at a seminar organised by the Asian 
Development Bank (AD B) , and moderated by one of the editors. We are grateful 
for the permission of the ADB and the authors for their inclusion. 
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Definitions, explanations and remedies 
There are several kinds of definitions of corruption. Some turn on the idea of 
the 'public interest', and deviations from it. Others turn on popular 
understandings, noticing cultural and other differences in what people regard 
as corrupt. Corruption is often, but not always, against the law in many 
countries, even if the law is hard to enforce. Different explanations for 
corruption suggest different remedies, just as different diagnoses of a disease 
suggest different cures. Klitgaard's formula, quoted above, for example, suggests 
the break up of government monopolies, reduced official discretion, and more 
accountability. 
Some of these explanations are quite traditional, but the cures they suggest 
remain plausible. Barry Hindess' chapter goes back to the classical foundations 
of Western political theory. Corruption has also been a concern of non-Western 
theory. Syed Alatas' pioneering sociology of corruption described the philosophy 
ofWangAn Shih (AD 1021-1086) who argued that corruption was caused by 
a combination of bad systems and bad men. Ibn Khaldun (AD 1332-1406) 
argued that it was caused by luxurious living within the elite (Alatas 1990). 
The recent scandals surrounding the Olympic games show how reliance on 
the virtue of 'good people', such as former athletes, is insufficient unless good 
systems are also in place. 'Luxurious living' suggests close attention to the 
office car park, bank accounts, and the lifestyles of leaders and their families. 
Transparency International influentially defines corruption in terms of the 
use of public office for private gain (Pope 1997: 1). The distinction between 
'public' and 'private' matters is often associated with the rise of the modern 
bureaucratic state. Corruption is seen as the result of the failure to distinguish 
private matters from public ones-appointing relatives, rather than on merit; 
or diverting public money to private purposes. Municipal reformers in the 
United States also saw corruption arising from politicisation of properly 
bureaucratic activities. The remedy was professional administration, at arms 
length from politicians, even-handedly applying legislation. Typical public 
administration remedies include independent commissions. 
As Hindess' chapter shows, corruption has long been seen as abuse of power. 
Revelations about corruption are often associated with a change of government, 
or the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (which, of course, has its 
own kinds of corruption). Governments and oppositions regularly accuse each 
other of corruption, and promise cleaner government. If corruption is diagnosed 
as the result of abuse of power, then the remedies include democratisation, 
parliamentary oversight of the executive, and campaign finance legislation. 
Corruption is often, but not always a crime. Angela Gorta, research manager 
at the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales, 
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and author of the chapter on research, decided to look for explanations in 
criminology (Gorta 1998). She found that 
• crime depends on situation, not the fixed personality of the 
offender. There is no 'corrupt personality', and anyone, even those 
at the top of an organisation, may be tempted. 
• people choose to commit crimes. They make calculations, 
including about their chances of being caught. 
• there are different types of crime. Remedies for one kind may have 
no impact on others. 
• offenders try to justifY, rationalise and neutralise what they do. 
People will say, for example, 'everybody does it' or 'I did it for my 
family' . 
• organisational factors affect whether crime takes place. These 
include the informal culture of an organisation, as well as fo rmal 
rules and regulations. 
These theories of crime in turn suggest their own remedies for corruption, 
which are described in Gorta's chapter. 
Corruption control in practice 
Different schools of thought have been reflected in the development of thinking 
about corruption prevention, which is reflected in the curriculum of the ANU / 
ICAC course on Corruption and Anti-Corruption. We will call these 
'interventionism', 'managerialism' and 'organisational integrity', the last of which 
is described in more detail in the chapter by Catherine Boardman and Vicki 
Klum. 
Interventionism 
Most western methods of policing wait for a crime to be committed and then 
intervene in the conduct of the offender. 'Catching crooks' is how most law 
enforcement agencies still see themselves. This approach prevails in the so-
called law and order auctions when political parties compete to show they are 
'tough on crime' at election times. It is easy to measure in the statistics of 
conviction and crime clear-up rates . 
It is assumed that society is protected by preventing the offender from 
continuing or repeating the offence. Intervention kicks off processes such as 
compensation, retribution, rehabilitation or quarantine. There is an assumed 
measure of deterrence for the offender as recidivist, and also for others 
contemplating similar conduct. 
There are, however, many weaknesses in this approach, particularly when 
applied in isolation. First, harm done cannot be undone. Second, most crime 
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goes unreported. Its particular conspiratorial characteristics mean an even 
smaller percentage of crimes of corruption are likely to come to notice. The 
'happy giver-happy receiver' situation and the absence of a victim at the scene 
of the crime mean most corruption is invisible. Effective intervention is therefore 
the exception rather than the rule. 
Third, its demands on resources are unlimited. As with taxation, full 
compliance might only be possible if every person is engaged in the supervision 
of everyone else. The abject failure of interventionism to deal with the trafficking 
of narcotics is a widely recognised example of the limits of resources. If the 
resources will never be available to match the scale of the problem, there must 
be selectivity in applying what resources are to hand. Thus we confront the 
issues of biased target selection, and uncertainty of detection. 
Fourth, the interventionist may not notice the offence, or not treat it 
seriously. If attending to street violence is an electoral priority, then white-
collar, environmental or industrial crimes may go unchallenged, despite their 
potential for causing a greater harm to society. For example, the law enforcement 
sector has been slow to realise the damage done bye-crime. Selective 
enforcement may also apply along socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, gender, age 
or political lines, sometimes unwittingly but also deliberately and corruptly. 
Individuals affected can include a government's political opponents. 
Fifth, if most crime and even more corruption goes undetected, unreported 
and hence unrestored, what measure of deterrence can exist? Interventionism 
assumes that a potential offender exercises rational judgment about behaviour 
and consequences. She supposedly compares the gain to be had from an illegal 
or corrupt act with the probability of detection and the severity of punishment, 
if detected, and then acts on the result of that notional equation. The slim 
possibility of detection means that corruption is almost risk free. Hence 
confidence in the deterrent effect of intervention might be misplaced. 
Rational choice is often assumed as an explanation. However, many crimes, 
like murder, are not well understood as rational choices. Similarly, the 
association between corruption and gambling has led to a contrary view about 
rationality. The conventional construction is that a gambler might turn to 
corruption in order to service debts. However, it may be that the propensity to 
engage in risk-taking behaviour is what attracts certain types of people to 
gambling. It may also attract them to corruption. If engaging in corruption is 
merely another form of risk-taking, or a gamble on the consequences versus 
the rewards, then it is likely that gambling and corruption are behavioural 
neighbours rather than a causal couple. 
Deterrence has an intuitive appeal to those who are close to the processes of 
law enforcement. They see the unhappy results of detection, prosecution and 
imprisonment. They would not want themselves to be caught up in the 
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harshness of the system. However, experience and criminological research 
suggests deterrence is a more elusive phenomenon in the minds of offenders. 
To rely on this as a sole means of controlling crime or corruption is problematic. 
Managerialism 
The managerialist model of corruption control assumes that those who seek to 
misbehave can be discouraged or prevented from doing so by the erection of 
appropriate systems, procedures and protocols. It also assumes that preventing 
the harm from occurring in the first place is more desirable than chasing the 
consequences of the harm after the fact. Prevention is often said to be better 
than cure. 
Managerialism sees the world as made up of opportunities and exploiters 
of opportunity. Reduce or eliminate opportunity and misconduct will be 
reduced or disappear. For example, cash boxes are locked away, every purchase 
order is double-checked, audit trails are kept and reviewed, and so on. A key 
advantage of the approach over interventionism is that it can realistically hope 
to capture a larger proportion of misconduct. It can defeat outright some 
attempted abuses. It may enhance deterrence by presenting a greater chance of 
detection. 
The limitation of this approach is its failure to recognise and deal with the 
interactivity of systems and human nature. It sees humans operating a machine 
which will only permit correct operation but not permit incorrect operation, 
rather like an electrical socket which can only work one way. However, people 
are an integral part of any system and organisations are much more complex 
than electrical sockets. 
For example, requiring all cars to be fitted with seat belts is a typical 
'managerialist' solution to the problem of road accidents. A reckless driver 
wearing a seatbelt should be prevented by the system from being injured in the 
inevitable accident. Ensuring that people use seat belts is another story. 
Managerialist solutions also tend to deal with idealised or standardised 
workplace situations. To call again on the car safety analogy, the seat belt solution 
is inappropriate for a heavily pregnant woman or for an infant but the system, 
because it is designed for the widest possible application, fails to be effective 
when it most needs to be-for those users who are most vulnerable. Similarly, 
a crime or corruption control system needs to be most effective in opposing 
the most serious instances of abuse. A system which only catches the insignificant 
abuse but which fails to deal with infrequent but critically damaging incidents 
is not serving the organisation. 
The failings of managerial approaches turn our attention to the character 
of the people operating the systems. Most people who work in organisations 
can be seen to fit into three broad categories. In Category 1 there are those 
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who want to do the right thing and need varying degrees of guidance about 
what the right thing is to do. Category 2 people are those who are too timid to 
take the risk of operating outside the rules. Paradoxically, they limit any deviance 
to technical, sometimes clever compliance with rules. Finally, in Category 3, 
there are those who simply are crooks and will operate outside the rules entirely. 
Let us look at a commonly used system which is assumed (often incorrectly) 
to prevent bribery by limiting the amount of money an official can receive in 
the form of a gift. People in Category 1 already know not to accept gifts, and 
a corrupt official in Category 3 is not going to declare the receipt of a 'gift' 
whatever its value. So having a system of controlling gifts merely creates a 
means by which Category 2 officials can legitimise corrupt rewards. How? If 
the rule says one can accept a gift up to $50, in order to receive a $100 bribe, 
you just register them as two separate gifts of $50. If the rule is consequently 
amended to stipulate that only up to $50 can be accepted on the same day 
from the one person, the corrupt official merely has to wait two days or take 
the bribe in two lots from two different people acting in concert. Or over three 
days from three people, and so on. 
If the prohibition is then applied to cash gifts in any amount, the giver 
simply spends the cash on a good or service before delivering it to the official. 
And so on. The point is that whatever regime of rules is established, it can be 
subverted. By engaging in a futile battle of rule-setting, response and then 
rule-hardening, the runaway growth in the number and complexity of rules 
can eventually lead to the stifling of all legitimate business activity. 
A burgeoning base of rules, characteristic of excessively managerialist 
systems, seems to lead to several effects. The first is to breed a culture of ' approval 
through omission'. Where impermissible conduct is carefully and 
comprehensively described, people tend to adopt a 'what's not proscribed is 
permissible' attitude. 
The second effect is that where clearly impermissible conduct can be made 
to fit the rules, it can 'launder' the misconduct. For example, if a travelling 
allowance rule requires a journey of no less than 50kms to trigger entitlement, 
the system merely encourages people to work harder for their misconduct, if 
they are so minded, perhaps by driving 50kms around in circles. 
Managerialist corruption control approaches also tend to ignore market 
forces. Say for argument's sake a group of public officials is corruptly selling 
confidential information. Each piece of information leaked earns the corrupt 
official 100 illicit dollars. If managerialist corruption prevention controls are 
applied with alacrity, the leaking of such information becomes more difficult 
and more risky. Some of the corrupt officials, unwilling to take the risk, drop 
out of the market. However, basic economic theory contends that if the supply 
of a commodity falls but demand remains unchanged, the price per item goes 
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up. The control measure has not dampened the corruption but merely created 
a more vigorous market because the remaining suppliers who are willing to 
take the risk can now command a higher price. 
Other similar effects can be seen in wider crime prevention practice. Banks 
which 'target harden' against armed robbery by the use of bullet proof screens, 
armed guards, dye bombs, etc do not reduce crime, but merely displace it into 
other areas. Petrol stations, post offices and convenience stores have become the 
new targets of armed robberies until target hardening in those locations acts 
again to shift the crime elsewhere. Similarly, sophisticated anti-theft measures in 
motor cars create sophisticated car thieves. It enables them to steal a commodity 
for which there is high demand but limited supply because of effective anti-
theft measures. They can command an even higher price for their crime because 
they no longer have to compete with the unsophisticated thieves. 
The same economic theory also contends that an increase in price will 
cause more suppliers to enter a market which will again achieve an equilibrium, 
but at higher price levels and with fewer suppliers. So, at best, the managerialist 
prevention measure distorts a market which simply responds in a recognisable 
way. At worst, the risk takers become more sophisticated in their methodology 
to avoid detection and the consequences. Paradoxically, the prevention measure 
can have the effect of professionalising or increasing the sophistication of the 
corruption hence making it more difficult to detect and control. By ignoring 
the interactivity of systems, the managerialist approach tends to change the 
nature and location of corruption rather than prevent it. 
Excessive reliance on systems can also engender complacency. Those who 
are convinced that a system is foolproof tend to look away, falsely believing 
they have successfully prevented corruption. A rule based, managerialist 
approach to controlling corruption may also generate responses in which 
strict compliance becomes an end in itself, displacing the outcome intended 
by the rules. A good example can be found in the way most conflicts of 
interest are handled. Many organisations require the disclosure of actual or 
potential conflicts of interest as a rule. The outcome intended is that officials 
sense the organisation's interests, not their own personal interests. Because 
many conflict of interest rules focus on declaration, there is a common attitude 
that the declaration itself purges the conflict. Having declared the conflict, 
the official then goes on to serve their private interest and defends any 
subsequent accusations of corruption by pointing to the declaration. Even 
worse, is that many people accept the defence because there was compliance 
with the rules. 
Another example is in procurement. Procurement rules often require the 
seeking of multiple quotations directly or by public tender in order to ensure 
best value for money is obtained and to lessen the chance of a corrupt 
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arrangement emerging between an official and a particular provider of goods 
or services. When auditing records against procurement rules, often a check is 
made to see if, say, three quotes have been obtained where it is necessary to do 
so. There are many cases where such audits have missed corruption because 
the three quotes have been present on the files but, unknown to the auditor, 
two of them were forged. Here the rules and their application, extending even 
into the audit methodology, have helped to hide corruption. How? The three 
quote rule when abused through prima facie compliance means that a corruptly 
favoured contractor enjoys the cover of having been the 'best' bidder each time 
bids were called. Cosy relationships, without the obfuscating documentation 
required by managerialist methods, might be questioned sooner. 
Many organisations deal with corruption risks by relying on some 
interventionist activities coupled with some measure of managerialist controls. 
Responsibility for implementation tends to lie with a specialised subsection of 
the corporate affairs portfolio, or be an additional responsibility of the internal 
audit function. T hus corruption control is marginalised. That is not to say 
that interventionist and managerialist measures have no place. The choice of 
measures and their strategic applications, however, form part of the 
organisational integrity approach outlined briefly below, and explained in greater 
detail in the chapter by Catherine Boardman and Vicki Klum. 
Beyond managerialism-organisational integrity 
Organisational integrity is a term used to label an approach to minimising 
corruption. It refers to the integration of an organisation's operational systems, 
corruption control strategies and ethical standards. In other words, it is about 
establishing a social norm in an organisation which accurately defines and 
resists corruption. That norm, in the case of a public agency, must be one 
which serves the public interest. The use of the word 'integrity' is similar to its 
use when describing a building or a bridge as having structural integrity, which 
is to say a robust stability founded in an informed use of physical laws. 
One of the conceptual underpinnings for the approach can be found in 
John Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative shaming (1989) . Braithwaite contends 
that the incidence of deviance is largely governed by the dynamics of shame in 
the community. Hence, if criminal behaviour is nourished by not subjecting it 
to shame, it tends to be encouraged as a group norm. A similar relationship is 
thought to exist between crime in the community and corruption in an 
organisation. 
A key assumption in the organisational integrity approach is that deviance 
stems largely from the nature of the organisation rather than the nature of the 
individual. 
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[Tlhe ability to behave ethically in the workplace may be related more to aspects 
of the organisation than to attributes of the individual (Zipparo 1998: 1 0) . 
It is the inverse of the 'rotten apple theory', which blames corruption on 
the attributes of individuals. If Zipparo is correct, then measures which target 
the individual are less likely to be effective than those which address the 
organisational context in which individuals operate. Corruption must be seen 
in the context of a social organism. The organisational integrity approach seeks 
to achieve high corruption resistance in the way an organisation functions 
according to a clearly defined schema of ethical values. 
Business and government have been learning that failure to manage an 
organisation along ethical lines can have a negative impact on the organisation's 
objectives. For example, if treating employees with care and dignity leads to 
greater levels of customer service, this in turn can lead to a more profitable 
business that enhances shareholder value. For a public company, the root ethic 
might be one of service to shareholders. For a public sector organisation, the 
root ethic must be one of serving the public interest. A group of second order 
ethical values can then be identified such as customer service, sustainable 
development, workplace safety and so on, but they must permeate universally 
the organisation's practices before an observable culture of ethical management, 
based on that particular ethical schema, can emerge. For an organisation to 
operate without corruption, careful selection and promotion of appropriate 
ethical values must be made. 
In the public sector, serving the public interest should be the defining ethic, 
which can be expressed in terms of public duty values. A government agency 
which operates on the Organisational Integrity model will have public duty 
values built in at every level, no matter where and how deeply one drills down. 
For example, for procurement to serve the public interest it must be conducted 
free of the personal interest of those administering the process. Procurement 
policies and procedures must, among other things provide the framework and 
guidance for officials to do their work in such a way that they cannot exploit 
the process for personal gain. The key is to deal with the corruption risks 
integrally with the procurement process. 
In contrast, the interventionist and managerialist approaches see the 
corruption problem as somehow separate and to be dealt with outside the 
procurement process. The difference is between having a fraud control policy 
and ensuring fraud control measures are built in to all policies, procedures and 
plans. Fraud and corruption control is not something to bolt on to a 
procurement system, it needs to be part of the procurement system. 
Organisations which make that leap in thinking across all areas of business 
appear to have the best chance of minimising corruption. 
xxii Corruption and Anti-corruption 
The choice of anti-corruption approaches seems to depend partly on the 
size of an organisation, and can be thought of (following Klitgaard 1988) in 
principal-agent terms. In a very small organisation, say a sole proprietor with 
one or two employees all located together, it is possible and cost effective for 
the owner to ensure her interests are being served by adopting an interventionist 
approach. She can conceivably monitor most or all of her employees' behaviour 
and when an instance of wrongdoing occurs, she can take any necessary action 
to minimise loss. 
Where the organisation is larger and perhaps distributed over more than 
one location, it is not possible for the owner or owners to maintain total 
surveillance and control over all employees' behaviour. However, a managerialist 
approach can be adopted to minimise the range of behaviour which requires 
surveillance and possible intervention. 
A cost-benefit analysis must be applied in the sense that much in the way 
of resources could be spent dealing with threats which in a medium-sized 
organisation might never occur. Falling back on interventionist methods in 
the event of a threat becoming a reality is probably a better use of resources. 
Hence, a suitable combination of these two anti-corruption methods is likely 
to serve best an organisation of medium size and complexity. 
For example, the organisation may be small enough to reserve all purchasing 
decisions for the owners rather than vesting them with employees. This 
managerialist control might prevent gross oversupply frauds, but is less likely 
to be able to stop an employee corruptly leaking valuable information· to a 
tenderer. An interventionist approach is the only practical and cost effective 
al ternati ve. 
In a very large and highly distributed organisation a managerialist solurion 
will not be able to deal with all situations requiring control. A key advantage 
in the organisational integrity approach is that without a clear procedure for 
completing a task correctly, the right decision can be made by the application 
of a previously established global ethical framework. The interventionist model 
caters only for what has happened. The managerialist model caters for what 
might happen but is limited by the imagination and prescience of the system's 
designers. The inherently heuristic nature of organisational integrity, however, 
means the right decision can be inferred even if the problem was never 
anticipated or previously encountered. 
The serving of ethical values needs to merge invisibly into every business 
system from Human Resources to waste management. Organisations which 
exhibit high levels of corruption resistance tend not to be obsessed with the 
rhetoric of fraud and controlling corruption and tend not to approach the 
problem by establishing discrete functional work groups (like anti-fraud 
sections) . Instead, the corruption resistance emerges from the fact that dealing 
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with corruption problems is a seamless part of the core business of the 
organisation. It is but one component, along with others like strong customer 
service values which in turn underpin higher order outcomes and, ultimately, 
stakeholder interests, public or private. Whichever business process one 
examines, at any level of complexity, public duty values must be factored in, 
both explicitly and implicitly, to ensure high corruption resistance in the public 
sector. Organisational integrity means being able to drill down into any part 
of an organisation, to any depth, and see evidence of the guiding ethics, whatever 
they might be. 
A useful comparison is with fractal objects, which have an inherent property 
of self-similarity. Computer generated fractal art became popular in the 1990s 
because, no matter how closely one zooms in on a fractal image, the shape of 
the overall object is reflected in any component part. In a public sector agency, 
when the guiding ethical values of public duty can be observed to be operating 
at any level of inspection, the term organisational integrity can be applied. 
That it can better resist corruption is almost axiomatic. Of course, public 
sector organisations are invariably very complex social organisms. Unpacking 
and describing the precise factors which contribute to high corruption resistance 
is a difficult task and one which varies from organisation to organisation. The 
strength of a building can be described by reference to engineering principles 
based on the laws of physics. In the world of organisational strengthening, 
cause and effect are harder to define. 
Note 
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Good government and 
corruption 
Barry Hindess 
Corruption today is commonly understood in economic terms, in relation 
both to its content (money in exchange for favours) and to its effects (on 
economic growth, development, and so forth). In other historical contexts, 
corruption has been understood more generally and I will raise the question 
of why this narrowly economic perspective has come to be so influential. 
Other chapters in this collection address the issues of how to identify 
corruption and how to deal with it when you find it. The aim of this 
chapter, in contrast, is to stand back from such concerns and to focus instead 
on how we think about corruption, especially in relation to other aspects of 
public life. Along the way I will raise some questions about the links between 
democracy and corruption and suggest ways in which what counts as 
corruption can be seen as a political issue. 
Corruption as an economic issue 
Susan Rose-Ackerman's Corruption and Government (1999) is a useful place 
to start since it presents a particularly clear example of the modern 
understanding of corruption as a predominantly economic issue. With only 
minor variations, her account is one that would be accepted not only by 
the World Bank and other international financial institutions but also by 
many aid agencies. Rose-Ackerman begins by asking why it is that so many 
countries have low or negative rates of economic growth, often in spite of 
the fact that they are well endowed with natural resources or with a highly 
educated labour force . She offers two different but complementary answers. 
One is that such countries have weak and poorly functioning public and 
private institutions. 
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They need institutional reform, but such reform is difficult. Constructing dams, 
highways, and port facilities is technically straightforward. Reforming 
government and nurturing a strong private sector are more subtle and difficult 
tasks that cannot be reduced to an engineering blueprint (Rose-Ackerman 
1999: 1) . 
Not so long ago, the assumption that economic growth requires a strong 
private sector would have been widely disputed, but it is now common 
currency amongst professional economists, and therefore also amongst the 
governments and other agencies that they advise. So too, unfortunately, is 
the economists' disdain for all too many technical skills-such as those 
involved in managing large-scale construction projects-other than those 
of their own profession. 
Her second answer, of course, is corruption, which she understands as a 
condition in which people (politicians, public servants, businesses) use their 
privileged positions in order to pursue economic gain. The problem she 
identifies here is not the pursuit of self-interest as such but rather the manner 
in which it is pursued in such cases-that is, through the use of a privileged 
position. Thus she contrasts the pursuit of self-interest through competitive 
markets-where, she claims, it 'is transmuted into productive activities 
that lead to efficient resource use' -with 'situations where people use 
resources both for productive purposes and to gain an advantage in dividing 
up the benefits of economic activity-called 'rent-seeking' by economists' 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999:2). The problem in this latter case is that rent-
seeking introduces costs and distortions with the result that a country will 
be 'poorer overall if corruption levels are high' (1999:3) . 
Rose-Ackerman also acknowledges, of course, that what counts as 
corruption often depends on the context: 'one person's bribe is another 
person's gift' (1999:5). Her aim is not to deny the reality of such cultural 
differences but rather to point out 'as an economist ... when the legacy of 
the past no longer fits modern conditions' (1999:5). Here, the economist 
presumes to pass judgment over contemporary cultures and practices, 
dividing them up into elements that belong in the 'modern' world and 
those that should be discarded as really belonging in the past. While the 
latter may not always be seen as forms of corruption, the economist's 
perspective tells us that they have much the same effect. 
Why do I think that this view of corruption is far too narrow? I can 
answer by way of a few examples, starting with two taken from recent issues 
of The Washington Post-excerpted in The Guardian Weekly of9 March 2000. 
The first is an article on Brazil's civil and military police which claims that 
'thousands of brutal slayings around the country are being blamed on corrupt 
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civil and military officers' . The second, rather closer to home, refers to 'the 
worst corruption scandal' in the history of the Los Angeles Police 
Department. The Washington Post reports the LAPD's own internal inquiry 
as showing that the problem was caused, in large part, 'by its own poor 
management and a culture of mediocrity-creating the very conditions 
necessary for dirty cops to run wild'. Not surprisingly, the LAPD also insists, 
on the basis of the same inquiry, that 'only a small number of officers were 
directly involved in corrupt and criminal activities' . It is interesting to 
speculate about how much comfort the citizens of the United States could 
be expected to draw from the careful use of the word 'directly' in this last 
extract (how many employees in a large business organisation deal directly 
with its customers?). 
For my purposes, however, what is most striking about these cases is 
that the word 'corruption' is used to describe the police activities in question, 
in spite of the fact that economic gain is obviously not the central issue. 
Even in Washington, home of the World Bank, there are times when it is 
clearly recognised that there is more to corruption than the pursuit of 
financial reward. Rose-Ackerman's treatment of corruption as if it were first 
and foremost an issue of financial gain and economic effect may not deny 
the existence of these other forms of corruption but it does suggest that 
they should be seen as something of a sideline. Thus, one problem with the 
narrowly economistic understanding of corruption concerns the value 
judgments-for example, that a few thousand brutal slayings may be 
ultimately less important than economic growth-which its technical 
language tends to disguise. 
In fact, of course, the value judgments involved here are rather more 
complex than I have just suggested. On the one hand, it is often assumed 
that economic growth itself will reduce the incidence of violence in a society, 
and indeed of corruption more generally. The level of police brutality directed 
against members of the black community in the United States and the 
systematic corruption of the political systems in the most developed 
contemporary societies-Japan and the United States-suggest that this 
assumption may not be well founded. On the other hand, the contrast 
between economic and other forms of corruption-which the economistic 
definition tends to promote-should not be overdrawn. Police brutality is 
commonly directed against union organisers and other leftists, and against 
the poor more generally, and in that respect it has an obvious economic 
significance-although its effects in this regard will often be difficult to 
quantifY. This point brings out another facet of the value judgments disguised 
in the economistic understanding of corruption-the issues highlighted 
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by Rose-Ackerman's discussion are significant, not so much because their 
economic effects are more substantial than those of other forms of corruption, 
but rather because they can readily be analysed using the tools of 
contemporary economic theory. (An unkind critic might go further to 
suggest that, like the police themselves, economic theory often shows a 
marked social bias in its effects). 
Now consider a few other cases of what some might regard as corruption. 
• A government puts pressure on police and judiciary to protect 
its friends and to penalise its opponents. 
• A ruling party appoints judges (at very high salaries) and uses the 
courts to destroy the political opposition. The practice is not 
uncommon, but Singapore is perhaps the best known example. 
• A government acts illegally-that is, against its own laws-in 
order to influence the policies of other governments, to 
destabilise governments that it does not like or to prevent 
unfriendly governments coming to power. All powerful states 
do this-the United States is the best known example simply 
because it is by far the most powerful of all contemporary states 
and, unlike most other states, it has interests in all parts of the 
world. 
• A government uses its powers to discriminate systematically in 
favour of some sections of the population and against others. 
Fiji, Northern Ireland and Quebec are well known contemporary 
examples, but all governments do this to some degree. 
• Politicians and public servants are given high salaries relative to 
most of the population in order to make them less susceptible 
to bribes. This is one of the solutions to the problem of 
corruption canvassed by Rose-Ackerman. Why should one 
suppose that the political and economic effects of having the 
ruling stratum cut off from the majority in this way will be less 
damaging than the effects of bribery? Here, too, it is tempting 
to think that value judgments, rather than evidence and 
argument, may be at work. 
I'll stop here, but it would not be difficult to extend the list of dubious 
political practices. What is significant about these examples is that they 
show how political, how contentious, the idea of corruption can be. Whether 
the practices I've listed are good or bad for the society in question is a 
matter of political dispute, and those who favour the latter view might be 
tempted to describe them as corrupt. But they would not be corrupt in 
Rose-Ackerman's terms. This point brings out yet another facet of the 
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narrowly economistic understanding of corruption, namely, that it focuses 
on issues that are uncontentious. (Here again, as with the police and 
economic theory, an unkind critic might be tempted to suggest that this 
choice too disguises a certain political bias.) 
A broader perspective 
One way of taking a broader perspective on these issues is to go back into 
the history of the idea of corruption. The original, and still the most general 
use of the idea was to identify damaging impurity, some kind of intrusion 
or distortion which prevented something from being as it should-a foreign 
element in a chemical compound or a batch of seeds, stones in a packet of 
rice, talcum powder in cocaine, decay in meat or vegetables. In the case of 
government, then, corruption in its most general sense refers to anything 
that prevents government from being what it should (Euben 1989). 
T hus, Aristotle, one of the earliest and most influential of Western 
political thinkers, distinguishes various forms of government-of oneself, 
of a household, of a slave or of a state-each of which has its own proper 
purpose and its own forms of corruption (1988) . In his view, then, the 
government of oneself is corrupted if one gives in to unworthy desires or 
becomes a slave to one's passions. Again, the government of a household is 
corrupt if, instead of pursuing the interests of its members, the head of the 
household-assumed to be a male in Aristotle's discussion-uses his position 
simply for his own satisfaction. Similarly, if the government of a state pursues 
factional interests rather than the common interests of the community then 
it too should be seen as corrupt. 
Of course, Aristotle's days are long past but this broad understanding of 
corruption continued to be influential in the West well into the modern 
period. Thus, when modern forms of representative government began to 
emerge towards the end of the eighteenth century many people were 
concerned that parties would be divisive and lead to the pursuit of merely 
partisan interests. David Hume, for example, notes that parties are 
plants which grow most plentifully in the richest soil; and though absolute 
governments be not wholly free from them, it must be confessed, that they rise 
more easily, and propagate themselves faster in free governments, where they 
always infect the legislature itself, which alone could be able, by the steady 
application of rewards and punishments, to eradicate them (Hume 1987:55-6). 
T he most notable feature of this passage is its view of partisan politics as 
a damaging infection. This fear of what partisanship might do to government 
is a continuing feature of liberal political thought but, by the end of the 
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twentieth century, the term 'corruption' was no longer used to describe it. 
Another example appears in James Madison's comments on the danger of 
faction, which date from the early debates around the framing of the 
American Constitution. Faction, he tells us, is 
a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the 
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse ... adverse to rhe 
rights of orher citizens, or to rhe permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community (Madison 1857:43). 
Notice that, in Madison's view, a faction might well consist of a majority 
of the population. This raises an obvious issue in the relationship between 
corruption and democracy since it suggests that the people themselves can 
be seen as a major source of governmental corruption. In fact, this view of 
the people has influenced the development of representative government 
in the West (Hindess 2000), where it is designed to limit the influence of 
the people themselves on the work of government, and it has been used by 
states, leaders of coups and the military in many parts of the world. 
But, for the moment, the main points to notice are 
1. that partisanship in government was once seen as a major 
source of corruption and even now, in the West, where political 
partisanship is commonplace, there is still a concern that the 
ruling party or coalition might go too far; 
2. that while 'the common interest' or some such notion may be 
widely invoked, its substantive content is often a matter of 
political dispute, and that partisan groups commonly identify 
themselves as pursuing the common interest while describing 
their political opponents as representing merely factional interests. 
Finally, before moving on to the next section, it is worth noting two 
further uses of the idea of political impurity. One concerns the identification 
of alien groups within the community-Albanians in Serbia, Indians in 
Fiji, Christians in India, ete. The sense of impurity invoked here suggests 
an obvious political solution, namely, 'ethnic cleansing'. This term may be 
a recent invention but the practices it refers to have played a major part in 
the history of the West, as indeed they have in other parts of the world. All 
contemporary Western states, with the partial exception of Britain-which 
engaged in extensive ethnic cleansing in other parts of the world-are the 
products of widespread population clearances (Mann 1999). 
The other usage appears in the anti-elitism of populist politics. The 
underlying message here is that political and other dites pretend to speak 
for the people while actually representing only themselves-they offer a 
distorted representation of the common interest. Populism is often regarded 
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as a kind of extremism but it is actually an endemic feature of modern 
politics- in which the rulers of all states claim to act in the interests of the 
people (Schedler 1997) . Most successful political leaders resort to such 
populist appeals, suggesting that it is their political opponents who are out 
of touch with the people. 
While the word 'corruption' is not often used in these cases, they appeal 
to the same underlying idea of impurity or distortion. I suggested earlier 
that the economistic understanding of corruption may be too narrow, that 
there are important issues which it fails to address. These last two cases 
suggest that there may be dangers in a broader understanding, that the 
invocation of impurity or distortion as something which ought to be 
corrected can sometimes have remarkably destructive effects. It is not obvious 
that 'corruption', in its most general sense, is necessarily a bad thing. 
Why does it matter? 
I have said enough to indicate why the economistic view of corruption 
may be too limited. I have also suggested, in passing, that going in the 
other direction may not be without dangers. But I have said very little 
about how or why this particular understanding of corruption has become 
so influential. Unfortunately, this question raises the more general issue 
of the role of economics in contemporary politics-and that is clearly too 
large an issue to address in a few paragraphs. For the moment, then, let 
me offer just a couple of observations. One, as in fact I have just suggested, 
is that the focus on economic corruption is part of a more general shift in 
governmental thinking over the last 50 years or so-a shift in which 
economic issues have become increasingly important to governments, so 
much so, in fact, that they are now widely seen as the central area of 
government policy. 
The other observation is that development agencies were once content 
to live with a certain amount of corruption-as, indeed, were colonial 
governments before them-but that they have turned strongly against it 
over the last 30 years or so. And they have turned against it, not only in the 
narrow economic sense that I've been disputing, but also more generally. 
Thus, while not describing such issues in terms of corruption, these agencies 
now tend to favour human rights, free and fair elections, and so on. 
This last development might seem to suggest that my critique has been 
misdirected, that the economistic understanding which I have disputed 
has developed alongside a concern for at least some of the issues that I 
would want to include within a broader understanding of corruption. This, 
in fact, returns us to the question of the relations between corruption and 
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democracy which I mentioned earlier, and we should give some attention 
to the links that have recently been drawn between them. 
Democracy was initially understood as one of only three basic forms of 
government. Aristotle, for example, defines a state as 'a body of citizens 
sufficing for the purposes of life' (1988:1275b, 21-2) and he goes on to 
say that the state may be ruled by the one, the few or the many. The last of 
these cases, rule by the many, is democracy. The modern idea of government 
by the people carries a similar sense-it is not a matter of government by a 
King, dictator or military junta. This idea, that the people are the ultimate 
source of political legitimacy for governments, raises one of the broader 
senses of corruption noted earlier: who belongs to the people and who does 
not-and it is partly for this reason that population cleansing has played 
such a prominent part in modern history. 
But Aristotle was far from being an unequivocal supporter of democracy. 
On the contrary, all of the Greek philosophers who have anything to say 
about democracy regarded it as a potential source of a particular kind of 
political corruption-the corruption of government by the people themselves 
(Farrar 1988). The idea here is that government by the people is in danger 
of being dominated by the poor and poorly educated majority, in which 
case it could be expected to reflect their ignorance and their prejudices and 
the ambitions of unscrupulous demagogues. 
In fact, this negative perception dominated Western discussion of 
democracy until well into the nineteenth century (Roberts 1994). When 
modern forms of representative government began to develop around the 
end of the eighteenth century it was not initially seen as a kind of 
democracy at all. It did give the people as a whole a limited role in 
government, and it was seen for that reason as a way of avoiding the kinds 
of corruption associated with rule by a King or aristocracy (government 
by the one or the few) . But, because it gave the people a very limited role 
and left the work of government in the hands of a small minority of 
elected politicians and public servants, it was also seen as a way of avoiding 
the dangers which had traditionally been associated with democracy. The 
identification of representative government with democracy was a 
nineteenth century development, one that involved a radical transformation 
of the earlier meaning of democracy. 
Unfortunately, it soon became clear that, in avoiding one form of political 
corruption, by the people in general, representative government opened 
the way for corruption of others kinds, that is, for the corruption of 
government by professional politicians and public servants-a form of 
corruption which has been the concern of populist politics on the one side 
and of public choice theory and contemporary neoliberalism on the other. 
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In fact, the history of representative government could be written as the 
history of attempts to minimise the effects of the new sources of corruption 
which it creates (Hindess 2000). Populism addresses the issue by attempting 
to replace professional politicians by politicians of a different kind-that 
is, by politicians who profess not to be professionals. Liberalism, inheriting 
the older tradition of distrusting the people, addresses the issue rather 
differently 
1. by instituting a system of checks and balances, rational 
bureaucratic administration, codes of conduct for politicians 
and public servants, independent audits, among other things. 
2. by reducing the temptations in various ways-for example, by 
offering relatively high salaries to elected politicians and public 
servants. 
3 . by reducing the opportunities for corrupt practice by taking 
government out of certain areas and reducing the scope for 
administrative discretion. 
The last two categories are the prime targets of the economistic 
understanding of corruption, and I'll come back to them in a moment. But 
first, we should notice that when the World Bank and other agencies favour 
democracy, what they have in mind is a form of representative government 
that avoids the forms of corruption associated with dictatorship and military 
rule while giving a strictly limited role to the people themselves. 
Let me conclude by observing that, in addition to the issues noted earlier, 
there are grounds for thinking that minimising economic corruption may 
not be the most important issue for government. Consider two possible 
remedies for economic corruption canvassed by Rose-Ackerman. She 
suggests that one way of reducing corruption is to reduce the amount of 
government itself, for example, by privatising government utilities and 
public services or by limiting the extent to which economic activity is 
regulated. Rose-Ackerman focuses on the advantages of such developments 
but they also have disadvantages, and it is far from clear that the former 
will outweigh the latter. There are, for example, well known problems 
associated with the process of privatisation itself-developments in Russia 
since the end of communist rule provide Western media with the most 
flagrant examples. There are equally well known problems of a decline in 
certain kinds of standards as a result of privatisation or a reduction of 
administrative regulation-safety, security of employment, service to less 
wealthy customers and so forth. My point here is not that privatisation is 
necessarily bad or that state provision and state regulation are always good. 
It is simply that minimising certain kinds of corruption should not be the 
only concern, and it is not obvious that it will always be the most important. 
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Another suggested remedy is to ensure that professional politicians and 
those working at higher levels of the public service receive salaries that are 
competitive with those in private business. The assumption here, which 
seems to me prima facie implausible, is that the better off will be less 
susceptible to bribery. But, even if it does have the desired effect, this remedy 
has the consequence noted earlier of creating a significant income gap 
between a cadre of professional politicians and senior public servants on 
the one hand and the majority of the population on the other. It leads, in 
other words, to another version of the problem of faction. 
This last point brings us back to the older, more general view of 
corruption noted earlier. In contrast to this view, the economistic 
understanding of corruption seems both too narrow and too narrowly 
technical. It is too narrow because a focus on minimising the extent of 
economic corruption can obscure-and may sometimes exacerbate -more 
general problems in the workings of government. It is too narrowly technical 
because the identification of these more general problems depends on how 
we identifY the common interest-and that, as we have seen, is commonly 
open to dispute. Thus, to treat the problem of corruption as if it were really 
amenable to technical solution is also to ignore the fundamentally contentious 
character of political life. 
2 
Research 
A tool for buildi ng corru ption resistance 
Angela Gorta 
With the increasing attention that is being given to corruption 
internationally, calls to 'combat the cancer of corruption' or to 'stop the 
scourge of corruption' have become more frequent. In order to begin to 
control corruption two basic questions need to be addressed 
• where does one start in order to attack corruption? 
• how does one start to attack corruption? 
There are many possible answers to these questions, depending on one's 
understanding of the causes and manifestations of corruption, resources 
available and the legislative framework within which one is operating. 
The 'hidden' nature of corruption means that much corruption remains 
undetected. T his, in turn, highlights the importance of seeking to intervene 
before the corrupt conduct has been reported. More proactive methods of 
preventing future corruption (that is, how to increase corruption resistance) 
are required to supplement the investigation of reports of corruption once 
they are received. 
This chapter illustrates how the NSW Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) has used empirical research methods to improve efforts 
to build a more corruption-resistant public sector by identifYing where and 
how to intervene. T he basic theme of this chapter is that the more information 
one has about corruption the better equipped one is to prevent it. 
The NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption 
The New South Wales (NSW) Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC)l was established in March 1989 to expose and minimise 
corruption in the NSW public sector. It seeks to promote high standards of 
integrity in public administration. All public officials2 in NSW government 
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departments, statutory bodies and local councils, as well as judges, 
magistrates and elected officials fall within the ICAC's charter. Its jurisdiction 
also extends to those in the private sector and the general community when 
they deal with the public sector. 
The ICAC has three main statutory functions, 
• to investigate allegations of corruption-investigating and 
reporting on matters in order to expose and deter corrupt 
conduct and discover the deficiencies in systems and procedures 
which allowed the conduct to occur 
• corruption prevention-reducing opportunities for corruption 
by advising and working with public sector agencies on improve-
ments to procedures, policies, work systems and ethical culture 
• education-educating the community and the public sector 
about the proper conduct of those in public office, the 
detrimental effects of corruption and the benefits which flow 
from action to reduce corruption. 
In addition to these statutory functions, the ICAC uses empirical research 
as a tool to help it better understand corruption in the NSW public sector. 
ICAC research extends the information base on which the three statutory 
functions are carried out by conducting original empirical research on 
corruption and related issues, providing research support for major 
investigations, monitoring and/or evaluating anti-corruption initiatives, and 
providing the link to researchers working in related areas. 
Such research might take the form of surveys or focus groups to discover 
public sector or community views. It might also involve an analysis of the 
existing academic literature. The research methodology is critical to its 
effectiveness. For example, survey samples are selected in such a way that 
results (from a relatively small portion of the public sector) can be generalised 
to the entire public sector. Care is taken in the design and administration 
of any surveys to minimise the possible impact on the results of the study 
being conducted by the ICAC. For example, 
• some ICAC surveys have stressed their focus on exploring the 
range of personal views held about corruption (thus, there are 
no right or wrong answers) 
• responses are returned directly to the researchers rather than 
through senior officers where respondents work 
• respondents are assured that neither they nor their employers 
could be identified at any stage. 
ICAC researchers are able to access operational information that would 
not be available to other corruption researchers such as those working in a 
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university. ICAC research enables decisions about corruption-resistance 
strategies to be based on tested propositions rather than anecdotal evidence 
or untested assumptions about public sector behaviour. 
Through this multi-strategy approach (of investigation, corruption 
prevention, education and research), the ICAC seeks to make the NSW 
public sector more resistant to corruption. 
What is corruption? 
While people agree that 'corruption' is bad and most can nominate examples 
of corruption, there is no one agreed definition of what constitutes 
corruption. There is a very large literature about different definitions of 
corruption (for a summary of this literature see, for example, Gorta and 
Forell 1994:4-24; Independent Commission Against Corruption 
1997 a:22-32) . 
The literature distinguishes different types of definitions of corruption. 
'Formal definitions' (such as those provided in legislation, government 
guidelines and codes of conduct) frequently do not correspond to 'social 
definitions' (such as community and workplace views about what is corrupt) . 
Even at the formal level, no one definition of corruption is universally accepted. 
It has been argued that public opinion or social definitions are more 
salient in governing behaviour than are formal definitions. As has been 
repeatedly observed (Hollinger and Clark 1983; Werner 1983; Johnston 
1986; Greenberger, Miceli and Cohen 1987), the influence of co-workers' 
attitudes on the behaviour of employees is significant. Hollinger and Clark, 
for example, have stated 
. .. these empirical results confirm ... rhat employee deviance is more constrained 
by informal social controls present in primary work-group relationships than by 
rhe more-formal reactions to deviance by those in positions of authority wirhin 
the formal organisation (1983: 126) . 
The definition of corruption used by the NSW ICAC is provided in 
sections 7-9 of the ICAC Act (1988) . It should be noted that the main 
role of these sections is to define the ICAC's jurisdiction-the range of 
conduct on which the ICAC can focus-rather than to clarifY for the broader 
community what is meant by the term 'corruption'. 
Broadly speaking, 'corruption', as specified within the ICAC Act, is the 
conduct of any person that adversely affects the honest and impartial exercise 
of the functions of NSW public officials. Corruption involves the misuse of 
public office. It also involves the misuse of information gained while 
performing public office. Commonly it involves the dishonest or biased use 
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of power or position resulting in one person being advantaged over another. 
The ICAC definition of corruption takes into consideration the seriousness 
of the conduct. Only matters that amount to a criminal offence, a disciplinary 
offence, or conduct which would warrant a dismissal would be considered to 
be corrupt conduct by the ICAC. The lCAC definition includes the behaviour 
of private sector employees or community members if that behaviour is aimed 
at subverting a public official's performance of his/her public duty. 
The Importance of dividing 'corruption' into its specific forms 
It is common for commentators writing about the problem of corruption 
and causes of corruption to discuss it as if it were a single phenomenon. 
'Corruption', however, is a term which encompasses many different forms 
of misuse of power or misuse of office. It is not a single issue, nor a single 
problem. For example, the term corruption can be used to describe 
behaviours as varied as bribing an inspector to license an unqualified person 
to operate machinery that might put lives in danger, theft of office resources 
for use at home, and police assisting criminals to commit crimes. In order 
to be able to begin to reduce corruption, it is important to have a clearer 
target (or targets) than the broad, nebulous concept of 'corruption'. If 
'corruption' is viewed as a single problem it seems too large and amorphous 
to tackle effectively. 
In their attempts to minimise crime, criminologists advocate taking a 
crime-specific approach in order to tailor prevention strategies (Gorta 
1998a) . For example, one would not use the same strategies to minimise 
shoplifting as one would to reduce physical assaults. The same is the case 
for minimising corruption. If corruption is viewed as a single problem it 
obscures the fact that specific strategies are best employed to deal with 
different forms of corruption. In order to combat corruption it is important 
that specific forms of corrupt conduct which pose the most serious risks (to 
the area of interest-or example, state/organisation/process/country) are 
identified. Until one has some understanding of what forms corruption 
takes and how it comes about, one can do little to control it. 
Since there is no well-defined or universally-accepted taxonomy of 
different types of corrupt conduct, the first step is to identify a useful 
classification system for different types of corrupt conduct. The ICAC has 
used research techniques to establish a categorisation system for coding 
allegations of corrupt conduct to enable it to analyse patterns in the 
information it receives. This classification system involves summarising each 
allegation by pairing an area of workplace activity (for example, 'tendering', 
'development applications', 'licensing', 'use of government information') 
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with a type of corrupt conduct (for example, 'bribery', 'misuse or theft of 
public resources', 'favouritism'). Hence allegations are summarised in pairs 
such as 'favouritism in tendering', or 'bribery in licensing'. This is one 
method that the ICAC uses to clarifY the specific forms of corruption that 
occur in the NSW public sector. 
Finding out about corruption 
In order to decide where best to intervene one needs to understand the 
nature of the corruption which is or may be occurring. 
This is made difficult by the hidden nature of corruption. Corrupt 
activities tend to be carried out in secret with few witnesses. Unlike the 
victim in many forms of criminal conduct (for example, robbery or assault) , 
the potential victim of corruption is unlikely to know that it has occurred. 
Figure 2.1 provides an outline of how one might obtain information 
about potential corruption. This figure also illustrates how the corruption 
which does occur is filtered, with only some being reported. As is evident 
from this diagram, opportunities and motivation must exist for corruption 





the corrupt conduct is witnessed or detected in some other way 
the conduct is labelled as 'corrupt' 
the witness decides that it is worth taking action about the 
conduct 
• that action includes reporting the conduct. 
One possible strategy to improve our understanding of the nature of 
corruption is to analyse the allegations received about corrupt conduct (see 
item 9 on the flowchart). Reports of corruption that are received by anti-
corruption bodies such as the ICAC are, however, only a subset of all of the 
corruption which occurs. The reported allegations of corrupt conduct are 
those that are more easily detected and labelled as corrupt. Hence that 
which is reported is not representative of all the corrupt conduct which occurs. 
The 'hidden' nature of corruption means that the examination and 
investigation of individual allegations of corruption, while important, is 
not sufficient to prevent future corruption. Any strategy that relies solely 
on investigating and prosecuting individuals who have been reported as 
engaging in corrupt conduct is disadvantaged by the necessity fo r corruption 
first to have occurred, be detected, and then identified as 'corrupt' before it 
can be tackled. Such a strategy is also limited because it can never detect all 
those who are acting corruptly. 
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Figure 2.1. Finding out about corrupt conduct 
1. Do opportunities and motivation for 
corrupt conduct exist? 
Yes No 
No corrupt 




4 . Is the conduct identified as 
J corrupt? 
Yes 













7. Is the conduct 
reported to IGAG 
under 8 .11? 
Yes No 




8. Is the conduct I 













Gorrupt conduct not J 
known to IGAG 
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One consequence of the hidden nature of corruption is the importance 
of intervening before the corrupt conduct has been reported. Other more 
pro active methods of determining strategies to prevent corrupt conduct, 
such as undertaking empirical research, are required to supplement the 
investigation of reports of corruption once they are received. 
The outline depicted in Figure 2.1 provides suggestions for identifying 
where to intervene before the corruption occurs to make the public sector 
more resistant to corruption and for making more visible the corrupt conduct 
which does occur. The process depicted in Figure 1 suggests that areas to 
explore in order to improve our understanding of corruption and to promote 
corruption resistance in the NSW public sector include 
• opportunities and motivations for corrupt conduct to occur (see 
item 1 in the flowchart in Figure 2.1) 
• making corruption more observable (item 3) 
• making it easier to identify corrupt conduct (item 4) 
• promoting action against corrupt conduct (item 5). 
The sources of information used by ICAC research to explore these areas 
are described in the following section. 
Types of research conducted by the ICAC 
ICAC research uses a variety of approaches to aid efforts at building 
corruption resistance. 
Considering the employees' perspective. The ICAC has found that surveys 
of employees' views can contribute to the formulation of strategies which 
assist in minimising corruption. 
Employees' views are important for several reasons. Personal beliefs about 
corruption (social definition) have been found to have a greater impact than 
legislation or organisational policy documents in determining which types 
of conduct people identifY (item 4 in Figure 2.1) and respond to as corrupt 
(item 5 in Figure 2.1). If people do not recognise an activity that they 
witness, or participate in, as 'corrupt', or at least as 'undesirable', then they 
are unlikely to take action against it. If they do recognise the behaviour as 
'corrupt', but believe that, for example, such behaviour is appropriate given 
the circumstances, they are also unlikely to attempt to change their behaviour. 
Since employees are in the best position both to engage in corrupt 
conduct and to witness any corruption that takes place at work and take 
action about it, it is important to consider their attitudes and beliefs. 
Examples of the use of this approach can be found in Coulter (1999), Gorta 
and Forell (1994, 1995), Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(2000a), Zipparo (1997a, 1997b), and Zipparo and Cooke (1999). 
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Identifying and disseminating strategies that some managers have found 
useful. Another strategy is to learn from those who have experience in 
attempting to minimise corruption. Drawing on the experience of those 
who have successfully fought corruption within their agencies (items 3 to 6 
in Figure 2.1), advice can be disseminated to others in the public sector. 
This can p ropagate useful new strategies for reducing corruption and 
promote discussion of how best to minimise corruption. An example of the 
use of this approach can be found in Zipparo, Cooke and Bolton (1999). 
Learning from others by reviewing the literature. Although corruption 
research is still in its infancy, there is already extensive material on factors 
contributing to corruption. Along with related areas of literature, such as 
those pertaining to ethical behaviour, crime prevention and organisational 
change, this material can provide a basis for identifying corruption risk 
factors (item 1 in Figure 2.1), and shaping corruption-resistance strategies 
(Gorta 1998a, 1998b; Zipparo 1998). 
Analysing the types of allegations of corruption made to the ICAC. Soon 
after an allegation is received, the ICAC assesses the merits of investigating 
each matter individually. Analysis of aggregated allegations (item 9 in Figure 
2.1) can usefully supplement the assessment of individual matters. The 
analysis of aggregated allegations to determine patterns and trends is 
important because it provides a mechanism for identifying public sector 
corruption risk areas and corruption-related issues that are relevant to a 
range of different agencies. It also enables the identification of agencies for 
whom the issues examined in specific investigations will be relevant . 
Examples of such analysis can be found recent ICAC annual reports 
(Independent Commission Against Corruption 1999b, 2000b) . 
Fostering com munity awareness and support for the min imisation of 
corruption. Based on the belief that a community which refuses to accept 
corruption is an important element in the fight against public sector 
corruption, community attitudes surveys can provide an informed basis for 
attempts to enhance public sector corruption resistance. 
The ICAC collects information for these surveys through telephone 
interviews with a random sample of approximately 500 NSW adults. Each 
of the ICAC community attitude surveys conducted to date has contained 
two sets of questions- the first exploring general attitudes and perceptions 
about corruption, and the second seeking information about awareness of, 
and support for, the existence of the ICAC (Independent Commission 
Against Corruption 1994, 1995, 199Gb, 1997b and 1999a). 
Over the years these surveys have explored a range of issues, including . 
• perceptions of the effects of public sector corruption 
• opinions of what is considered acceptable in the public sector 
compared with what is considered acceptable in the private sector 
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• attitudes to corruption 
• awareness of possible responses to corruption 
• attitudes to reporting corruption, and 
• factors which would affect people actually taking action against 
corruption. 
Examples of findings from such surveys include the finding that the 
majority of community members believe that they, as ordinary members of 
the public, are able do something about corruption in the NSW public 
sector and that they were most likely to make the effort to take action 
about corruption when they perceive the corruption affects them or their 
family (Independent Commission Against Corruption 1996b). 
For any individual project, the type of research conducted by the ICAC 
depends upon the nature of the questions to be answered. It may include 
quantitative or qualitative empirical research and/or research us ing 
information from primary or secondary sources. As noted earlier, the research 
methodology is crucial to its effectiveness. ICAC research might take the 
form of 
• surveys or focus groups with public sector employees or 
members of the community 
• literature reviews to determine what can be learnt from the 
work of others 
• analysis of the types of allegations of corruption made to the 
ICAC. 
Some lessons from the research about how and where to intervene 
ICAC research assists in building a more corruption-resistant public sector 
by identifYing strengths to build upon and areas where further attention is 
required. Examples of identified strengths and areas for intervention are 
discussed below in terms of the following questions. 
• What assists in the conduct being identified as 'corrupt'? 
• How can taking action against corrupt conduct be promoted? 
• What promotes an ethical culture? 
• How does one to start to build corruption resistance more 
generally? 
What assists in the conduct being identified as 'corrupt'? 
As stated earlier, individual public sector employees' perceptions of what is 
considered to be corrupt impact upon the perpetuation of corrupt practices. 
If people do not recognise an activity as 'corrupt' , or at least as 'undesirable' 
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or 'harmful', then they are not likely to attempt to change the behaviour. 
Examples of some of the identified strengths available for the NSW 
public sector to build upon when communicating about corruption include 
the fact that the majority of public sector employees 
• do not restrict their definition of what may be corrupt to that 
which is prohibited by law (73 per cent in 1999) (Gorta and 
Forell 1994; Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(forthcoming) ) 
• do not accept rationalisations that something cannot be called 
corrupt if everyone does it (94 per cent in 1999) or that the ends 
justifY the means (79 per cent in 1999) (Gorta and Forell 1994; 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (forthcoming)) 
• do not condone petry theft from the government (92 per cent 
in 1999) (Gorta and Forell 1994; Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (forthcoming)) . 
Some examples of the areas identified through the research as possible 
places for intervention, together with the specific research findings follow. 
Lessons from ICAC research 
ICAC research has found that it is important to foster a common definition 
of what is corrupt in order to address the current lack of shared 
understanding by 
• identifYing and addressing 'grey' areas where employees are 
unsure of the appropriate behaviour 
• focusing on the consequences or harmfulness of the behaviour 
as a useful educational strategy for communicating messages 
about corruption 
• identifYing, then challenging, explanations used to excuse or 
ignore corrupt behaviour 
• providing specific training to address the needs of those 
participating in selection panels 
• addressing educational messages across all subgroups of public 
sector employees. 
Furthermore, public sector agencies should raise the awareness among 
contractors of the public sector's ethical expectations when these contractors 
are engaged to undertake public sector work. 
Research findings on which lesson is based 
ICAC surveys have 
• found that NSW public sector employees differ in the rypes of 
behaviours that they consider to be corrupt. Thus, what any 
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one public sector employee understands as 'corrupt' may not be 
shared by his or her colleagues. This research finding suggests 
that, when communicating to employees, it is not enough to 
have messages such as 'this organisation does not tolerate 
corruption' or 'report corruption'. Such messages leave open the 
response 'Yes, I know corruption should not be tolerated-but 
what I am doing isn't corrupt, it is just. .. '. A prior step to 
using these messages is to foster a common understanding 
throughout the organisation of what 'corruption' is. 
• identified some behaviours where respondents were not clear 
whether or not the behaviour should be labelled as 'corrupt' 
(for example, in the case of theft with mitigating circumstances 
and for scenarios where rules were not followed yet a 
'reasonable' outcome was reached). 
• found that the perceived harmfulness of the behaviour was the 
variable which most frequently and best distinguished between 
those who consider a behaviour to be corrupt and those who do 
not. These results suggest that corruption, as an abstract term, 
is understood when translated into the more tangible context of 
the consequences of the behaviour 
• provided insight into the criteria and justifications some public 
sector employees use when considering which behaviours are 
corrupt. For example, some respondents equate corruption with 
breaking the rules-as long as procedures are followed the 
behaviour cannot be corrupt; some suggest that if there is no 
personal gain the behaviour cannot be corrupt. ICAC surveys 
have also found a clear link between considering the behaviour 
as justified and the choice to do nothing about that behaviour 
(Gorta and Forell 1994, 1995; Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (forthcoming)). The literature on 
corruption and workplace crime indicates that, where an 
organisation does not clearly specifY what is acceptable, there is 
more scope for employee deviance, including corruption 
(Homing 1970; Cressey 1986; Mirrlees-Black and Ross 1995; 
Hollinger and Clark 1983). 
From the scenarios used in one survey, recruitment stood out as an area 
of decisionmaking in need of further attention in order to minimise 
corruption risks. Approximately one-third of the respondents considered 
that it was not corrupt to use one's public sector position to get a friend a 
job, irrespective of the respondent's experience in recruitment. This 
perception is inconsistent with the NSW public sector recruitment system 
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which seeks to go fairly to the market, get the best person available, and 
leave no room for corruption or unfair advantage. Hence this perception 
needs to be addressed in both agency policy and training for those who 
participate in recruitment panels (Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (forthcoming)). 
The relative unimportance of background characteristics of respondents 
in influencing perceptions of the scenarios and attitudes to what is corrupt 
suggests that educational messages and corruption resistance strategies should 
be directed across all subgroups of public sector employees (Gorta and Forell 
1994, 1995; Independent Commission Against Corruption (forthcoming)). 
Public sector rules are more likely to be perceived as negative or pointless 
by contractors engaged to undertake public sector work when there is a 
lack of understanding about the relationship of those rules to public duty 
and ethical work practices (Zipparo and Cooke 1999). 
How can taking action against corrupt conduct be promoted? 
In order to build a corruption-resistant public sector, public sector 
employees must be aware of the options for taking action and be prepared 
to take such action if they witness workplace misconduct. 
Among the strengths available for the public sector to build upon when 
responding to potential workplace misconduct are that 
• the majority of NSW public sector employees (86 per cent) 
indicated that they considered it their responsibility to report 
corruption (Zipparo 1997 a) 
• ICAC survey results strongly refute the notion that any 
reluctance to report corruption is due to peer pressure or that 
the Australian culture is opposed to reporting corruption 
(Gorta and Forell 1994; Zipparo 1997a, 1997b; Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (forthcoming)) 
• the majority of public sector employees believe that it is worth 
reporting corruption both because something can and 
something will be done about it (Gorta and Forell 1994; 
Zipparo 1997a, 1997b; Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (forthcoming)) 
• those in a position to take action (that is, supervisors, those in 
the higher salary categories, those who participate in 
recruitment and tender selection) are the ones who are most 
likely to believe that something can and will be done about 
corruption (Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(forthcoming) ) 
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• those with some experience in particular areas of work (such as 
recruitment and tendering), and therefore more likely to be in a 
position to observe corruption in such work, are more likely to 
say that they would report the behaviour within their 
organisation than those without such experience (Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (forthcoming)) 
• public sector employees are less likely to believe that people 
who report corruption are likely to suffer for it than they were 
in the past (Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(forthcoming)) . 
Lesson from ICAC research 
The basic steps to equipping employees with a capacity to act if they witness 
workplace misconduct is for individual agencies to ensure that 
• they have reporting mechanisms in place 
• these reporting mechanisms include protection for those who 
use them 
• they inform all employees of the existence of these internal 
reporting mechanisms and how they work, about external 
reporting channels available to the employees, and about the 
Protected Disclosures Act 1994, paying particular attention to 
induction training. 
Management needs to take, and be seen taking, effective action against 
corrupt behaviour (including systemic change) in order to convince 
employees of the value of reporting corruption. 
An organisational culture must be created in which employees feel safe 
to report corruption. 
Research findings on which lesson is based 
Each of the following was seen as a definite or likely deterrent from reporting 
corruption. 
• Absence of formal reporting channels (by 55 per cent of the 
public sector employees surveyed). 
• Not knowing anyone they could trust to whom to make a 
report of corruption (71 per cent). 
• Lack of legal protection from negative consequences (76 per cent). 
• Not being sure if their identity would be kept confidential (65 
per cent) 
• Not having enough proof (82 per cent) (see Zipparo 1997a). 
A lack of knowledge of how to report corruption was found to be related 
to negative attitudes toward reporting corruption (see Zipparo 1997a, 1997b). 
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Recent survey results identified that it is those who are not supervisors, on 
lower salaries, and who have been employed for shorter periods, who consider 
that they are most in need of information about how and where to report 
corruption (Independent Commission Against Corruption (forthcoming)). 
The belief that there is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful 
will be done about it is a major deterrent to reporting corruption. Thus, if 
people are to be encouraged to take action about corruption, they must feel 
that their contribution will make a difference to the situation. While safe 
reporting channels are necessary, they are not sufficient (Gorta and Forell 
1994, 1995; Independent Commission Against Corruption (forthcoming)) . 
Not being sure if their report of corruption would be taken seriously 
was seen as a definite or likely deterrent from reporting corruption by most 
of the public sector employees surveyed(61 per cent) (Zipparo 1997a). 
Not being convinced that making a report will help to stop corruption 
was cited by 53 per cent of the public sector employees surveyed as a major 
deterrent to reporting (see Zipparo 1997 a). 
Managers acknowledged that being seen to punish perpetrators is 
extremely important for setting the tone of what is acceptable behaviour in 
organisations. On the other hand, those who perceive that their organisation 
does nothing about corruption say this sends a clear message to staff that 
corruption is acceptable to the organisation (Zipparo, Cooke and Bolton 
1999). 
Behaviours associated with the workplace being perceived as being honest 
include appropriate action being seen to be taken when wrongdoing is 
reported and appropriate action being taken against those who act 
dishonestly (Independent Commission Against Corruption 2000a). 
One-third of public sector employees did not believe that their 
organisation would respond appropriately to a report of corruption and 54 
per cent did not know whether their organisation was serious about 
protecting them from negative consequences if they were to make a disclosure 
(Zipparo 1997a). 
Significantly fewer employees in 1999 than in 1993 agreed that people 
who report corruption are likely to suffer for it. The substantial number 
still agreeing with this statement suggests, however, that significant work 
remains for public sector managers to create organisational cultures in which 
employees feel and are safe to report corruption (Gorta and Forell 1994, 
1995; Independent Commission Against Corruption (forthcoming)). 
Lack of faith in how their organisation might handle reports was 
associated with employee perceptions that dishonest behaviour occurred in 
their organisation and that it was likely to go unpunished (Independent 
Commission Against Corruption 2000a). 
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What promotes an ethical culture? 
Corruption occurs within a context. Some aspects of organisational culture 
facilitate corruption, others impede it. The lessons summarised above outline 
some of the steps to promote an organisational culture which impedes rather 
than facili tates corruption. The material which follows describes some more 
general lessons about promoting an ethical culture. 
A literature review was undertaken to examine empirical evidence (as 
opposed to merely stated opinion) of how ethical culture impacts on the 
efficient functioning of an organisation as well as to identify which 
organisational factors impact upon ethical culture (Zipparo 1998). T his 
analysis revealed that emphasising ethical work practices has a positive 
impact on the efficient functioning of an organisation. For example, it was 
found that the ethical tone of an organisation impacts upon efficiency and 
effectiveness, decisionmaking processes, employee commitment and job 
satisfaction, employee stress, and employee turnover. From this analysis of 
the literature, it was also apparent that, when it comes to making workplace 
decisions, aspects of the organisation appear to have more influence on the 
individual's ethical behaviour than do the individual's personal values. This 
provides a very positive message in terms of the capacity of organisations to 
influence the behaviour that occurs within them. 
Lesson from ICAC research 
A number of strategies for promoting ethical culture wthin an organisation 
can be derived from ICAC research. T hese include 
• examining the organisational culture since the ethical culture of 
an organisation is critical to its performance. 
• focusing on the example set by management. 
• identifing corruption risk factors within the organisation, 
educating people within the organisation about these factors , 
and taking actions to minimise the risk. 
• using tools such as codes of conduct and clearly stated values to 
communicate the organisation's ethical stance 
Research findings on which lesson is based 
Organisational culture and ethics research has shown that the ethical tone 
of an organisation impacts upon efficiency and effectiveness, decisionmaking 
processes, staff commitment and job satisfaction, and reduces staff stress 
and staff turnover (Zipparo 1998). The organisation has the potential to 
make an ethical person act unethically or an unethical person behave ethically 
(Zipparo 1998). 
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ICAC survey results confirm the importance of creating a workplace 
which emphasises and demonstrates ethical behaviour. Perceptions of an 
ethical workplace were found to be related to positive outcomes, such as 
staff saying they had better work relationships, greater job satisfaction, were 
less fearful to speak out, and were less likely to leave the organisation 
(Independent Commission Against Corruption 2000a). 
In building an ethical culrure, public sector managers advocate that 
'tone at the top' is important. Appropriate behaviour must start at the top 
of the organisation and be transmitted down the hierarchy. The consistent 
and overwhelming message from public sector managers was that corruption 
prevention strategies require thought, effort and commitment from the top 
of the organisation (Zipparo, Cooke and Bolton 1999). 
In this respect, public sector managers considered targeting education 
strategies towards CEOs and General Managers to be important, in addition 
to having education strategies for all other levels in the organisation (Zipparo, 
Cooke and Bolton 1999) . 
Behaviours associated with the workplace being perceived as being honest 
include supervisors and senior executives being seen to act honestly and 
practise what they preach, encouraging and emphasising honest behaviour 
in the workplace, treating all staff fairly and equally, and supervisors allowing 
staff to make decisions about how to conduct their own work and encouraging 
new ideas from staff (Independent Commission Against Corruption 2000a). 
The most critical aspect of creating an ethical workplace is the behaviour 
ofleaders (both senior executives and managers). The perception that leaders 
were honest was associated with staff having positive perceptions about 
colleagues, their job, and the workplace as a whole (Independent 
Commission Against Corruption 2000a). 
Corruption risk factors are of interest because they present possible points 
of focus for corruption-resistance strategies. A review of the literature revealed 
the following corruption risk factors. 
• The nature of the work performed, such as discretion exercised 
by position, position in the organisation and whether the work 
or service performed is associated with delays. 
• Working conditions, such as the disputed role of salary and its 
relationship to need, lack of benefits for remaining with the 
employer, employee dissatisfaction, work pressures. 
• Individual histories and dependencies, such as ethical 
decisionmaking history, dependence on employer, dependence 
on alcohol, drugs and gambling. 
• Organisational culture, such as unclear messages about what is 
acceptable, attitudes of colleagues, example set by management, 
lack of reinforcement of ethical behaviour, other work practices. 
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• Other organisational factors , such as failure to identify the 
behaviour as wrong; existence, knowledge and perceptions of 
organisational reporting mechanisms; employee responsibility; 
organisational history in dealing with reports of corruption. 
Other factors which affect whether action is taken against corruption, 
include individual beliefs about responsibility for taking action, beliefs about 
reporting being the appropriate thing to do, beliefs about whether benefits 
outweigh any costs, whether the employee has direct and convincing 
evidence of the wrongdoing, whether the wrongdoing is considered to be 
serious, whether the wrongdoing directly affects the employee (Gorta 1998b) . 
Survey results revealed that knowledge about codes of conduct, values, 
rules and procedures was related to employee perceptions that their 
organisation placed a strong emphasis on the importance of working 
honestly, had high levels of honesty among the executive, supervisors and 
staff, handled reports of wrongdoing appropriately, treated staff in a fai r 
manner, and had values that matched their own (Independent Commission 
Against Corruption 2000a). 
Public sector managers considered that it was important to have a written 
set of expectations (such as codes of conduct) that all staff are aware of in 
order to communicate the policies and standards set in the organisation 
(Zipparo, Cooke and Bolton 1999). 
More general lessons on building corruption resistance 
By exploring the crime prevention literature (Gorta 1998a), both general 
and specific lessons for minimising corruption were identified. In general 
terms, the crime prevention literature advocates taking an informed approach 
to corruption minimisation by understanding the process of engaging in 
corrupt conduct. Understanding the offender's perspective and considering 
different types of corruption separately are two strategies suggested to 
facilitate understanding the factors which underlie corrupt conduct. By 
examining individual types of corrupt conduct separately, those seeking to 
minimise corruption are better placed to tailor prevention techniques to 
match the various types of corruption. 
Examples of some of the specific lessons for building corruption resistance 
which can be learnt from the crime prevention literature include 
• not making assumptions that just because someone holds a 
particular position or has a particular background that they will 
be corruption-free 
• asking offenders why they undertook the corrupt activity in 
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asking offenders about how they undertook the corrupt activity 
in order to understand in detail the process leading to the 
corrupt conduct and the necessary and sufficient conditions, ill 
order to identifY how and where to intervene in order to 
optimise the likelihood of prevention 
asking offenders whether they considered what they did 
acceptable and, if they did, why they did, in order that 
justifications can be identified and subsequently challenged 
after obtaining a better understanding of the dynamics and 
mechanics of corrupt conduct, consideration should be given to 
what recognised crime prevention technique, or set of 
techniques, might be most applicable to preventing a given 
type of corruption. 
Conclusions 
The basic theme of this chapter is that the more information and the better 
understanding one has about corruption, the better-equipped one is to 
prevent its occurrence. In order to combat corruption one needs to try to 
understand what forms it takes and how it comes about. Empirical research 
techniques provide methodologies for informing corruption-resistance 
strategies. 
This chapter has illustrated the types of research the ICAC undertakes 
to inform efforts to minimise corruption in the NSW public sector and the 
reasons for such research. In particular, the following approaches are 
suggested as ways of informing corruption minimisation strategies 
• consider the employees' perspective 
• identifY and disseminate strategies which other managers have 
found useful 
• learn from others by consulting the literature 
• analyse trends and patterns in allegations of corruption 
• determine community awareness and support for the 
minimisation of corruption. 
There are common themes which arise from the different ICAC research 
studies, undertaken using different methodologies. These common themes 
include the need 
• 
• 
to foster a common understanding of what behaviour is corrupt 
to identifY and then challenge the rationalisations used to 
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for management to take, and be seen to take, effective action 
against corrupt behaviour 
for management to be committed and set an example 
to put effective and safe reporting mechanisms in place within 
organisations and inform employees about these reporting 
channels 
• to examine organisational cultures and promote ethical culture. 
When considering these research results in a broader context, it is 
important to recognise that the survey findings are based on samples (of 
public sector employees, private contractors or members of the community) 
from one Australian state. The public sector employees' views, no doubt, 
reflect their experiences in working in the NSW public sector and their 
knowle.dge of how allegations of corruption have been dealt with, within 
that arena, in the past. Despite this quite specific focus, many of the lessons 
from the ICAC's research work have broader implications. Over and above 
the specific research findings, you might also find helpful the broader concept 
of using research techniques to better understand different forms of 
corruption and how they come about in order to assist you build corruption 
resistance. 
Notes 
I The I CAC is based in Sydney, New South Wales (NSW). NSW has a population of 
approximately six million people, and an area of 801,428 square kilometres, and is 
the most populous state in Australia. 
2 Excluding police officers, whose conduct falls within the jurisdiction of the Police 
Integrity Commission. 
3 
An international human rights 
approach to corruption 
Zoe Pearson 
Corruption is a phenomenon that appears to be increasing throughout the 
world. It is a problem that affects both developed and developing countries to 
varying degrees, depending on the extent and type of corruption. There is a 
vast literature on the subject of corruption. Much of it approaches the problem 
from an economic or a political viewpoint, and the resulting analyses of the 
causes, effects and solutions to corruption reflect this approach. Corruption is 
viewed as having a deleterious effect on the economic growth and development 
of a country. This conclusion is generally accepted despite the limited empirical 
data. Corruption is also seen as a contributing factor to ongoing inequalities, 
whether in developed or developing countries. 
It is important to extend the way in which corruption is analysed. It is 
argued here that current approaches that view corruption as exclusively an 
economic and political issue are inadequate and fail to give significance to the 
effect of corruption on people's lives and their rights. This chapter examines 
the effect of corruption on fundamental human rights. It argues that tolerance 
of corruption by states results in breaches of human rights and that existing 
international human rights mechanisms may therefore be useful in the fight 
against corruption. It does not propose the establishment of new human rights. 
Essentially, the fight against corruption and the fight for protection of human 
rights both rest on the need for accountable, representative government 
committed to equality and transparency. 
The current approach 
General issues and approaches to corruption 
Corruption is a phenomenon that human societies have experienced and 
attempted to overcome for thousands of years (Alatas 1990; Morgan 1998). 
30 
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A1atas notes that the problem of corruption can be traced to the beginnings of 
humankind's social interaction and the development of social organisations. It 
is a problem that appears to be widespread. Despite the limited empirical 
evidence, most of the literature refers to corruption as being 'both pervasive 
and significant' throughout the world (Shleifer and Vishny 1993:599). It is 
important to emphasise that corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, 
experienced in both developed and developing countries. However, both the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank note 
that the causes and effects of corruption vary from country to country, 
depending on the prevailing social, economic and political conditions (World 
Bank 1997b; UNDP 1999). Nye (1967:418) comments that while corruption 
is certainly not limited to developing countries, 'the conditions of [developing] 
countries are such that corruption is likely to have different effects than in 
more developed countries'. 
While corruption and the campaigns against it are not new, the problem 
of corruption is emerging as an important global issue requiring global action. 
Glynn et al. comment that 'this decade is the first to witness the emergence 
of corruption as a truly political issue eliciting a global political response' 
(1997:7). Elliott, too, notes an increase in international action concerned 
with corruption this decade, with policies emerging to combat corruption 
from bodies such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the World Bank (IBRD), the United 
Nations (UN) , the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) , and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (Elliott 1997b:2-3). In addition, the growth of the 
non-governmental organisation Transparency International (TI) since its 
establishment in 1993 has been an important force in increasing the awareness 
of corruption as an international problem. Despite the limited empirical 
evidence on levels of corruption, the success and growth of international 
action against corruption indicates that there is real concern about corruption 
as an international issue. 
T he reasons for this increase in international awareness and action on 
corruption are varied. Commentators point to the increase in globalising 
tendencies as an important influence in the growth of awareness of corruption, 
with the increased interrelatedness of countries making corruption harder to 
hide (George et al. 1999). The end of the Cold War is also thought to have 
contributed to the emergence of corruption as an international issue (Glynn et 
al. 1997). Much of the literature discusses the increasing international 
integration in economic and trade arenas as important influences (Elliott 1997b; 
Joongi and Jong 1997). Other commentators point to the spread of values of 
democracy, and the increase in expectations of the accountability and 
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transparency of states as influential (World Bank 1997a; Elliott 1997b) . The 
increase in awareness of the importance of protection for human rights may 
also be a significant influence. The changing nature of the media in response 
to increased demands for transparency in the public arena, and the increased 
opportunities fo r communication due to advances in technology are also 
regarded as being important (Glynn et al. 1997; George et al. 1999). Glynn 
et al. believe that 'a new global standard appears to be taking shape in human 
consciousness, with potentially major ramifications for our institutions as 
well as our political and business lives' (1997:8). 
Definitions 
Definitions abound for corruption and nearly all mention the difficulties 
involved in formulating a definition. Gould (1991 :467) notes that 'corruption 
has no single definition. It varies from region to region and remains largely 
contextual' . The World Bank (1997b) suggests that part of the reason for the 
difficulty in defining corruption lies in the complexity of the concept. 
Corruption is a phenomenon that may refer to many different human 
activities and behaviour in differing circumstances. As the causes and effects 
of corruption are different depending on the context of the country, it is 
perhaps not surprising that a single comprehensive definition that covers all 
the manifestations of corruption is difficult to formulate . As the Council of 
Europe notes, the result is that 'no precise definition can be found which 
applies to all forms, types and degrees of corruption, or which would be 
acceptable universally as covering all acts which are considered in every 
jurisdiction as contributing to corruption' (World Bank 1997b:20) . The fact 
that corruption is studied from several different disciplines, including 
economics, law, sociology, political science and anthropology also contributes 
to the variety of definitions (Morgan 1998). 
As a result of the difficulties of arriving at a universal definition, Morgan 
(1998) notes that much of the literature adopts a minimalist definition, 
concise and broad enough to be of use in most instances of corruption. The 
definition provided by the World Bank and also by Transparency International 
is an example of this, where corruption is defined as 'the abuse of public 
office for private gain' (World Bank 1997b: 13; Transparency International 
website). Other institutions and authors have adopted similarly broad 
definitions (Morgan 1998:11-12). For the purposes of this chapter, such a 
broad definition of corruption will be adopted. It is worth noting that in 
most of these broad definitions, the focus is on corruption in the public 
sector, although there is recognition that corruption may also be present in 
the private sector. This may occur as a result of individuals engaging in corrupt 
behaviour within private companies for their own interest, and also as a 
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result of individuals engaging in corrupt behaviour with public entities for 
their own private benefit. As the World Bank comments, 
the problem of corruption lies at the intersection of the public and private 
sectors. It is a two-way street. Private interests, domestic and external, wield 
their influence through illegal means to take advantage of opportunities for 
corruption and rent seeking, and public institutions succumb to these and 
other sources of corruption in the absence of credible restraints (l997a:102) . 
A distinction is often drawn between grand corruption and petty corruption. 
While grand corruption involves high public officials making corrupt decisions 
on large public contracts, petty corruption is generally said to involve public 
servants obtaining small extra payments-sometimes known as 'speed money'-
from the public in return for the performance of their official duties (UNDP 
1999). This chapter examines corruption as a systemic issue, and will thus 
consider the broader effects of corruption as a prevalent phenomenon, rather 
than concentrating on the differences between grand and petty corruption, 
both of which form a part of the larger picture of corruption within a society. 
The broad definition can then be broken down further, distinguishing types 
of corruption by where it occurs (private or public sector), how it occurs (by 
extortion or consent), its intensity (high or low levels, depending on institutional 
mechanisms, governmental constraints and public tolerance of it), its prevalence 
(isolated or systemic occurrences), and what it involves (bribery, theft of assets, 
distortion of government expenditure, patronage, cronyism) (Morgan 1998:27-
38; UNDP 1999:7-9; World Bank 1997b:13-15). Other distinctions are made 
depending on whether the corruption is local or national, personal or 
institutional, traditional or modern (Morgan 1998). In addition, distinctions 
are often also made in the literature between economic corruption and political 
corruption, though the two are necessarily often interlinked. Morgan comments 
that 'all of these various ways of dividing the concept of corruption into 
categories offer varying degrees of utility in identifying causes, consequences, 
and solutions. They suggest that the type of corruption determines the prognosis 
for solving the problem' (1998:12-13). 
An examination of definitions of corruption often leads to discussion as to 
whether the definitions are universal across all cultural contexts. Morgan asks 
whether anti-corruption efforts represent a uniform standard of good 
governance or a misguided effort to impose subjective standards and values on 
countries and cultures where they are inappropriate (Morgan 1998: 13). There 
is much discussion in the literature about the effects of cultural values and 
differing legal traditions and customs on whether certain practices are regarded 
as corruption. Due to these cultural differences, it is often argued that what 
constitutes corruption may differ between countries. For example, the literature 
notes that in some countries it may be customary to give a gift as part of a 
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transaction, a practice which may often be regarded as bribery in other countries 
(Larmour 1997; Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 1994; Joongi and Jong 1997; 
UNDP 1999). However, some authors set out a clear distinction between gift-
giving and bribery, noting that gifts are ceremonial, of a nominal value and 
presented in the open, compared to bribes which are secretive and often 
substantial (Alatas 1990). Larmour notes comments by a Nigerian Head of 
State, that 'the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded. The value is usually 
in the spirit rather than the material worth. It is usually done in the open, and 
never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an embarrassment and it is 
returned' (Obasanjo quoted in Larmour 1997:3; UNDP 1999:8). Rose-
Ackerman notes that often the critique of imposition of values is a 
mischaracterisation of local practices. She comments that many scholars of 
developing countries 'make it clear that traditions of gift giving do not translate 
into widespread acceptance of corrupt practices' and that widespread acceptance 
of corruption is not common (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 177). However, issues of 
cultural relativity remain. Joongi and Jong comment, in the context of bribery 
as a form of corruption, that 'to create an international consensus to end the 
practice of bribery, these cultural differences cannot be disregarded and must 
be considered. Any efforts against international bribery will remain a contentious 
issue unless the fears that these cultural differences might be ignored in the 
process are allayed' Ooongi and Jong 1997:557). 
Causes, effects and solutions 
Due to the complexity of the phenomenon of corruption it is hardly surprising 
that the literature identifies many varied causes of corruption. The World Bank 
notes that the causes of corruption 'are always contextual, rooted in a country's 
policies, bureaucratic traditions, political development, and social history' 
(World Bank 1997b: 14). Morgan summarises several widely accepted causes, 
noting that different methodological approaches identifY different causes for 
corruption (Morgan 1998:13-15). At least three general classes of causes are 
identified: ethical or cultural causes (such as the changes to religious beliefs 
and public morality, the conflicts between traditional practices and colonial 
institutions), economic causes (examining the economic incentives for officials 
to act corruptly, and economic reasons for the private sector to tolerate, and 
engage in, corruption), and political causes (examining political systems and 
institutions, where weaknesses can lead to breakdown of formal rules and 
systems and lead to greater opportunities for corruption). There is also a growing 
approach in the literature that recognises that the causes of corruption are 
complex and interrelated, consisting of factors to do with institutional 
structures, civil liberties, governance, economic policies, country characteristics-
including size-and existing inequalities between citizens (Morgan 1998). 
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Just as the causes of corruption are complex and varied, so too are the 
effects. Much of the literature approaches this issue from a political or economic 
viewpoint, looking at the consequences of corruption on a country's political 
or economic wellbeing. One of the primary foci in the literature is on the 
effect of corruption on the economic development of a country. In the past 
there has been limited empirical data, which has resulted in much theorising 
about whether corruption was in some circumstances good for the economic 
development of a country (Morgan 1998; Mauro 1997). However, more 
recently, emerging empirical studies have begun to show a negative correlation 
between corruption and long-term sustainable development. In particular, the 
work of Mauro indicates that corruption can slow development rather than be 
beneficial (Mauro 1997:83-107; Morgan 1998). Thus, there is increasing 
consensus on the negative effects of corruption on economic development 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Morgan 1998). 
Commentators point to the similarly negative effect on the strength and 
legitimacy of political institutions, and the consequences associated with this 
Oohnston 1997:61- 82) . For example, some authors note the effects of corruption 
on electoral processes and outcomes, and the subsequent political practices 
resulting from this (Etzioni-Halevy 1989:287-304). Nye notes that possible 
negative effects of corruption on governments include instability, reduction of 
administrative capacity, loss oflegitimacy, waste of government resources and 
investment distortions (Nye 1989:967-73). The World Bank is also studying 
the links between good governance and development, especially with regard to 
anti-corruption (Kaufmann et al. 1997, 1999). One of the most widely 
discussed consequences of corruption on political and economic wellbeing is 
the distortion of government expenditure caused by corruption. This often 
results in public money being spent on large-scale projects-typically military 
or infrastructure projects-rather than on necessary public services such as 
health and education. The rationale behind this is that with large-scale expensive 
projects, more opportunities are presented for corrupt use of the funds (Mauro 
1997, 1998; Morgan 1998). Related to this, the literature also notes that 
corruption exacerbates inequalities and poverty within societies. However, due 
to limited empirical data, these effects are not explored much beyond general 
statements (Elliott 1997b; Morgan 1998; UNDP 1999). As Morgan (1998:20) 
comments, 'additional empirical work to further develop our understanding 
of this complex issue is imperative. Understanding the full consequences of 
corruption is an important step in its eradication'. 
The solutions to combat corruption suggested in the literature are similarly 
varied. The strategies used will necessarily be different depending on the type 
and cause of the corruption. Morgan (1998:20) notes that 'once the types of 
corruption and its determinants have been identified for a specific situation, 
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anti-corruption reform is a two-step process. Policies must be developed that 
address the fundamental causes of corruption, not just symptoms. Then the 
political will must be created to implement reforms' . In deciding on ways to 
combat corruption, there is therefore a recognition that at the heart of the 
problem of corruption is the issue of good governance (UNDP 1999). Rose-
Ackerman comments that 
combating corruption is not an end in itself. The struggle against 
malfeasance is part of the broader goal or creating a more effective 
government. Reformers are not just concerned with corruption per se but 
with its distortionary effect on development and society. Widespread 
corruption is a sign that something has gone wrong in the relationship 
between the State and society (l997b:34) . 
As a result of the focus on the economic and political consequences of 
corruption, the strategies that are commonly developed to combat corruption 
also adopt this approach. Morgan (1998:21) sets out the key strategies: 'serious 
and sincere commitments to counter corruption involve comprehensive 
institutional or administrative reform, reform of economic policy, legal or judicial 
reform, and in extreme cases of patronage and cronyism, reform of the political 
system'. Much of the literature discusses how to prevent officials from engaging 
in corrupt practices, through methods such as increasing the risks of getting 
caught, increasing the punishments involved for corruption, and limiting 
discretion of officials (Rose-Ackerman 1997b:46-55). This is also addressed at 
the international level with the development of new international agreements 
containing mechanisms to monitor and combat corruption of foreign public 
officials in the fields of international commerce and trade (Pieth 1997:119-31). 
Corruption as an issue in the international arena 
International action to combat corruption is very recent. Pieth notes that while 
some unsuccessful efforts began to develop international action on the subject 
in the 1970s, the topic of corruption has long been regarded as taboo due to its 
sensitivity (Pieth 1997; Klitgaard 1988). However, there have been several 
developments among international organisations this decade that have brought 
the issue of corruption onto the international agenda. One of the first initiatives 
to combat corruption on an international scale was the OAS Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption, which was adopted in Venezuela in 1996. This 
Convention recognised the negative effects of corruption and the importance of 
coordinated efforts to combat it, and it has been widely adopted by the members 
of the OAS.1 In addition, in 1997, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Program 
for Cooperation in the Fight Against Corruption, which sets out guidelines to 
implement the Convention and to combat corruption, working in four areas: 
legal, institutional, international, and civil society (OAS website) . 
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Another important development in the international arena has been 
the development of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions . This 
Convention was signed and adopted by the OECD in December 1997, 
after several years of negotiation and discussions, and came into force on 
the 15 February 1999. The Convention has now been signed by all 29 
OECD countries as well as five non-OECD countries. Currently, 18 of 
these have ratified the Convention and the rest are in the process of 
ratification and implementation of new domestic legislation .2 Australia 
has recently enacted legislation to incorporate the Convention. The 
Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) Act No. 
43 of 1999 came into force on 17 December 1999. The Convention 
represents an important part of the international effort to criminalise bribery 
in international business deals. 
The United Nations has not played a major role in development of 
international instruments to combat corruption. Early attempts by the UN to 
address corruption as an international effort were stifled due to the lack of 
agreement and the atmosphere of distrust that prevailed at the time (Pieth 
1997). However, the UN has remained part of the debate and has made efforts 
in its various forums and bodies to investigate and take steps to combat 
corruption. In 1996, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a Declaration 
Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions 
(Res.51/191, 16 December 1996) . In addition, UNGA also adopted an 
International Code of Conduct for Public Officials in 1996, which recognised 
the seriousness of the problems posed by corruption and the importance of 
international cooperation in action against corruption (Res.51/59, 12 December 
1996). Such resolutions are important in signifYing broad political agreement 
in the international community. In 1997, UNGA adopted another resolution, 
on International Cooperation Against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions (Res.52/87, 12 December 1997). George et al. 
(1999:39) note that it 'is by far the most extensive and significant declaration 
in support of the criminalization of bribery in international commercial 
transactions'. The most recent UNGA resolution concerning corruption-
Action Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions-reaffirms the previous resolutions on corruption in international 
commercial transactions, and calls for national and international action against 
corruption by states (Res.53/176, 15 December 1998). All of these UNGA 
resolutions were adopted without vote. In addition, several UN programs and 
projects recognise the importance of addressing corruption as part of their 
programs. In particular, the UNDP takes an integrated and holistic approach 
to addressing corruption in its programs (UNDP 1999). 
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To date, the World Bank and other international financial institutions have 
been reluctant to address corruption as an issue. This reluctance is due largely 
to these institutions' perception of themselves as politically neutral, the 
limitations of their charters, and because of the sensitivities of many of their 
member states (UNDP 1999; Pieth 1997). Recently, however, this reluctance 
has changed, and both the IMF and the World Bank have increased their 
efforts to develop policies to combat corruption. This is welcome, as these 
institutions have long been linked with corrupt behaviour associated with their 
schemes and projects (Pieth 1997; UNDP 1999). The World Bank's approach 
to corruption is concerned only with the economic causes and effects of 
corruption. Due to the limits of its legal mandate, the Bank cannot concern 
itself with 'the exercise of State powers in the broad sense but specifically with 
the appropriate management of the public sector and the creation of an enabling 
environment for the private sector' (World Bank 1997b:24). The Bank sees 
itself as therefore limited to helping to design and implement government 
programs, by advising on economic policy reform and strengthening 
institutions, and also providing support in international efforts against 
corruption (World Bank 1997b). The IMF is also developing policies to combat 
corruption, one of which denies financial assistance to countries where 
corruption is likely to undermine economic recovery programs. The IMF has 
also recently adopted guidelines concerning its role in governance and 
promoting transparency and accountability in the public sector. The WTO 
has similarly begun to address corruption, with the establishment of a working 
group in 1996 focusing on transparency in government procurement (UNDP 
1999; George et al. 1999). 
Transparency International has had a major influence on increased action 
in the international arena in the fight against corruption. Transparency 
International's approach is to build national, regional and global 'coalitions', 
consisting of involvement of the state, international institutions, civil society 
and the private sector, to fight national and international corruption. It is 
founded on the principles of participation, decentralisation, diversity, 
accountability and transparency. Importantly, Transparency International does 
not seek to target individual cases of corruption, but rather to focus on building 
and supporting systems to combat corruption. The influence of Transparency 
International through its national chapters and its international conferences 
has been significant, both through increasing public awareness of corruption 
and through working with other international organisations to develop policies 
to combat it. Another important contribution of Transparency International 
has been the development of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which 
provides an indication of the levels of corruption believed to exist within 
countries. More recently, an important development by Transparency 
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International is the Bribe Payers Index (BPI) which provides an indication of 
levels of corrupt practices engaged in by transnational companies abroad. 
Empirical data 
As previously noted, one of the principal difficulties in discussing corruption 
is limited empirical data showing the prevalence and levels of corruption, and 
the effects that corruption has on countries. While this makes exact 'proof' of 
the levels and effects of corruption difficult, corruption is nevertheless widely 
accepted as a common phenomenon. It is recognised that measuring corruption 
is notoriously difficult owing to the nature of the phenomenon-corrupt 
behaviour is inherently secretive, which makes gathering empirical evidence 
difficult, if not impossible. Despite these difficulties, however, increasing 
numbers of empirical studies are emerging that attempt to measure levels and 
effects of corruption (Elliott 1997b:241-44), 
Perhaps the most widely referred to is the Transparency International CPI, 
an annual report of Transparency International, which, in 1999, ranked 99 
countries according to the perceived levels of corruption in the country 
(www.transparency.org), The CPI has been described as a 'poll of polls' and 
draws upon a large number of independent organisations' surveys of expert 
and general public views of the extent of corruption in many countries around 
the world. A number of countries are not included, however, due to insufficient 
availability of reliable data, and Transparency International stresses that it is an 
index of perceptions of corruption rather than a direct measurement of precise 
data. Importantly, Transparency International notes that the CPI shows that 
'corruption is by no means perceived to be a plague confined to the developing 
countries. Numerous countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe 
have very low rankings, while a number of leading industrial countries have 
scores that highlight the serious corruption problems that they must address' 
(www.transparency.org). The CPI is useful because it broadens the awareness 
of corruption, stimulates anti-corruption reform and influences the policies of 
international organisations, aid agencies and multinational corporations. 
In addition to the CPI, Transparency International recently released a new 
index, the BP!. This index provides a ranking of 19 leading exporting countries 
in terms of the degree to which their corporations are perceived to be paying 
bribes abroad in order to win business opportunities. The BPI involved a survey 
in 14 leading emerging market economies.3 The survey involved questioning 
senior executives at major companies, chartered accountancies, chambers of 
commerce, major commercial banks and law firms in each of the 14 emerging 
market economies about their perceptions of the levels of bribes being offered to 
their countries by corporations from abroad (www.transparency.org). The BPI 
is significant in that it attempts to show the responsibility and the role that 
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industrial countries play in international anti-corruption efforts. Transparency 
International comments that 'the CPI only points the finger at the recipients 
of bribery. TI has always felt that this was inadequate, particularly since it does 
not reflect the responsibility of exporting countries for international corruption. 
The 1999 BPI is the first attempt to address this' (www.transparency.org). The 
BPI highlights the responsibility of industrial countries to take action to stop 
transnational corporations in their countries from engaging in corrupt 
behaviour abroad. The BPI is therefore a monitor of the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
Why combat corruption? 
There has been some disagreement about the importance of combating 
corruption. Some authors have claimed that corruption may in some cases be 
desirable, facilitating and benefiting the development of a country (Morgan 
1998). This view considers that corruption improves the efficiency of the 
country by providing a way around unnecessary, cumbersome regulations and 
bureaucratic delays. It is also seen as beneficial as it supplements the incomes 
of officials who may otherwise be poorly paid. This sort of view, however, is 
becoming less prevalent, as emerging empirical studies suggest that there is a 
negative correlation between corruption and the development of a country 
(Morgan 1998). The World Bank comments that such arguments are focused 
on the short term and therefore fail to take into account any objective other 
than enhanced efficiency in the short term. There are not only direct costs of 
corruption-diversion of money-but also indirect negative consequences, 
costly in the long term (Morgan 1998). The World Bank notes that in the long 
run, 'the results are likely to be costly in terms of economic efficiency, political 
legitimacy, and basic fairness' (World Bank 1997b:15). Such arguments also 
fail to address the underlying issue of what causes corrupt practices in the first 
place- the essential underlying structural inequalities and distortions within 
society that lead to corruption (Ward 1989). 
Hence, there appears to be more of a consensus on the need to develop 
policies and measures to combat corruption, both in the literature, and also 
increasingly in practice at the national and international levels. While debates 
continue at the academic level about the definitions of corruption and on 
aspects of cultural relativity, it seems clear that corruption is a hindrance to the 
development and prosperity of a country. 'Governments can no longer deny 
its pernicious effects. Debunking this myth has been a crucial first step for 
building political will for any anti-corruption policy' (Morgan 1998:25; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993:600). There is much discussion in the literature as to the 
possible benefits of eliminating corruption in countries, and these differ in 
emphasis depending on the discipline from which they come. On a general 
An international human rights approach 41 
level, much of the literature focuses on the possibilities for increased 
development of countries. There is also focus on the opportunities for 
countries-and for the poor especially-arising from escaping the distortions 
of government expenditure on public services and infrastructure that are created 
by corruption. Those involved in business and trade anticipate benefits from 
the efficiencies of a corruption-free system, such as increased certainty in 
business transactions and increased opportunities for investment Qoongi and 
long 1997). 
Possibly one of the most important reasons for combating corruption is 
the fundamental change in government that is required in some cases. 
Corruption is often associated with a lack of good governance: unrepresentative, 
autocratic, unstable and illegitimate regimes (Gould 1991; UNDP 1999). 
Corruption is often seen as essentially resulting from a bad system, rather than 
solely due to the influence of corrupt people in the system (Klitgaard 1988; 
Gould 1991). As Euben notes' . . . corruption is a disease of the body politic. It 
has less to do with individual malfeasance than with systematic and systemic 
degeneration of those practices and commitments that provide the terms of 
collective self-understanding and shared purpose' (1989:222-3). Much of the 
focus of the literature is on fighting corruption to improve good governance. 
Raising the standards of governance is thought to lead to many benefits for 
countries, especially in terms of economic, political and social development 
(UNDP 1999). It is seen as necessary for recognition of fundamental human 
rights, the rule oflaw, strengthening of institutions, political participation and 
strengthening of civil society and democracy (Ruzindana 1997; UND P 1999). 
Much emphasis is also placed on the importance of strong leadership in efforts 
to combat corruption and promote good governance (Ruzindana 1997). 
Fighting corruption and promoting good governance is therefore crucial to 
developing an environment that facilitates the social, political and economic 
development of people within a country. 
The inadequacies of current approaches 
As previously noted, while corruption has been present in various forms in 
societies worldwide for thousands of years, it is only recently that coordinated 
efforts have begun at the international level to address the issue, and to discuss 
causes, effects and possible international solutions to the problem. Previously, 
the discussion of corruption as an international issue, both in the literature 
and in the international political arena, was negligible. It seems to have been 
regarded as a taboo matter (Pieth 1997). Until the mid 1970s, any analysis of 
corruption had a national focus (LeVine 1989). This appears to have been 
largely due to corruption being viewed as a domestic political issue which was 
the responsibility of individual states to address (LeVine 1989:686; Perry, 
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1997:36). Linked with the approach of regarding corruption as a national 
issue, there continue to be arguments that regard such international action as 
an unacceptable imposition of ' Western' values and customs on countries (Rose-
Ackerman 1999; Pieth 1997). This continues to create tensions between 
developed and developing countries. As a result, Myrdal (1989:406) notes 
that the result is a certain 'general bias that we have characterized as diplomacy 
in research. Embarrassing questions are avoided by ignoring the problems of 
attitudes and institutions ... The taboo on research on corruption is, indeed, 
one of the most flagrant examples of this general bias'. 
This 'diplomacy in research', in addition to the general diplomatic approach 
on the international political level of non-interference with other state's domestic 
policies on corruption, has meant that the issue of corruption as an international 
problem was slow to be addressed. However, the enactment in 1977 of the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the subsequent attempts by the United 
States to get corruption on the international agenda marked the beginnings of 
an international movement to combat corruption. This 'opened a Pandora's 
box which much of the world-particularly those countries most affected by 
the revelations-would have preferred to have remained closed. On the other 
hand, the new transnational corruption, once revealed, had to be recognized 
for what it was-a new and dangerous challenge to the stability and predicability 
of the international market' (LeVine 1989:687) . Increasingly, the focus turns 
to the responsibility and role of states in combating corruption, both internally 
and externally, for it is the efforts of states on the national and international 
level that are crucial in the elimination of corruption. 
However, the examination of anti-corruption efforts by states remains 
limited, and to some extent a 'diplomacy in research' still exists. The current 
literature and action in the international domain approaches the causes, effects 
and solutions to corruption from largely an economic or political viewpoint. 
To some extent this reflects international practice in general, where consensus 
and action is more common and more readily arrived at in economic areas. 
In addition, much of the corruption literature and international action focuses 
on the actions of government officials only, and how to make these actors 
more accountable . For example, the OECD Convention focuses on 
combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
conventions; the four UNGA instruments concern adoption of an 
international code of conduct for public officials, and resolutions and a 
declaration concerning action and cooperation against corruption and bribery 
in international commercial transactions; and the World Bank's mandate is 
restricted to the economic causes and effects of corruption. Focusing solely 
on the actions of public officials often obscures the underlying wider 
responsibility of states to provide an environment in which corruption is 
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not tolerated or condoned. The role of the state therefore seems marginalised, 
and the analysis restricted to economic concerns. 
These approaches and strategies towards combating corruption are entirely 
valid and certainly necessary. The above comments are not intended to imply 
criticism of the usefulness of this approach per se. However, it is proposed here 
that this approach alone is inadequate. There is insufficient examination in 
the literature of the responsibility and role of the state to prevent corruption, 
both directly-by not engaging in corrupt behaviour through its officials-
and indirectly-by not condoning an environment that tolerates or encourages 
corrupt behaviour by others. While current approaches address corrupt 
behaviour of officials and how to prevent and punish this sort of corruption, it 
is also important to address the corruption of the system as a whole that tolerates 
or condones corrupt behaviour, and to analyse the role and responsibilities of 
the dominant actor in this system, the state. 
While general statements are often made about the effect of corruption on 
poverty and development, there is no explicit recognition that corruption is 
more than just wealth misappropriation or abuse of power. The effect of 
corruption on people's rights and needs has largely been left out of the 
corruption debate. There is little direct reference to human rights in the 
Preamble to the OECD Bribery Convention (,Considering that bribery .. . raises 
serious moral and political concerns, undermines good governance and 
economic development, and distorts international competitive conditions'); 
little in the Preamble to UNGA Resolution 51159 of 1996 adopting a code of 
conduct for public officials ('Concerned at the seriousness of problems posed 
by corruption, which may endanger the stability and security of societies, 
undermine the values of democracy and morality and jeopardize social, 
economic, and political development'); and no mention in the Preamble to 
UNGA Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions 511191 of 1996. There is little reference to human 
rights concerns in the Preamble to the UNGA Resolution on International 
Cooperation Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions 52/87 of 1997 ('Convinced that such practices undermine the 
integrity of State bureaucracies and weaken social and economic policies by 
promoting corruption in the public sector, thus diminishing its credibility'); 
and only some mention in the UN GA Resolution on Action Against Corruption 
and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions 53/176 of 1998 
('Concerned at the seriousness of problems posed by corruption, which may 
endanger the stability and security of societies, undermine the values of democracy 
and morality and jeopardize social, economic, and political development') . 
The preamble to the OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 
does make reference to the conviction that 'corruption undermines the 
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legitimacy of public institutions and strikes at society, moral order and justice, 
as well as at the comprehensive development of peoples', and of 'the need to 
strengthen participation by civil society in preventing and fighting corruption' . 
The UNDP has also recently begun to consider the effect of corruption on 
governance. Overall, however, there is little reference to human rights in the 
corruption literature and in international action and instruments against 
corruption. Given the importance of human rights discourse in international 
law, an examination of corruption from a human rights perspective may shed 
some new light on the corruption debate, and provide some impetus for the 
way forward in anti-corruption efforts. 
An alternative approach 
A human rights approach 
The growth of human rights discourse in international relations over the last 
50 years has been impressive and is now universally recognised as a prominent 
aspect of international law. While there remain disagreements on aspects of 
the human rights jurisprudence, there is no longer debate on whether it is a 
legitimate subject for discussion between states (DFAT 1998). The basis of 
international human rights law rests upon the International Bill of Rights as 
the cornerstone of the human rights system, comprising the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UD HR), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These three instruments contain the 
fundamental rights and freedoms that are recognised as being universal in 
nature and essential to the enjoyment oflife by all people. The two Covenants, 
which are binding on states that ratifY them, have been widely accepted by the 
international community. One of the most important results of the development 
of the notion of universally applicable international human rights standards 
has been the recognition that human rights are a legitimate international 
concern. 
Since the development of the UDHR, human rights have been regarded as 
inherent (that is, applying as a result of a person's humanity, rather than 
bestowed), inalienable (that is, cannot be taken or given away), and universal 
(that is, applying equally to all persons, regardless of race, nationality, status, 
sex, religious beliefs, and so on) (UDHR; DFAT 1998). There has been much 
discussion in the literature as to the relationship between the rights contained 
in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Much has been made of the categorisation of 
the rights contained in the Covenants, and whether there is a hierarchy of 
rights. However, there is an increasing body of jurisprudence that takes a broad 
approach to human rights and argues against the categorisation of rights. This 
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approach argues that the rights contained in the two Covenants are indivisible, 
interrelated and interdependent. The Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action that were adopted at the Vienna World Conference of Human Rights 
in 1993 supports this approach and it is the approach endorsed by many 
countries, including Australia (DFAT 1998). This approach recognises that the 
values contained in the Covenants cannot be protected in isolation from each 
other, but that a more holistic approach should be taken in recognition of the 
interdependent nature of these rights and in the pursuance of the goal of human 
rights discourse-that of the pursuit of human dignity. Scott comments that 
[a] general conceptual analysis of human rights ... should be approached with 
sustained attention to the underlying humanity of human rights and to the 
reality that human experience rarely confines itself to neat categories, much less 
highly abstract ones . .. By breaking out of overly rigid categories, human rights 
analysis can better focus on the underlying interests that rights should serve to 
protect .. . and the kinds of harm, practices, and systems that have historically 
generated the need for a discourse on human rights (1999:636-7). 
T he approach that is taken in this chapter is to transcend the categorisation 
of rights under the two Covenants, and to group the rights contained in those 
Covenants into categories that concentrate on people's inherent needs. There 
is no intention of suggesting that these groupings are in any way rigid, as the 
rights contained in the Covenants may be categorised in any number of ways. 
It simply represents an attempt to break from the rigid dichotomy drawn 
between the ICCPR and the ICES CR. This is useful for the purposes of this 
chapter, which explores human rights aspects of the complex phenomenon of 
corruption. The groupings serve as a productive way to examine how the 
fundamental needs of people are affected by corruption, and therefore how their 
rights are affected also. The groupings of rights used in this chapter are as follows 
1. Rights to affiliation 
• right to self-determination 
• right to freedom of association 
• right to freedom of cultural belief and practice 
• right to freedom of religion 
2. Rights to life, bodily health and integrity 
• right to freedom from torture 
• right to life, liberty, security of person 
• right to an adequate standard of living 
• right to health and wellbeing 
3. Rights to political participation 
• right to freedom of expression 
• right to vote 
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4. Rights to non-discrimination and the rule of law 
• right to a fair trial and recognition as an equal person before 
the law 
5. Rights to social and economic development 
• right to just and favourable conditions of work 
• right to education. 
Examining a topic through a human rights lens involves focusing on the 
effects that a policy or practice has on the fundamental rights of people. It 
involves recognition that people have inherent rights, the protection of which 
must have consideration in states' policies and practices. It also involves 
examination of these policies and practices to determine their effectiveness or 
otherwise in protecting human rights. Therefore, this involves attention to the 
role and responsibilities of states in the creation of an environment that is 
conducive to the protection of human rights. Ultimately, for the successful 
prevention and elimination of corruption, it is necessary for the system as a 
whole to be involved. Transparency International notes that this must mean 
'the involvement of all the stakeholders which include the State, civil society 
and the private sector' (Transparency International website). Moving from an 
economic and political perspective on corruption to a human rights approach 
involves shifting from viewing corruption as being a misappropriation of wealth 
and distortion of expenditure (that is bad for the economic and political stability 
of a country), to viewing corruption and the tolerance of corruption by states 
as also being a breach of fundamental human rights (due to the deleterious 
effects corruption has on people and on the state's ability to enforce these 
rights). Using the discourse of human rights enables the effects that corruption 
has on the ordinary person-especially in his/her contact with the state-to 
be recognised. Too often, the sufferings of people as a result of corrupt practices 
are hidden behind vague euphemistic statements of development and poverty 
levels that fail to draw national or international attention and stimulate the 
necessary action. It is proposed here that, by examining the human rights cost 
of corruption, added weight is given to anti-corruption efforts, as well as to 
human rights protection. A human rights approach to corruption provides an 
existing international procedural framework on which to base action against 
corruption to achieve minimum standards of protection of rights (HRCA 1995). 
This chapter examines whether the generally recognised causes of corruption 
and the effects on people can be regarded as breaches of fundamental human 
rights, as grouped loosely into the categories broadly representative of necessary 
human needs. The issues that arise from recognising the role of states in 
tolerating corruption, both on the national and international levels, and the 
responsibility of states towards developing effective national and international 
mechanisms to combat corrupt behaviour are also important. Despite the 
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limitations of the empirical data, there is an understanding that the phenomenon 
of corruption is widely recognised as prevalent, as is the usefulness of anecdotal 
evidence in this regard. 
The Human Rights Covenants 
While the rights noted above are grouped into categories in an attempt to use 
broad groupings based on the needs of people, it is recognised that the rights 
are drawn from two distinct Covenants. These Covenants place different 
obligations on states as to the realisation of the rights contained in the 
Covenants. The ICCPR provides that the state must respect and ensure the 
rights of individuals immediately; the ICESCR, by contrast, provides that the 
state must 'take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights' (Article 2 of both 
Covenants). However, there is increasing consensus in the literature and in the 
international arena-including the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR)-that this difference in obligations does not indicate 
that states are free to delay the implementation of respect for the rights contained 
in the ICESCR. Rather, states must work towards the implementation of the 
rights, beginning with satisfying minimum standards (Yamin and Maine 
1999:586-91). In addition, both the 1986 Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Limburg Principles) and the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines for 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Guidelines) 
indicate that states are required to move towards the full implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights as soon as possible, and that the differing 
obligations contained in the ICESCR do not imply that states can defer efforts 
towards realisation of these rights . 
What constitutes violation of the Covenants? Both the Limburg Principles 
and the Maastricht Guidelines provide guidance as to the nature and scope of 
the obligations contained within the ICESCR and also provide examples of 
what constitutes a violation of the Covenant. Both sets of guidelines were 
developed by a group of distinguished experts in international law, at meetings 
convened by the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva), the Urban 
Morgan Institute for Human Rights (Ohio, USA), and the Centre for Human 
Rights, Faculty of Law at Maastricht University (the Netherlands). Participants 
were a diverse range of experts from many countries, including academics, 
representatives of centres for human rights, non-governmental organisations, 
the International Commission of Jurists, staff members of the UN, and its 
Specialised Agencies and Committees.4 The Limburg Principles have 
subsequently been adopted as an official UN document. 5 Both the Limburg 
Principles and the Maastricht Guidelines have been adopted widely as 
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interpretive of the obligations in the ICESCR, and are useful for determining 
'the general contours of possible violations of these rights' (Leclcie 1998:89). 
While both the Limburg Principles and the Maastricht Guidelines refer to 
rights in the ICESCR, they also accept the indivisibiliry and interdependence 
of the rights contained in both the ICESCR and the ICCPR. They also note 
that consideration must be given to the implementation and protection of all 
the rights contained in these Covenants, that a failure by a state to comply 
with an obligation in either Covenant is a violation under international law of 
that treary, and that states are as responsible for violations of economic, social 
and cultural rights as rhey are for violations of civil and political rights. Therefore 
the guidelines provided in these documents are useful indicators of the bnds 
of behaviour by states regarded as a violation of either Covenant, and serve as 
guidelines for interpretation in addition to the relative clariry of provisions in 
the ICCPR as to violations of these rights . The Maastricht Guidelines are 
developed from the Limburg Principles and build on them, specifically 
providing guidelines as to the nature and scope of violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights. They are therefore a useful place to start when 
considering what amounts to a violation of a provision of the Covenants (Box 
3.1). 
The principles set up by the Maastricht Guidelines provide useful indicators 
as to what constitutes violations of rights in the ICESCR. Previously, there 
was some difficulry in determining what amounted to a violation as few 
standards of appropriate conditions were clearly set out, and this was 
compounded by the discussion as to what 'progressive realisation' meant. This 
was in contrast to the relative clariry of the rights and standards in the ICCPR, 
which was often backed up by indicators, bodies of national jurisprudence 
and precedent to draw upon as to what constituted appropriate conditions 
(Yamin and Maine 1999) . AB a result, these Guidelines may make things a 
little clearer concerning the responsibilities of states to protect rights, and states' 
culpabiliry in certain circumstances of rights violations. Sometimes, due to 
the limited empirical evidence, it is difficult to establish a direct causal 
relationship berween a state's actions or omissions and breaches of human 
rights. An example of this is in the case of corruption, where there is often a 
lack of evidence to establish a direct causal relationship with human rights 
breaches due to the secretive nature of corruption. These guidelines, however, 
indicate that states have responsibiliry both through action, and through 
countering inaction on the part of themselves and their agents, to provide an 
environment where human rights are respected, protected and fulfilled, and 
achieve a certain internationally-agreed standard. 
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Box 3.1. Maastrlcht Guidelines on violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights 
11. The meaning of violations of economic, social and cultural rights ... 
14. Violations can occur through the direct action of States or other entities insufficiently 
regulated by states. Examples of such violations include 
(a) The formal removal or suspension of legislation necessary for the continued enjoyment of 
an economic, social and cultural right that is currently enjoyed 
(b) The active denial of such rights to particular individuals or groups, whether through 
legislated or enforced discrimination 
(c) The active support for measures adopted by third parties which are inconsistent with 
economic, social and cultural rights 
(d) The adoption of legislation or policies which are manifestly incompatible with pre-existing 
legal obligations relating to these rights, unless it is done with the purpose and effect of 
increasing equality and improving the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights for 
the most vulnerable groups 
(e) The adoption of any deliberately retrogressive measure that reduces the extent to which 
any such right is guaranteed 
(f) The calculated obstruction of, or halt to, the progressive realization of a right protected by 
the Covenant, unless the State is acting within a limitation permitted by the Covenant or it 
does so due to a lack of available resources or force majeure 
(g) The reduct ion or diversion of specific public expenditure, when such reduction or diversion 
results in the non-enjoyment of such rights and is not accompanied by adequate measures to 
ensure minimum subsistence rights for everyone. 
15. Violations can also occur through the omission or failure of States to take necessary 
measures stemming from legal obligations. Examples of such violations include 
(a) The failure to take appropriate steps as required under the Covenant 
(b) The failure to reform or repeal legislat ion which is manifestly inconsistent with an 
obligation of the Covenant 
(c) The failure to enforce legislation or put into effect policies designed to implement 
provisions of the Covenant 
(d) The failure to regu late activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from 
violating economic, social and cultural rights 
(e) The failure to utilise the maximum of available resources towards the full realisation of 
the Covenant 
(f) The failure to monitor the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, including the 
development and application of criteria and indicators for assessing compliance 
(g) The failure to remove promptly obstacles which it is under a duty to remove to permit the 
immediate fulfilment of a right guaranteed by the Covenant 
(h) The failure to implement without delay a right which it is required by the Covenant to 
provide immediately 
(i) The failure to meet a generally accepted international minimum standard of achievement, 
which is within its powers to meet 
(j) The failure of a State to take into account its international legal obligations in the field of 
economic, social and cultural rights when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements 
with other States, international organisations or multinational corporations. 
Note: The Limburg Principles and the Maastricht Guidelines set out examples of what amounts 
to violations. The failure of a state to comply with an obligation under either Covenant is a 
violation of the international obligations under that Covenant . Essentially, states have 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the rights contained in the Covenants. The Maastricht 
Guidelines provide some guidance as to what these obligations mean: the obligation to respect 
requires states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the rights ; the obligat ion to 
protect requires states to prevent violations of rights by third parties; the obligation to fulfil 
requires that states take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other 
measures necessary towards the full realisation of rights. The Maastricht Guidelines also note 
that there are then obligations on the state of conduct and result; the obligation of conduct 
meaning that the state must engage in conduct designed to realise the enjoyment of rights; 
and the obligation of result meaning that there is a requirement on the state to achieve a 
certain minimum standard of respect for rights as agreed in the international arena. 
Source: International Commission of Jurists, 1998. 'Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', Human Rights Quarterly, 20(3) :695-97 . 
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Classical notions of corruption and a human rights approach 
An examination of corruption in terms of the effects that it has on human 
rights involves highlighting specific rights and how they may be violated. 
Sometimes there may be difficulties in this, as specific human rights are often 
bound up in broad concepts. For example, there is some discussion in the 
literature linking corruption and ideas of development, including aid, and 
also corruption and ideas of democracy. Currently, however, these analyses 
tend to focus on the economic and political costs to development and political 
stability, rather than examining to any great extent the human costs (Morgan 
1998: 15-20). As Alston points out, it is necessary to break down these broad 
terms such as 'development' and 'democracy' and to identifY the values and 
rights contained within them in order to promote recognition of these rights. 
Alston goes on to note: ' [wJe should affirm not that there should be 'democracy' 
and 'development', but that a range of quite specific values must be promoted 
and that those values, taken as a whole, will enable the realization of meta-
norms of democracy and development' (HRCA 1995). 
However, a human rights approach to corruption should also involve 
consideration of the broader, more systemic effects that corruption has on 
society as a whole. Examining corruption in terms of human rights highlights 
the obligations and accountability of states to facilitate the creation and the 
maintenance of a society in which human rights are respected and human 
dignity is promoted. To some extent this involves an analysis of existing 
discourses of the elements that are thought to be important for the idea of a 
good society, and the effect of corruption on these elements. It involves 
examination of ideas of democracy, development, the rule oflaw, accountability 
of power, and so on. While this involves looking at specific values, such as that 
proposed by Alston, it is also important to consider broad values that may be 
seen to be inherent in ideas of what a good society consists of, such as 
expectations of fairness, transparency, honesty and trustworthiness from those 
in a position of power within states. A corrupt state may be highlighted by 
discrepancies between what the state claims to do, and what actually happens, 
which in turn leads to distrust and cynicism by the people. Corruption may 
also lead to these legitimate expectations of society being violated as a result of 
lower standards that the state is prepared to enforce, including human rights 
standards. The lowering of standards in addition to general disillusion with 
corrupt practices in government may result in changes to society's attitudes 
and expectations, as reluctant acceptance oflower standards develops at a societal 
level. Therefore, an examination of the role of the state and society in considering 
the causes, consequences and methods of combating corruption is important. 
This recognition that corruption may be part of a broader societal problem 
rather than an individual economic one may be important for the success of 
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anti-corruption efforts, and in particular for efforts to ensure protection for 
human rights against corruption. 
The view that corruption is not simply an economic issue, but one that has 
broader societal origins and implications is an historical one. Heidenheimer et 
al. (1989:5) note that in ancient times, political theorists such as Aristotle 
regarded corruption as being primarily a moral issue, where corruption was 
used in an analysis of the structures and functions of society to characterise 
situations which were perceived to be 'marked by the decay of the moral and 
political order'. Aristotle's view of corruption involved looking at the ideals of 
a particular regime or political system; where the system fell short of these 
ideals, it was regarded as corrupt (Euben 1989). Euben notes that Aristotle's 
ideas of a healthy political system involved ideals of administration of justice, 
non-materialism in economic matters, diversity and unity, equality, higher 
guiding values of public interest over private values, and notions of citizenship 
(Euben 1989:227-30). Where these values were compromised, the system was 
viewed as corrupt. Corruption was viewed as 'a disease of the body politic', a 
degeneration and disintegration of the political system (Euben 1989:222; 
Friedrich 1989: 18). Friedrich comments that corruption was therefore regarded 
as being 'a disintegration of the belief system upon which a particular political 
system rests' (1989:17). This view of corruption is therefore much broader 
than simply viewing corruption as an economic issue involving individual 
impropriety. Friedrich notes that this broader historic notion of corruption 
has developed into the modern sense of corruption-the abuse of public power 
for private gain. 'Corruption, then, has become a particular form of political 
pathology rather than a global degeneration' (Friedrich 1989:21). The current 
economic focus of corruption has possibly become more prominent due to 
the increased importance of economic activities in society and in international 
discourse, and also due to the increased notions of individuality in society. 
However, it is proposed that a reversion to these classical notions of corruption 
as being a broader societal problem may be useful for an alternative approach 
to anti-corruption efforts. 
Corruption and violations of human rights 
The difficulties encountered in answering the question as to whether corruption 
can lead to human rights violations may well be one of the reasons why it has 
not been adequately addressed in the past. Indeed, due to the limited empirical 
evidence establishing a link between corruption and breaches of human rights, 
it is difficult to present a clear case. This is not due to the absence of information 
regarding the status of human rights within a country, as this is fairly readily 
available, often in the form of UN reports, particularly annual reports such as 
the UNDP Human Development Report. The difficulty lies in linking breaches 
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of these rights with incidences of corruption. This is the crucial work that 
remains to be done. There is some anecdotal evidence in the literature which 
can be drawn upon to demonstrate how corruption can run counter to states' 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights, therefore leading to 
breaches. While these data are far from perfect, they nevertheless provide 
examples of how corrupt behaviour can lead to human rights violations and, 
therefore, provide a starting point for discussion. 
Rights to affiliation. This category is proposed to include the right to self-
determination (ICCPR, Article 1; ICESCR, Article 1), the right to freedom of 
association (ICCPR, Article 22; ICESCR, Article 8), the right to freedom of 
cultural belief and practice (ICCPR, Article 27; ICESCR, Article 15), and the 
right to freedom of religion (ICCPR, Article 18). An example of a possible 
violation of these rights, based on case law and recent reported events, is of 
corrupt behaviour on the part of a government official regarding leasing territory 
to private companies for mining or forestry. Where there is a group of indigenous 
people living and subsisting within the territory, extensive logging or mining 
may lead to the violation of the right of the group not to be deprived of their 
means of subsistence, a part of the right to self-determination under both 
Covenants (Jayawickrama 1998; Cockcroft 1998). In addition, this could also 
be construed as a violation of the right of the group to freedom of their cultural 
beliefs and practices guaranteed under both Covenants, if the change in the 
environment so drastically alters their way of life. Larmour points to several 
examples reported in two South Pacific countries where government officials 
were engaging in corruption in relation to the timber industry, to the detriment 
of traditional communities (Larmour 1997:6-8). Rose-Ackerman also notes 
the deleterious effects of widespread inefficient and environmentally destructive 
practices on traditional communities, many of the causes of which can be 
linked with corrupt practices in allocation and exploitation of natural resources 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999:19, 33). For example, corruption is often associated 
with decisions to undertake development projects, such as large-scale dams, 
which invariably cause the displacement of people from traditional lands, with 
violations of rights, including the right to self-determination and to a means 
of subsistence (HRCA 1995; Alatas 1999:94). As many as 90 million people 
may have lost their homes to make way for dams, roads and other development 
projects over the course of the last decade (Brown 1997:124). 
Rights to life, bodily health and integrity. The general category of rights to 
life, bodily health and integrity is proposed to include the right to freedom 
from torture (ICCPR, Article 7), the right to life (ICCPR, Article 6), liberty 
(ICCPR, Articles 9-13), security of person (ICCPR, Article 9), the right to an 
adequate standard ofliving (ICESCR, Article 11), and the right to health and 
wellbeing (ICESCR, Article 12). One example of a violation of these rights is 
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corrupt officials allowing the dumping of toxic waste into an area which is 
planned for residential purposes. There are also instances documented where 
the payment of bribes is thought to have influenced public officials' decisions 
in a Southeast Asian nation to allow the illegal importation of toxic waste 
from other countries (BAN website). Resulting ill health of the community 
caused by exposure to the toxic waste may mean that human rights-particularly 
the right to life, and the right to health and wellbeing-may be violated 
(Jayawickrama 1998). 
Violations of the right to health and wellbeing are also linked with corruption 
through the distortion of government expenditure by corrupt officials. One 
study sets out preliminary findings that corruption reduces government 
spending on health, as a result of money going to large-scale projects, where 
the misuse of funds is easier to hide and presents more opportunities for 
corruption (Mauro 1998:265). It would be generally accepted that reduced 
spending on health is likely to lead to a decrease in the quality of healthcare 
available, and therefore a violation of people's right to health and wellbeing. It 
is also suggested that this can lead to corrupt behaviour on the part of medical 
professionals who must be bribed in order to obtain healthcare, further violating 
these rights (Alatas 1999; Cockcroft 1998). 
High levels of corruption in governments and the resulting violations of 
human rights-especially the right to freedom from torture, right to life, liberty, 
and security of person-have often been linked. The Human Rights 
Committee-the UN treaty committee monitoring the ICCPR-has implied 
several times in its Annual Reports recognition of a link between corruption 
and violations of the right to life and the right to freedom from torture. In its 
1998 Report, it noted in relation to one West Asian country 
The Committee is deeply concerned that all government power. .. is 
concentrated in the hands of an executive which is not subject to scrutiny or 
accountability, either politically or otherwise . .. the Committee notes with 
grave concern reports from many sources concerning the high incidence of 
summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture and ill-
treatment by members of security and military forces, disappearance of many 
named individuals and of thousands of people . .. and forced relocations. In 
this respect, the Committee expresses its regret at the lack of transparency on 
the part of the Government in responding to these concerns (Human Rights 
Committee Report N53/40 1998, paras 96-7). 
Rights to political participation. This category is proposed to include the 
right to freedom of expression (ICCPR, Article 19) and the right to vote 
(ICCPR, Article 25). Freedom of expression includes the freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of any kind. Violations of this right 
can occur on all three fronts as a result of corruption. Freedom of the press is 
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essential to promote government accountability and transparency and there 
are several ways in which a corrupt government can stifle this freedom and 
control the media, which therefore may violate the right of freedom of 
expression (Rose-Ackerman 1999:165-7). Rose-Ackerman also notes the 
negative effect on freedom of expression by strong libel laws protective of 
public officials, pointing out that several North American, European, Middle 
Eastern, Asian and Latin American states have laws protecting public officials. 
These sorts of provisions often prevent or delay the publishing of matters 
that are of public interest-of which corruption by public official is certainly 
one-which may lead to a violation of the right to freedom of expression 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999: 166-7). T he CESCR noted in its 1998 Annual Report, 
in relation to the situation in one Middle Eastern state that 'the ability of 
people to defend their economic, social and cultural rights depends 
significantly on the availability of public information. Efforts to ensure 
accountability and to combat corruption also require such information in 
order to be effective' (CESCR Report on the 16th and 17th Sessions E/19981 
22, para 346). 
The Human Rights Committee noted in 1995, in relation to a North 
African state 
The Committee is ... concerned that present laws are overly protective of 
government officials, particularly those concerned with security matters, it is 
particularly concerned that those government officials who have been found 
guilty of wrongdoing remain anonymous ro the general public, becoming 
immune from effective scrutiny (Human Rights Committee Annual Report 
N50/40, VoU, 1995, para 86). 
And again in relation to the same state 
The Committee is concerned that dissent and criticism of the Government are 
not fully tolerated .. . and that, as a result, a number of fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Covenant are not fully enjoyed in practice. In particular, it 
regrets the ban on the publication of certain foreign newspapers. The 
Committee is concerned that those sections of the Press Code dealing with 
defamation, insult and false information unduly limit the exercise of freedom 
of opinion and expression as provided for under article 19 of the Covenant. In 
this connection, the Committee is concerned that those offences carry 
particularly severe penalties when criticism is directed against official bodies as 
well as the army or the administration, a situation which inevitably results in 
self-censorship by the media when reporting on public affairs (Human Rights 
Committee Annual Report N50/40Vol.I, 1995, para 89). 
The right to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections-an 
aspect of the right to participation in public affairs-consists of two elements: 
the requirement of universal and equal suffrage and secrecy of ballot, and 
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the guarantee that the vote must reflect the free expression of the will of the 
electors. This right can be violated by corrupt behaviour on the part of public 
officials, which is designed to interfere with the integrity of the electoral 
process, either through the bribery of electors to induce them to vote or to 
refrain from voting, or through the bribery of election officials to induce 
them to interfere more directly with the electoral process Qayawickrama 
1998). Such corrupt behaviour has occurred in some North American, 
European and Asian states (Rose-Ackerman 1999:137-8). Not only does 
corruption affect the voting process, but also the campaigning; politicians' 
political campaigns are often funded by wealthy interests concerned with 
influencing legislative outcomes and government policy. Examples of this 
occur in some North American, European and Asian states (Rose-Ackerman 
1999:132-5). This represents further interference in the integrity of the 
electoral process and a possible violation of rights to vote and participate in 
public affairs. 
Rights to non-discrimination and the rule of law. This category includes the 
rights to a fair trial and recognition as an equal person before the law (ICCPR, 
Articles 9-15). The main violation of these rights discussed in the literature is 
the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. Corruption can affect the judicial process in several 
ways so that rights to a fair trial are violated. 
A corrupt or politically dependent judiciary can facilitate high-level 
corruption, undermine reforms, and override legal norms. When the 
judiciary is part of the corrupt system, the wealthy and the corrupt operate 
with impunity, confident that a well-placed payoff will deal with any legal 
problems (Rose-Ackerman 1999:151). 
If one party has engaged in bribery of a judge, court official, or through 
bribery has access to documents the other party does not, then the trial 
will hardly be impartial, independent or fair (Jayawickrama 1998). In 
addition, where corruption of the entire government system is prevalent, 
the judiciary may not be impartial towards the state, so an individual 
attempting to take action against the state may not receive a fair trial. 
Rose-Ackerman notes that this has been the case in some Latin American 
and Asian countries, due to the lack of constraint by the judiciary of the 
executive (Rose-Ackerman 1999:147-8) . For this reason, even where the 
judiciary is independent and impartial, it is necessary to conduct deeper 
reforms of the political system where corruption is prevalent in the state 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999). However, an honest, independent judiciary can 
be helpful in reforming the system and in protecting human rights, as has 
previously been the case in some European, Latin American and Asian 
states (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 151-2). The CESCR has noted the importance 
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of judicial independence in protection of human rights, commenting with 
concern in 1997 in relation to a Caribbean country 
that, according to the information received from various sources, that there is 
no mechanism for lodging complaints against the arbitrariness or corruption of 
some judges and that there is no appellate procedure for challenging the 
discriminatory application of the law, an executive degree or a decree of a court 
(CESCRAnnual Report on the 14th and 1yh Sessions E/1997/22, para 227). 
The following year, however, the Committee noted with appreciation in 
relation to the same country that 
the measures taken to combat the problem of corruption of public officials, 
including judges, and in particular the increase in the salaries of government 
officials and judges. Furthermore, the Committee notes that the procedure for 
nominating judges to the new Supreme Court has been made public and 
transparent, with the objective of guaranteeing the impartiality of the judiciary 
and its independence from the executive ... The Committee recommends that 
measures to combat the arbitrariness and corruption of some judges and public 
officials be pursued. In particular, the Committee recommends that 
information on the means available, if any, to challenge the discriminatory, 
arbitrary and unjust application of a law, an executive decree or a court decree 
be provided in the State party's next periodic report (CESCRAnnual Report 
on the 16th and 17th Sessions, E/1998/22, paras 203, 228). 
The CESCR also noted in 1998, in relation to one Middle Eastern state 
The Committee stresses the importance of an independent judiciary, ensured 
not only by constitutional declaration, but in fact by guarantees accorded to 
magistrates, in order to ensure the exercise of all human rights, in particular 
economic, social and cultural rights, and the availability of effective remedies 
in case of violation (CESCR Annual Report on the 16th and 17th Sessions, El 
1998/22, para 332) . 
And in relation to a North Mrican state, the Human Rights Committee 
noted in 1995 that, 
[allthough there is now in place an impressive array of State organs for the 
promotion and protection of human rights at various levels, the Committee 
notes that they have been concentrated exclusively within the executive branch 
of the Government. Consequently, it is not clear whether there are sufficiently 
independent mechanisms within the public administration and the judiciary to 
effectively monitor and enforce the implementation of existing human rights 
standards, including the investigation of abuses ... The Committee is concerned 
about the independence of the judiciary. It is also concerned by the reports on 
harassment oflawyers who have represented clients accused of having 
committed political offences and of the wives and families of suspects (Human 
Rights Committee Annual Report Al50/40Vol.I, 1995, paras 85, 87). 
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Rights to social and economic development. This category includes the right 
to just and favourable conditions of work (ICESCR, Articles 6-9) and the 
right to education (ICESCR, Articles 13-14). Both of these rights can be 
violated through distortion of government expenditure due to cortuption. 
Large-scale, capital-intensive projects which provide more opportunities for 
corrupt behaviour may be preferred by corrupt officials to labour-intensive 
projects providing work or spending on essential public services, such as 
education (Jayawickrama 1998) . Indeed, a recent empirical study has shown a 
negative correlation between corruption and government expenditure on 
education. Mauro examines the relationship between corruption and the 
composition of government expenditure, using corruption indices produced 
by a private firm, for a cross-section of countries. The hypothesis he tests is 
that corrupt governments will spend more public resources on items which 
provide more opportunities for corrupt behaviour and for which bribes can be 
efficiently collected and secrecy maintained (Mauro 1998). Mauro's findings 
confirm the hypothesis that corruption alters the composition of government 
expenditure. Specifically, the study shows that government spending on 
education is reduced. Mauro's paper presents 'evidence of a negative, significant, 
and robust relationship between corruption and government expenditure on 
education' (Mauro 1998:277). Mauro comments that 
a possible interpretation of the observed correlation between corruption and 
government expenditure composition is that corrupt governments find it 
easier to collect bribes on some expenditure items than on others. Education 
stands out as a particularly unattractive target for rent-seekers, presumably in 
large part because its provision typically does not require high-technology 
inputs to be provided by oligopolistic suppliers (Mauro 1998:277-8). 
When government expenditure on education is decreased, there are increased 
opportunities for violations of the right to education. In addition to the 
ICESCR, rights to education for children are protected under the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Where there is lack of resources to provide basic 
conditions for education, such as school buildings, textbooks and teachers, 
the access to and quality of education suffers and the right to education may 
be violated. Even where resources are provided, corrupt officials may divert 
these, and therefore the resources supplied will be inadequate or substandard. 
An example is provided by a project to extend primary schooling in a South 
Pacific nation which was affected by a corrupt official's misuse of some of the 
funds (Larmour 1997:9). UNICEF notes that the lack of basic education 
'remains the most important single factor in protecting children from such 
hazards as exploitative child labour and sexual exploitation', which are violations 
of other human rights (UNICEF 1999:9). Decreased expenditure on education 
is a reason for concern, as previous literature has shown that educational 
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achievement is an important determinant of economic growth (Mauro 1998), 
which is likely to be important for the protection of other human rights. Mauro 
notes that 
[tlhe question whether corruption affects the composition of government 
expenditure may have important implications. First, while the empirical 
literature has so far yielded mixed results on the effects of government 
expenditure and, in particular, its composition, on economic growth, most 
economists seem to think that the level and type of spending undertaken by 
governments do matter for economic performance. For example, even 
though cross-country regression work has not conclusively shown the 
existence of a relationship between government spending on education and 
economic growth, it has gathered robust evidence that school enrolment rates 
and educational attainment play a considerable role in determining economic 
growth (Mauro 1998:264-5). 
The CESCR has noted the deleterious effects that corruption can have, 
inter alia, on the right to education and work, through distortion of government 
expenditure. It noted in 1999 in relation to a West Mrican state that 'economic, 
social and cultural rights were hindered by the negative effects of widespread 
corruption on the functioning of government institutions' (CESCR Report 
on the 18th and 19th Sessions, E/1999/22, para 97). It also commented in 1998 
with regard to a transition state 
The Committee notes with apprehension that the process of transition to a 
democratic country with a market-based economy is being undermined by 
corruption, organized crime, tax evasion and bureaucratic inefficiency, 
resulting in inadequate funding for social welfare expenditure and for the 
payment of wages in the State sector (CESCR Report on the 16ch and 17ch 
Sessions E/1998/22, para 99). 
The Committee noted that rights to food, health, nutrition, education and 
jobs were all affected due to the undermining of the social, economic and 
political structure in the transition state by, amongst other forces, corruption. 
Furthermore, in relation to a Middle Eastern state: '[t]he Committee notes 
with concern that a large proportion of resources necessary to finance social 
programs is diverted by corruption, which is pervading State organs and the 
sectors of the economy that are still under State control' (CESCR Report on 
the 16th and 17th Sessions E/1998/22, para 327) . 
Summary. This analysis indicates that, in many circumstances, corruption on 
the part of the state can lead to breaches of human rights. The analysis has 
sought only to give examples of how corruption can affect human rights and 
has attempted to provide supporting evidence where it is available. One of the 
difficulties mentioned above is linking corrupt behaviour with actual breaches 
of human rights. While this direct causal approach is useful for highlighting 
An international human rights approach 59 
breaches, it should also be noted that breaches of human rights can also occur 
through indirect actions or omissions. It must also be recognised that corruption 
can have long-term effects which may not be as easily identifiable as being 
linked with resulting human rights violations, as well as short-term effects that 
are immediately recognised as breaches of human rights. 
Conclusion: possibilities of a human rights approach 
Taking a human rights approach to corruption highlights the fact that 
corruption is more than just misappropriation of money or abuse of power; 
corruption also has deleterious effects on people, which can lead to breaches of 
human rights. It acknowledges that corruption is a global problem, requiring 
global action and solutions. Giving corruption a 'human face' may lead to 
increased efficiency of anti-corruption efforts through better awareness of the 
effects of corrupt behaviour, increased calls for improved accountability and 
transparency in governments, and increased varieties of strategies that are 
available to combat corruption. The involvement of international organisations 
and institutions and non-governmental organisations in the process-many 
of whom already participate in human rights issues-may result in a 
strengthening of efforts towards human rights protection and anti-corruption, 
as these organisations put pressure on states to reform. Recognition of the 
effects of corruption as breaches of human rights as provided for under the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR may also lead to further attention being given to 
corruption within states by the respective Covenant Committees, which may 
be useful ro highlight more explicitly the effects of corruption on human rights. 
Highlighting the human rights effects of corruption may serve to stimulate 
international concern and facilitate anti-corruption action. An element of this 
must be increased empirical study on the effects of corruption on human rights, 
which can only serve to stimulate further interest and action. 
This chapter has highlighted that, while corruption is widely discussed in 
the literature and increasingly addressed in the international arena, a 
fundamental aspect of corruption has been left out of the discussion. The 
effect that corruption has on the fundamental human rights of people has 
been largely ignored, referred to only in the vague terms of 'development' and 
'democracy'. The human rights discourse is an integral part of international 
law and needs to be incorporated into the international discussion and action 
against corruption. This chapter has highlighted instances where corruption 
has had, or may have, a deleterious effect on the rights of people. In examining 
the role and responsibility of states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights 
as guaranteed under the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the actions or omissions of 
states must be examined in regard to corrupt behaviour, as it has been argued 
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that the tolerance of corruption by states through action or omission can result 
in breaches of human rights . States should be held accountable for this 
toleration. Utilising existing human rights discourse and mechanisms may be 
useful in the efforts to combat corruption to ensure human rights protection 
and accountability and transparency on the part of governments. The 
international community has an obligation to extend its anti-corruption efforts 
to the protection of human rights. 
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Regulating virtue 
formulating, engendering and enforcing 
corporate ethical codes 
Andrew Brien 
Amongst the most popular instruments used when attempting to inject 
ethics into organisational life is the code of ethics (or code of practice-I 
use the expressions synonymously). In fact, such codes are often the first 
formal structure to be established when the attempt is made to raise the 
ethical profile of an organisation. The popularity of codes stems from the 
fact that they are very adaptable; they are used in all types of regulatory 
environments, from external regulatory regimes to self-regulatory and 
enforced self-regulatory regimes. As well, all sorts of organisations-
government departments and agencies, universities, along with many 
professions-have codes of ethics, as do many businesses (Abbott 1983:857). 
For example, one global study of business organisations found that 76 per 
cent of respondents had codes (Brooks 1989:120), while over 90 per cent 
of Fortune 500 firms and almost half of US companies have codes, mission 
statements or practice statements (Centre for Business Ethics 1992:863-
7; Hoffman 1990:630; Murphy 1988:908). 
The rapid growth in the number of ethical codes is a phenomenon 
characteristic of the past two decades. It is largely a result of widely-
publicised ethical failures that have affected many people and have caused 
disquiet within the government and the professional, business and civic 
community about the behaviour of powerful sectors within the societies 
concerned. Writing in 1989, L.J. Brooks reported that 60 per cent of codes 
were less than ten years old. Six years earlier, Cressey and Moore (1983:55) 
reported that 43 per cent of their sample of codes in the United States 
'were either drafted or revised in 1976, the year following the first nationwide 
publicity about corporate bribery', and almost two-thirds were written or 
revised between 1975 and 1977. Codes of ethics are also popular amongst 
academic theorists, many of whom consider them to have an important 
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role to play in institutionalising ethics (see Purcell 1978; Mathews 1988:79; 
Snoeyenbos and Jewel! 1983:129; Ferrell and Gardiner 1991; Weber 
1983:534; Hoffman 1990; Maitland 1990:513-14). 
Despite the popularity of codes, there is no evidence that they actually 
improve ethical standards. Violations are frequent, and compliance is a 
major practical problem (Brooks 1989: 123; Snoeyenbos and Jewel! 
1983:103). The reasons why compliance is a problem are well known and 
fall into two categories-internal factors and external factors . Internal factors 
are those features of the code itself that predispose the code's constituents 
to violate it. The most common internal problem of codes is that they are 
poorly formulated (Staff 1983:104) . They may contain inconsistencies, 
ambiguities, confusions or provisions that invite non-compliance and the 
development of cynical attitudes towards the code. For example, the code 
may be directed only at employees while management may be exempted, 
or the code may be self-serving and ignore the interests of other stakeholders, 
as many codes seem to do (Arthur 1987; Cressey and Moore 1983; Mathews 
1988; Starr 1983). Thus, codes may lack an integral authority, and 
organisational actors will thus be encouraged to develop a disposition to 
ignore them or evade their provisions. 
Codes may also possess inadequate external authority. This can be of 
two sorts. First, the ethical culture of the organisation may be weak. This 
sort of weakness is manifested in two areas. 
• The leaders of the organisation may not fully support the code 
or affirm the importance of ethics in organisational life. Yet, 
enthusiastic support for codes, as well as ethics in general, by 
the leaders of an organisation is crucial to a code's success and, 
more generally, to the project of injecting ethics into 
organisational life. Without such support, a code is unlikely to 
be observed. The problem, however, is that since high-level 
executives have been frequently implicated in (or are the 
perpetrators of) much of the ethical misbehaviour that many of 
the codes have been formulated to correct, their support is 
unlikely to be forthcoming (Cressey and Moore 1983). 
• The code may not have been internalised by its constituency. 
Often this means that the members of the organisation may not 
believe that the code embodies values that are important to 
their activities as members of the organisation. For example, 
actors may not respect a code because they have not been 
encouraged to see that the values embodied in the code are 
important in the daily functioning of the organisation. 
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Consequently, they will not be disposed to follow it, or, in 
ethically ambiguous situations, they may defect from it. 
Internalisation is important for the success of a code since 
people are more likely to behave in compliance with a norm if 
they hold the norm themselves. Therefore, such internalisation 
is essential to maintaining high levels of voluntary compliance. 
Second, the code may not be adequately institutionalised. For example, 
the code may not be part of the organisational infrastructure, the mechanisms 
that promote the code may not exist or may not be used effectively, or there 
may be no systematic attempt to use the code, even if the infrastructure 
exists. Thus, codes may fail because the structure and culture of the organisation 
is not conducive to ethical action. Actors may be presented with mixed and 
confusing messages. Ethical ideals and an ambivalent or confusing 
organisational infrastructure for codes (for example, interpretation and 
adjudication mechanisms that are poorly coordinated, empowered, or which 
are not serious or clear about their respective roles) are often reinforced by 
pious affirmations from management and other organisational leaders within 
an ongoing organisational climate that is in fact antagonistic to ethics. The 
lack of institutions such as an ethics committee, an adjudication and 
interpretation committee, and an appropriate organisational climate are well 
known problems that undermine the success of ethical codes. This is widely 
recognised in the literature where it is often noted that such institutions are 
essential to the success of a code and its successful implementation, and it has 
been the absence of these bodies (or inactivity on their part) that has been a 
primary cause of their failure (Barber 1983:145, 151-2; Tomasic and 
Bottomley 1993:94-6). Surprisingly, while the drafters of codes seem to be 
aware of the importance of promoting compliance, judging by the fact that 
many codes include compliance procedures, few codes have compliance 
institutions, such as ombudsmen, ethics or watchdog committees, or well-
developed, systematic and routine compliance programs (Cressey and Moore 
1983:71) . 
The upshot is that while there is clear evidence that the organisational 
climate and institutionalisation of codes often have a more profound effect 
in promoting ethical action than behaviour modification and enforcement, 
which is usually at the heart of the project of implementing ethical codes, 
appropriate measures are seldom taken (Cressey and Moore 1983:71) . In 
practical terms, this means that there must be effective and authoritative 
institutions within the organisation that interpret the code, clarifY it, apply 
it to quandaries, resolve ambiguities and contradictions, communicate it, 
conduct ethical audits and enforce the code by adjudicating on alleged 
violations and responding to those found to have violated it. 
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The internalisation and institutionalisation problems include difficulties 
with grounding a code's external authority in the behaviour patterns of 
organisational actors. Clearly these are problems of implementation. How 
can the promulgator of a code encourage it to be internalised so that it 
becomes part of the culture of the organisation? How can it be made a part 
of the fabric of the organisation-a 'cultural artifact' -by establishing it as 
part of the stable institutions of the organisation? How can this be enforced 
most effectively? 
While there are many suggestions for implementing and enforcing codes, 
there is surprisingly no discussion of the theory that grounds the formulation 
of codes or their implementation, nor does there seem to be any discussion 
of the criteria to be used to distinguish a good code from a bad one. There 
is, to be sure, an air of 'ad hocery' in this entire area. It is this lack of a 
theoretical discussion that I want (at least to start) to make good here. I 
shall begin by developing an account of the nature of ethical codes. Using 
this, I shall then discuss the desiderata that determine the nature of a well-
formed code. These desiderata are necessary conditions for the development 
of a code's internal authority. The nature of the implementation 
mechanism-a code's external authority-will then be discussed. 
A code of ethics is, ideally, a statement of the organisational norms against 
which the actual or proposed actions of an actor-as a member of an 
organisation-are evaluated. Codes embody these norms in a variety of 
different forms as rules, principles, tenets, credos and ideals They in effect 
express the criteria for good and bad, right and wrong action, within an 
organisational setting. 
Codes can be used in two ways-reactively and pro actively. Reactively, 
an ethical code may be used as a basis upon which to regulate the behaviour 
of organisational actors because it provides the criteria for the evaluation of 
(performed) action. In that way, an ethical code may constitute the basis 
for discipline and deterrence. Pro actively, an ethical code may be used as a 
standard to resolve ethical quandaries or, more simply, it may serve as a 
standard to which action must conform. In these ways, it guides the proposed 
behavior of organisational actors and educates and nurtures their ethical 
awareness. 
Given this analysis of the nature of codes, prime facie, there seem to be 
both similarities to, and differences from, the institution of law that society 
has. To be sure, codes do differ from the laws of a society in that they are 
not typically punitive in orientation, nor do they expressly stipulate the 
result of non-compliance (Cressey and Moore 1983:69). Nevertheless, they 
do have a number of fundamental similarities to law. Like law, an ethical 
code operates on a one-way projection of power, from those who create and 
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enforce the code, to those whom it regulates, guides and educates. And, 
like the law, a code relies for its success upon the voluntary cooperation of 
the code's constituency and acceptance by it of the code. 
Such cooperation and acceptance will occur and be nurtured only if the 
code is seen to possess some inherent moral authority and legitimacy. In 
order that this aura of authority and legitimacy may develop, a code, like 
the law, must be framed so as to foster voluntary cooperation by the code's 
constituency. It will do this by taking account of the constituency's capacity 
to obey, by being, and being seen to be, 'reasonable', by taking into account 
the views of the constituency during the formulation and periodic 
reformulation processes and by being adopted through discussion and 
consent. This occurs in civil society with law, for example, when interested 
parties are invited to make submissions on a proposed law to a select 
committee of parliament and through the conduct of regular, free and fair 
general elections. Therefore, a code-like law-relies upon a projection of 
influence by its intended constituents, upon the drafters of the code when 
it is formulated, as well as a sensitivity on the part of the legislators to the 
needs, desires, aspirations and capacities of the governed. 
This points directly to the similarities between codes and law-codes 
operate in an environment similar to that of law, and serve a similar function. 
First, they are the private laws of a private state; their efficacy is grounded 
ultimately upon the consent and support of the governed. On this analysis, 
a code's makers have a role in the formulation of the code that is analogous 
to that of the law's makers (Cressey and Moore 1983:67-8). Second, codes 
have a similar function to the law in society-they embody criteria that are 
used within the institutional context to guide and evaluate conduct, pro actively 
and persuasively, and sometimes reactively and coercively. They have the 
capacity to provide the basis for discipline and a foundation upon which one 
member of the organisation may be empowered to behave in a certain way 
towards another, when in the ordinary course of events such behaviour would 
not be permitted. In this way, codes, like the law, may enjoin certain actions 
and prohibit others. In their general outlook, however, codes embody the 
values and ideals of the organisation in the same way that the law as a body of 
practice and knowledge embodies the values and ideals of society. 
These similarities to law are important. Just as there can be well or 
poorly-drafted laws, there can be well or poorly-drafted codes of ethics, 
and it seems that given the extensive similarities, codes (like laws) may be 
well-drafted or poorly-drafted for the same sorts of reasons. The question 
then is what criteria should be used to distinguish well-drafted from poorly-
drafted laws? One influential account of such criteria has been given by 
Lon Fuller. According to Fuller (1969:96), these criteria 'are like the natural 
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laws of carpentry, or at least those laws respected by a carpenter who wants 
the house he builds to remain standing and serve the purpose of those who 
live in it' . Just as the natural laws of carpentry-the rules that a carpenter 
must obey in order to attain his purpose-are determined by the purpose 
he has, the natural laws or criteria governing the nature of well-drafted 
law-the rules that a lawmaker must obey in order to attain her purpose-
are determined by the purpose she has in making laws. 
This leads to another question. Do the criteria that a law must meet in 
order to be considered well-drafted also apply to codes of ethics? Clearly 
they must. The activity of lawmaking is, according to Fuller (1969: 1 06, 
122), 'the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules'. The activity of code-making is similar, since the aim is to regulate 
human conduct by using criteria for right and wrong conduct. 
Moreover, according to Fuller (1969:205), the purpose of law is to 
provide a 'firm base-line for human interaction' in order to secure the good 
life. In order that they fulfil this purpose (that is, are effective) , laws must 
be such that they are capable of being obeyed and of guiding action, and 
laws that do this are considered well-drafted. Codes share the same purpose. 
They are designed to provide a baseline against which behaviour can be 
evaluated and regulated and consequently to promote the flourishing of 
the organisation. This in turn promotes the wellbeing of the stakeholders. 
In order for this purpose to be fulfilled, codes must, like the law and 
individual laws, be capable of being obeyed and guiding action, and (like 
laws) codes that do this are well-drafted. Since the activity and the purpose of 
the law and codes are identical and the contexts of their operation analogous, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the properties the law must have in order to 
be capable of attaining its purpose must also be possessed by ethical codes. 
What properties does a well-drafted law (or, as I have been arguing, a 
code of ethics) possess? Fuller's (1969:39, 46-91) answer to this question 
consists of eight necessary criteria 
• there must be rules or laws that ground evaluation of action 
rather than ad hoc evaluation 
• laws must be publicised 
• laws cannot be made retroactively 
• laws must be understandable 
• laws should not be contradictory 
• laws must be within the power of the citizens to obey them 
• laws must maintain a degree of stability through time 
• laws as announced must be in agreement with their actual 
administration. 
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Fuller claims that a total failure in anyone of these eight desiderata does 
not simply result in a 'bad legal system' . He claims that it 'results in 
something that is not properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps 
in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can still be said to be 
some kind of contract' (Fuller 1969:38). Fuller's point is that what makes 
a putative legal system a genuine legal system is its capacity to fulfil the 
purpose that legal systems have in societies. The proximate purpose of the 
legal system is to 'subject human conduct to the governance of rules' in 
order to procure the ultimate purpose of promoting human wellbeing. A 
total failure in anyone of these desiderata will result in a lack of general 
rules that can be used to regulate human conduct; consequently, the 
proximate and ultimate purposes will be prevented from being realised. In 
virtue of this, the system will fail to be a legal system. Similarly, a putative 
code of ethics would fail to be a 'code of ethics', since it would fail to 
embody (in a useful manner), the norms of the organisation that are used 
to guide, regulate and evaluate action in order to promote the flourishing 
and wellbeing of the organisation's stakeholders. It would be unable to 
fulfil its purpose and would, for this reason, fail to be a code of ethics. 
Fuller's justification for each of the desiderata is based upon the capacities 
that human agents possess: that actors are rational, that there must be a 
point to action, that actors require guarantees that the laws will not be 
used against them capriciously or whimsically and certainty as to outcomes. 
Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a 
moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from 
him, or that came into existence only after he acted, or was unintelligible or was 
contradicted by another rule of the same system, or commanded the impossible, 
or changed every minute. It may not be impossible for a man to obey a rule that 
is disregarded by those charged with its administration, but at some point 
obedience becomes futile-as futile, in fact, as casting a vote that will never be 
counted (Fuller 1969:39). 
Such reasons apply also to codes of ethics, since the nature of human 
agency within organisations is substantially similar, and the role of a code 
of ethics in civil society is analogous to that of the law. 
Are there only eight desiderata? It would seem not. Actors must be able 
to trust the code, have confidence in it and see that it is not an instrument 
of repression, but one of protection, which promotes the good of the 
organisation and its stakeholders. Fuller's eight desiderata fail to do this 
completely, since by themselves they fail to deliver adequately the wellbeing 
of the code's stakeholders and the subjective sense of security that is essential 
if a code is to be capable of being effectively implemented and adhered to. 
They fail to provide grounds upon which to base trust in the code. 
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Such trust is based ultimately upon an agreement between the 
organisation's governors and governed, and the capacity of the governed to 
be certain that the agreement is being honoured. In other words, a culture 
of trust must be cultivated (see Brien 1998). Fuller's eight desiderata do 
not, however, provide an adequate means whereby the code's constituents 
can see that the agreement legitimising the code is being honoured. To be 
sure, the moral and rational basis of a code is the same as it is for law. Like 
the law, a code rests upon a contract between the code-makers and the 
code's constituents. The contract embodies the interlocking responsibilities 
of the governors of the (corporate) state and its citizens. These responsibilities 
arise from the same source, an offer which must be made by the 
organisation's governors if the code is to be effective: 'These are the rules we 
ask you to follow. If you will obey them, you have our promise that they are 
the rules we will apply to your conduct.' (Fuller 1969:216-17) . Once 
accepted, the code attains legitimacy and the contract at the basis of the 
code's legitimacy embodies a bond of reciprocity; a person, in virtue of 
being a member of the organisation with this code, has an obligation to 
obey the code and the organisation's governors have an obligation to abide 
by the rules they have made. 
To be effective, however, contracts must be nurtured by appropriate 
institutions and practices (something that Fuller seems merely to assume). 
That is, unless the constituents can see that it is being honoured, the code, 
like the law, will be ineffective. It will not be trusted and it will not attain 
the purpose set for it. To be effective, a code must have a form that promotes 
trust, that does not discourage voluntary compliance but rather promotes 
it, and which provides a means whereby the constituents can see and be 
assured that the contract that is the foundation of the code is being honoured. 
For these reasons codes must offer their constituents clear guarantees as to 
their application and use. These guarantees provide clear grounds upon 
which to trust the code and trust that it will not be used against them 
without justification. Ultimately, such guarantees provide a basis upon 
which to evaluate whether the contract is being honoured and a criterion 
for continued compliance and acceptance. To Fuller's eight desiderata must 
be added: due process, procedural justice, and substantive morality and 
justice. In other words, the code must contain explicit provisions stating 
that 
• the implementation and enforcement will be carried out in a 
particular, known and settled way, rather than secretly or 
haphazardly 
• the code will be applied to all members of the organisation, 
from the CEO down 
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• the code and its use rests upon legitimate authority, typically 
the consent of the governed 
• people will be treated in accordance with their culpability, in 
the case of wrongdoing, or praiseworthiness in the case of 
exemplary service. 
However, this is not all. Two further conditions concern the nature that 
the provisions themselves should have. The provisions must be general. 
However, provisions can be general in two quite different senses, both of 
which are important here-provisions must be general in the sense that 
they must refer to types or classes of actions, and provisions must be general 
in the sense that laws must not be directed at one individual but at classes 
of individuals. Why should the provisions of a code be general in any of 
these senses? Provisions directed at individuals, rather than individuals 
occupying a certain role, will smack of victimisation. And even if such a 
provision is initially benign, it may provide a precedent upon which an 
organisation may base future victimisation of individuals. It is best to avoid 
mention of individuals altogether and talk instead of 'role duties' and ideals. 
Moreover, provisions should be directed at classes of actions since it is 
impossible to construct a workable code that will specifY in advance all the 
vagaries and nuances of human action. Provisions must refer to general 
rules or principles in order to remain a code of ethics, rather than a code of 
directions, as one might find in an instruction manual. 
Codes should be general so that the organisation's governors will not 
have to expend enormous energy formulating precise ordinances, and 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with individual ordinances. It is more 
sensible to have general rules or principles aimed at all, bolstered by 
organisational ideals where possible, and to leave the observance, 
interpretation and implementation to the commonsense of individuals, 
stepping in only when justified-in much the same way that the law does. 
In addition to these extra desiderata, codes must be seen to address real 
issues and not be merely another mechanism for social control. A code 
which did that would destroy the trust between the organisation's governors 
and citizens. This would not only erode support for the code, but would 
also weaken the morale of the organisation. Therefore, there must be a 
point to having the code and any particular precept in it. 
Moreover, the precepts of the code must not be outside the capacity of 
the organisation to implement. Just as a law that is never enforced because 
the state lacks the capacity to do so, or because it is too complex, quickly 
becomes a sham, so too a code or any provision in it. So, like a law, a code 
and its provisions must be practical and useable from the point of view of 
the code-maker. 
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Finally, there is a general requirement that any guide to behaviour must 
actually improve matters. If the ultimate purpose of a code is to promote 
the wellbeing of the organisation, and in that way its stakeholders, a code 
that fails to do so lacks moral justification. Hence, a code or an individual 
provision must not leave an organisation worse off than it would be if it did 
not have the code or the individual ordinance. 
These desiderata work together to constitute an ideal against which any 
code (or element of a code) can be evaluated as 'well-drafted'. They determine 
whether a code will have an effective and credible internal authority-one 
of the areas that must be strong if a code is to succeed. Given that an 
organisation has developed a well-drafted code, how does it then go about 
implementing it so as to promote compliance-that is, how does it develop 
an effective and credible external authority? 
No matter how well formulated a code may be, compliance will not 
result naturally or from haphazard efforts which implement the code in an 
uncoordinated manner. Effective compliance requires a compliance 
mechanism, that is, a structured approach that takes into account the 
capacities and features of the code's constituency. It is well known that an 
effective compliance mechanism would contain various elements-or 
institutions-that implement, interpret and enforce the code. It would operate 
within a sympathetic organisational culture. It would enjoy unequivocal 
support from the management and leadership of the organisation. AB well, 
the code would be developed and promoted in such a way as to encourage 
'ownership' of it by the organisational community. However, the question 
remains: what structure would the compliance mechanism have? To answer 
this, we must look at the nature and foundation of compliance. 
As a matter of stipulation, I shall define 'compliance' in the following 
way: an actor A is acting in compliance with a standard X if, and only if, 
that actor knowingly, consciously and deliberately selects and performs an 
action precisely because it conforms (reflects, honours, instantiates) with 
standard X. Under this analysis, a compliance mechanism would be a group 
of settled institutions that work together to motivate the selection and 
performance of the appropriate act-option. How can actors be motivated to 
select the appropriate option? Acts of compliance rest primarily upon two, 
often mixed, motives. An actor may be motivated to comply because she 
believes some standard is right and ought to be obeyed, or she may be 
motivated to comply out of fear of the consequences for failing to do so. 
Since the motivational sources of compliance are, by and large, limited to 
these sorts of motivation, a successful compliance mechanism will consist 
of measures that create in actors one or another, or some mixture of both. 
How can these two types of motivation be developed? 
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These motives rest upon certain beliefs-belief in the rightness of values 
or belief that certain unwanted consequences will follow certain actions. In 
the former case, the aim of the compliance mechanism is to encourage the 
actor to internalise the code-that is, to have the actor develop a strong 
belief that the code of ethics embodies values that are (in an organisational 
context) good and right and which ought to be obeyed. Such values are 
engendered in each actor, become part of their belief system and become 
part of the organisational culture. 
Compliance produced through the fear of the consequences also rests 
upon beliefs-the actor believing that non-compliance will be discovered 
and that certain unwanted consequences will follow. This is a deterrence 
theory-actors are deterred from wrongdoing by the likelihood of discovery 
and fear of the consequences. There is no change in the actor's beliefs about 
the merits of the code, whether it is right or wrong, good or bad. The code 
exists and actors must comply or face the consequences. Thus, actors are 
coerced into complying. The coercive approach attempts to enforce the 
code through credible sanctions and by inducing actors to believe that 
discovery will be highly likely. 
Creating compliance-inducing motivation on this analysis rests upon 
beliefs generated by two different sorts of mechanism-engendering 
mechanisms based upon persuasion, discussion, affirmation and 
demonstration; and enforcement mechanisms based upon surveillance, 
coercion, threats and sanctions, leading to deterrence. What is the 
relationship between these two approaches? Is one preferable to the other? 
Enforcement is a very blunt instrument, but it seems to be the approach 
favoured by some of the most influential writers and business leaders. For 
example, they speak of 'vigorous', 'savage' or 'routine' enforcement, '(credible) 
sanctions' and codes imitating the deterrence (and even retributive) nature 
of the criminal law. 
Such an approach is mistaken. Empirical evidence from the study of the 
regulation of business suggests that persuasion and trust (reinforced by 
firm action only if persuasion and trust fail) are more effective and less 
costly regulatory approaches than enforcement through the use of 
surveillance and sanctions alone (Fisse and Braithwaite 1993). There are 
good reasons to infer that such findings would be replicated within any 
organisation, since agents are similar in all organisations, and similar sorts 
of relationships and causes of unethical behavior are at work. For example, 
most agents prefer to be trusted, given responsibilities, and left to act 
autonomously, rather than work under intense supervision and surveillance. 
They prefer to be assessed by known, reasonable and transparent procedures. 
Further, in business corporations as well as other organisations, the regulator 
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and the regulated are individual people within whose responsibility 
wrongdoing and rightdoing reside. Corporate wrongdoers often face a 
tradeoff between corporate goals, customs, mores and ethics (which are 
often perceived not to be paramount corporate goals), while organisational 
wrongdoers face a similar trade-off between organisational goals, customs, 
mores and ethics. 
Additionally, the effectiveness of any enforcement program relies upon 
adequate levels of detection of code violators. Few organisations possess the 
capacity to marshal resources for the high levels of surveillance and detection 
necessary to make an enforcement program credible. It is simply too costly, 
and in many different ways: in the use of time, financial and material 
resources; in the maintenance of an extensive and formal adjudication system 
and other institutions that ensure due process in what is effectively a private 
justice system; distractions from the purpose of the organisation, and 
employee goodwill and trust, since the organisation may become like a 
mini police-state (Cressey and Moore 1983:70-0. The very act of 
enforcement may lead to a cure far worse than the disease. 
In general, the enforcement approach assumes that the members of an 
organisation cannot be trusted. It also fails to respect individuals, their 
autonomy and integrity, and their capacity to assume personal responsibility 
for actions they perform. Respecting these things has been identified as a 
major factor in an organisation having a strong ethical culture (Pastin 
1986:221-5; Peters and Waterman 1982:55-88 cited in Newton 
1986:253; Kotter and Heskett 1992:60- 7). The enforcement approach, 
relying upon the blunt use of power, fails to affirm, promote and encourage 
the engendering of the very values at the heart of a strong ethical culture-
the feature of an organisation that is essential if a code of ethics is to be 
successful (Ayres and Braithwaite (1992b:49) . Used alone, enforcement 
fails to develop the motivation base for reliable compliance and is ultimately 
self-defeating. 
Moreover, the enforcement approach is focused upon decontextualised 
individuals. It addresses only the violation and the possibility of repetition, 
while ignoring the causes of non-compliance, such as a poor ethical culture, 
an unsupportive organisational culture, and alienation from the 
organisational community and its values (Cressey and Moore 1983:68). 
However, an ethics program that makes pious pronouncements about the 
importance of ethics but does nothing to remove the causes of unethical 
behaviour is simply not credible and therefore unlikely to serve a regulatory 
role. Further, since it is concerned with results only, there is the possibility 
that it will license victimisation, the use of 'scapegoats' and impose solutions 
that are inappropriate and perceived to be so. 
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Since such an approach maintains alienation from the ethical culture of 
the organisation (because it uses power to deter and is unconcerned with 
what an actor believes is valuable), it fails to promote organisational 
'citizenship', inclusion and ownership of the values that drive the 
organisation. Essentially, such an approach fails to foster organisational virtue. 
This has unwanted consequences-people who are alienated from their 
community, who feel that they have no investment in it, and who have not 
developed and cultivated organisational virtue, are more likely to offend 
when the opportunity presents itself (this, it is worth pointing out, is as 
true of society in general as it is of organisations, where the analogue for 
organisational virtue is civic virtue, and the analogue for code-compliance 
is lawfulness or law abidingness) . 
Finally, if the enforcement strategy is to succeed, the penalties for 
violations must be set at a level that is credible; that is, at a level that deters 
the majority of potential miscreants. In the majority of cases-if not all-
this level is likely to be higher than the level that seems appropriate given 
the intrinsic wrongness of the violation. Thus, an effective enforcement 
strategy would violate one of the principles of retributive justice, namely, 
that a person should be punished only in proportion to the gravity of the 
wrongdoing. Such a principle is important for the citizens of any community, 
since it plays an important role in grounding their confidence in the system. 
In addition, the level may be so high that it paralyses decisionmaking within 
the organisation-actors become fearful of acting lest they breach the code. 
This engenders a 'better do nothing than risk everything' policy. 
These problems are all paradoxes of deterrent-orientated enforcement 
programs . Should they arise, they lead to cynicism about, and 
disenchantment with, the compliance mechanism amongst the members 
of the organisation. That such paradoxes would arise is highly likely, given 
the nature of the system and because the sanction levels must be high if the 
system is to be credible and deter would-be wrongdoers. 
The alternative to enforcing a code of ethics is engendering one. This 
approach is attractive for a number of reasons. It tends to produce ethically 
reliable actors. Most agents prefer, other things being equal, to do what 
they believe to be right and good-that is, to act in a way that seems 
ethical to them. Engendering involves getting actors to believe in something, 
or believe that it is right. If the code of ethics has been engendered, it will 
be perceived to be an ethical reference point, and actors will believe that it 
embodies relevant ethical values. They will be disposed, other things being 
equal, to ensure that their acts comply with it. Since the code means 
something to the actors because it has been engendered, the rate of 
compliance will be higher. 
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There are many ways to foster such beliefs. They may be promoted 
through demonstration, such as by the upper-echelon managers and leaders 
of the organisation behaving ethically. They may be affirmed through ethics 
education programs within the organisation which explain the code and 
the values in it, or by creating institutions that encourage ethical action-
for example, employee involvement in the formulation and administration 
of the code, as well as ethics 'hotlines' or advisers who will clarify, interpret, 
or apply the code and resolve a quandary, or provide ethics counselling. All 
of these measures serve to educate the code's constituents, persuade them 
of its merits, and generally foster belief in the code and, in that way, promote 
ethical motivation. 
Moreover, engendering ethics involves fostering values and traits of 
character-such as autonomy and integrity-that are at the heart of a strong 
ethical culture and organisational virtue. This is likely to be a more effective 
regulatory approach than enforcement since it is more likely to result in 
higher rates of compliance. The reason is simply that people prefer to act in 
ways that accord with their values, and people are more likely to do what 
they want to do (which in this ease is to act ethically) than what they have 
been coerced to do. Consequently, there are sound motivational reasons to 
select engendering programs over enforcement programs. 
Apart from the motivational advantages that engendering offers, such 
an approach avoids many of the costs associated with enforcement. Unlike 
the enforcement strategy, it does not require as much intrusive surveillance 
or monitoring of actors, with the consequent loss of employee goodwill and 
trust. Engendering mechanisms address causes (since to fail to do so would 
undermine the credibility of the mechanism). Consequently, an engendering 
approach addresses matters of concern or potential concern, specific 
problems, and so on. It is for this reason that it provides a more honest way 
for actors to interact with each other, since reasons are given, the motivation 
underlying decisions and directives is clear, and problems are dealt with. 
This encourages confidence in the system and the organisation, fosters 
citizenship (a reduction of alienation) and ultimately compliance with 
organisational norms. It fosters organisational virtue. 
Furthermore, in the special case of miscreants, the engendering process 
reincorporates them into the life of the organisation, offering them a chance 
of 'redemption' and forgiveness (that is, an actor's wrongdoing is not held 
against her). They have the opportunity of once again exercising full 
membership of the organisation. This process strengthens and repairs the 
relationships between actors, and tailors the response to violation of the 
code to the causes of the wrongdoing and the needs and situation of the 
perpetrator. This has the effect of reducing alienation from the life of the 
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organisation on the part of all organisational citizens. They can develop a 
sense of involvement and ownership in the process of ethical action. This 
can be heightened if they are incorporated into the process of developing 
and administering the code. This in turn fosters compliance since actors 
are reluctant to destroy those things in which they have a personal investment 
or which they value. 
Finally, engendering ethics is a more ethically-sound approach than 
enforcement. Unlike enforcement strategies, which treat actors as self-
interested players and a means to an end, engendering ethics assumes that 
actors are rational (since it attempts to persuade them), that they are 
autonomous and deserving of respect for no other reason than they are 
rational human beings. Such moral defences of engendering should not be 
discounted. Actors evaluate in moral terms what they do to others and how 
they are treated themselves. A program that seems ethically suspect will 
not obtain and maintain the support of a group of people. The capacity of 
such a program to promote compliance will be diminished. 
Such an approach does not abandon entirely some level of enforcement 
through the use of coercive programs. In any community there will be 
wilful wrongdoers displaying all levels of culpability, from trivial offenders 
against organisational norms to egregious actors who play the system but 
who never believe in it-sa-called 'organisational sociopaths' . Enforcement 
should focus only on those actors who cannot be reformed through 
engendering programs alone. The type of response to an actor's particular 
wrongdoing should be determined by her level of culpability and capacity 
for reform. For some code violators, it may mean a period of supervised 
work and education about the values of the organisation; for others, a warning 
or demotion; for yet others, some combination of these. 
This approach keeps coercive programs in the background, as an avenue 
of last resort to be used only against wanton and negligent actors. The 
organisation does not develop the thorough, far-reaching and intrusive 
programs to detect wrongdoers that enforcement programs assume. This 
approach uses targeted audits aimed at known weak spots and reported problem 
areas, rather than constant, general surveillance. The organisation encoutages 
reporting and disclosure-that is, proactive behaviour on the part of 
corporate citizens. Once wrongdoing is discovered, however, the coercive 
programs become an option, if warranted-that is, if education and reform 
fail. This sends a clear message to organisational citizens, that they are 
trusted but that their actions are subject to assessment, as in civil society. 
Such a system operates on a similar basis to ordinary, non-organisational 
life-something with which actors are comfortable and familiar. Such 
familiarity encourages support. In this way, the autonomy of the individual 
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is promoted and respected, while the organisation demonstrates clearly that 
it possesses the capacity and the willingness to deal with egregious miscreants. 
Actors know that only wilful wrongdoing will attract institutional sanctions 
and that inexperience, ignorance and mistakes will not be held against them. 
Such a system further promotes the engendering of the code, and compliance 
with it, since it reinforces the grounds upon which such engendering occurs. 
For example, it appears to be a reasonable and fair system. As such, it fosters 
feelings of security and trust, rather than feelings of vulnerability. 
From this, it is clear that the aim of any compliance mechanism should 
not initially be merely to deter. Deterrence rests on nothing more than a 
threat and is power at its crudest and most unimaginative. It obtains its 
credibility from the capacity of the powerful agent to induce the vulnerable 
agent to believe that she is willing and able to use her power. Such flaunting 
of power breeds resentment, mistrust and fear. A more imaginative use of 
power is to use the threat of deterrence and coercion as a last resort in a 
program of ethical education. The threat of power (albeit veiled) focuses 
attention on wrongdoers; having done that, education can begin. The 
problem, of course, is finding a balance between enforcement programs 
and engendering programs. This will be determined largely by the local 
conditions, such as the nature of the organisation, the state of its ethical 
and organisational culture, and the behaviour of its citizens. 
In the model sketched here, engendering the values of the organisation 
is the first option and enforcement is a last resort. In all events, the compliance 
mechanism should be internal to the organisation. There is good reason for 
this. It is cheaper, tailored to the needs and circumstances of the organisation, 
and, because it comes from within the organisation, the members feel that 




Persuasion and counselling 
Ethical education 
Source: Derived from Ayres and Braithwaite (1992a:45). See also Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992b:35ff) and Fisse and Braithwaite (1993:142ff). 
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they own it. Furthermore, studies have shown that keeping discipline within 
the organisation may in fact promote compliance (Fisse and Braithwaite 
1993:170). 
What emerges is a compliance mechanism that consists of an ordering 
of compliance programs based upon the level of coercion involved. 
Engendering programs and enforcement programs are organised so as to 
form a unified, progressive compliance mechanism. It begins with 
engendering programs such as education, affirmation, persuasion, 
information, counselling, and so on, which involve no coercion It then 
moves to programs designed less to engender and more to deter and educate 
from a position of power, each with increasing levels of coercion, moving 
finally to pure deterrence. The levels should not be seen as exclusive, and 
practices from one level may be mixed with those from another. This code 
of ethics compliance mechanism is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
The amount of effort invested in engendering ethics decreases as one 
ascends the triangle, while the amount of coercion increases. At the top of 
the pyramid only the most blatant, obvious and egregious actors are dealt 
with-those who are unable to be convinced of the relevance of organisational 
norms. Often they will be re-offenders for whom the best engendering 
efforts were unable to nurture allegiance. They effectively become a self-
selecting group that does not require the expenditure of vast amounts of 
resources to detect. As a result, the organisation has to expend fewer resources 
in dealing with them and is exposed to fewer of the risks and costs associated 
with suveillance and punitive enforcement measures. There is, for the 
organisation, an economy of effort. 
Resources can be reallocated and the organisation can use proactive 
programs, such as targeted ethical audits (which can often be quite effective 
since internal auditors often know 'where the bodies are buried') to identifY 
problem areas, to provide opportuniry for confession, and to encourage 
actors to seek help, guidance and the clarification of ethics policies. As a 
result, actors will not be caught in a web of perpetuating unethical behavior, 
but will have clear exits, and fewer cases will go so far as to require the most 
drastic coercive responses-the sorts of responses that may easily use 
enormous resources compared to the returns generated, and which often 
end up being resolved in the civil courts. Throughout this process, the 
coercive level of the response must be limited by the culpability of the 
actor and the seriousness of the offence, rather than by the harshness required 
to attain some desired level of deterrence. In this way, the enforcement 
paradoxes will be avoided, but the lessons that can be learned from 
deterrence programs will be communicated to the citizens of the 
organisation, without the costs. 
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This strategy seeks to educate all and redeem those who can be redeemed, 
while providing a mechanism to incapacitate the most dangerous offenders. 
It rests upon the assumptions that agents are rational actors who are capable 
of choosing and weighing reasons, that most of them care about ethical 
concerns and that they desire to 'do the right thing'. Such a mechanism 
promotes and fosters the engendering of ethics in the organisation since it 
nurtures the ethically confused or ignorant as well as the virtuous; it reforms 
the ethically wayward; it deters the ethically uncommitted and venal actor. 
Ultimately, it may be used to incapacitate the ethical rogue. It does all 
these things while minimising enforcement costs and redirecting resources 
into the most important part of any organisation-its people. 
This structure sends the message to the members of the organisation 
that they are valued and trusted by the organisation as individuals, and not 
merely as recipients of coercive treatment. This is reinforced by the fact 
that at all stages, agents are respected as autonomous, rational and responsible 
for their own decisions. In this way, this structure promotes participation 
in the life of the organisation and a reduction of alienation from it and 
organisational goals. It enfranchises (and re-enfranchises) them as members 
of the organisational community; as well, it promotes confidence and trust 
in the overcall compliance system, further promoting the engendering of 
ethical attitudes. This is particularly important. Trust encourages ethical 
action and ethical action further encourages trust, in a self-reinforcing circle 
(Braithwaite 1993; Brien 1998) . This structure provides the foundation 
for that trust and, in that way, grounds the trust necessary for actors to 
internalise the code and live by it. 
Finally, embodied in the structure of this mechanism (as opposed to 
being merely stated in the code) are three guarantees that actors in vulnerable 
positions value highly and which underpin the credibility of any ethics 
program. First, this system embodies a due process. There is a definite, 
known, public and agreed-upon process that must be worked through, 
and a progression through a system of steadily escalating responses towards 
actors who violate the code. They know that organisational power cannot 
be wielded capriciously, that they do not live at the whim of their superiors, 
and that the possibility of victimisation-one of the criticisms of codes-is 
minimised. This further engenders trust in the organisation and the ethics 
program, and fosters ethical action. 
Second, there is procedural justice. In other words, the due process and 
the substantive elements of the code are applied to all institutional actors 
alike. This is because without procedural justice there would be no guarantee 
that the compliance mechanism would be applied to all similar cases. This 
would tend to encourage cynicism about the mechanism and the motives 
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of its proponents, thus weakening support for it. If it is not to be self-
defeating, the compliance process must assume and utilise procedural justice. 
Third, there is substantive justice or fairness. It would be unfair to hold 
accountable a person who violates the code accidentally, through ignorance, 
or because of pressure from her superiors, if she cannot access appropriate 
mechanisms that allow her to ignore such pressure with impunity. On the 
compliance mechanism developed here, an actor's individual circumstances 
are taken into account, the causes of a violation are determined and an 
appropriate response is developed. Again, so that it is not self-defeating the 
compliance process must assume and deliver substantive justice or fairness. 
Moreover, opportunities are given whereby actors can seek assistance 
and guidance, as well as be given it before violations occur This accords 
with received opinion of what counts as fair and just. Such received opinion 
is important. Fairness and justice (along with reasonableness) are principles 
that actors prize highly in all sorts of circumstances. No system can long 
maintain the support of citizens and be as successful as it has the capacity 
to be unless it makes some effort to abide by at least the principles of 
fairness and justice. Organisations as mini-communities are no different in 
this respect from general society (Kotter and Heskett 1992: 52; Pastin 
1986:222). Such principles serve as criteria that actors use to evaluate the 
organisation, and in grounding any commitment to the organisation and 
appropriation or internalisation of organisational values. For this reason, if 
a compliance mechanism is to be successful, it and its constituent elements 
must operate on the basis of substantive justice and fairness. 
This chapter has examined the theory that underlies ethical codes and 
which grounds the development of a code's internal and external authority-
the features which determine whether a code will be successful or not. I 
have attempted to set out the desiderata that an ethical code must satisfY in 
order to be well formed, and so be capable of fulfilling the purpose that was 
intended for it. I have also attempted to set out the structure of the compliance 
mechanism that well formed codes must use in order to be effective. This 
structure, along with the desiderata, is determined by the role that codes of 
ethics play in organisational life-to guide human conduct, raise the ethical 
profile of an organisation, and in that way promote the wellbeing of 
stakeholders. 
It is surprising that more research has not been done on the theory 
underlying ethical codes. Over the past few years the citizens of the Western 
democracies have shown an increased intolerance of those who, holding 
various sorts of positions of power, abuse the trust placed in them. Such 
intolerance has been directed not only at legislators, but also at the paradigm 
professions, such as law and medicine, and professionals, such as business 
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people, public servants and even university lecturers and school teachers. 
'Accountability' has become the 'buzz-word' of the 1990s. Apart from various 
pieces of legislation, ethical codes are often an integral part of the attempt 
to ensure accountability and exert some measure of control by the 
community over people who live largely without constraint. Such codes, 
however, need to be well formulated and adequately implemented. The 
theory expounded here provides a basis for assessing codes and their 
implementation mechanisms. It remains to be seen whether this approach 
to reining-in the power of influential sectional interests will be successful. 
Notes 
This is a longer version of a paper originally presented at the Ethics in Business and 
the Professions conference, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand in 
June 1993. My thanks to conference participants for their vety helpful comments 
and to Jim Battye and Peter Schouls for reading the penultimate version. This 
chapter previously appeared in the the Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 





Catherine Boardman and Vicki Klum 
An organisation's leaders are the key to its operational effectiveness. They 
are its principal motivators. They provide focus, direction and inspiration. 
They set its ethical tone. 
Why is ethical tone important? 
Every public sector agency, from local councils to government trading 
enterprises, is established for a specific purpose. That purpose might be to 
provide municipal services to the local community or health services to 
regional areas, coordinate education services for the state, or ensure an 
adequate water supply to the capital. Whatever an organisation's purpose, 
it has a public duty to optimise the value of its services to the community. 
Corruption and other unethical behaviour compromise the value of those 
services. Apart from affecting the cost, quality and availability of services, 
unethical behaviour can lead to a loss of public trust. Loss of public trust 
can further undermine the ability of public sector agencies to provide effective 
and equitable services, especially to those most in need. 
Therefore, public sector agencies also have a public duty to reduce 
corruption risks and promote high ethical standards of performance. 
Furthermore, as major purchasers, as well as providers, of services in the 
community, they have the power to influence the behaviour of those they 
deal with. Therefore they have both the opportunity and responsibility to 
lead by example. 
In New South Wales, the importance of ethical tone is acknowledged 
by the explicit requirement that state public sector leaders behave ethically 
and maintain high ethical standards in their agencies. 1 
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T his chapter emphasises the ethical dimension of good management 
and its links to corruption prevention. Its focus is on building organisational 
integrity or completeness. Organisational integrity can be said to exist when 
an organisation's operational systems, corruption prevention strategies, and 
ethical standards are fully integrated to achieve its purpose. 
Background 
The benefits of maintaining high ethical standards 
High ethical standards are not simply an end in themselves. There are 
significant benefits to be gained from raising the ethical tone of an 
organisation. Zipparo (1998) established that sound ethical practices 
contribute not only to an organisation's integrity, but also to its operational 
effectiveness. Zipparo demonstrated that the ethical tone of an organisation 
can affect 
• efficiency and effectiveness 
• decisionmaking processes 
• staff commitment and job satisfaction 
• staff stress 
• staff turnover. 
G iven these findings, organisations that optimise their ethical 
performance will not only protect the public interest and improve their 
resistance to corruption, but are also likely to enhance 
• their reputation 
• their competitiveness 
• their ability to attract and retain quality staff 
• the career prospects of their staff 
• their ability to meet new challenges 
• their ability to serve the community well. 
These are persuasive reasons for giving attention to the ethical dimension 
of good management. 
The causes of unethical behaviour 
In deciding how to promote and maintain high standards of ethical 
behaviour and corruption resistance it is worth looking at some of the causes 
of unethical behaviour. 
Gorta (1998b) has shown that unethical behaviour, such as corruption, 
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opportunity-for example, through poor systems 
little fear of exposure or likelihood of detection-for example, 
lack of organisational reporting mechanisms, or an 
organisation's poor history in dealing with reports of corruption 
lack of ethical leadership and support-for example, unclear 
messages about what is acceptable, setting poor examples, 
failure to reinforce ethical behaviour 
• cultural acceptance of aberrant behaviour, both within the 
organisation and the wider community (including self-excusing 
rationalisations-for example, 'it didn't hurt anyone', 'it's 
standard business practice', 'it's not illegal'). 
It also concludes that examining the context in which corruption and 
other unethical behaviour occurs (organisational culture) can aid corruption 
prevention. 
Zipparo (1998) suggests that the ability to behave ethically in a 
workplace may be related more to aspects of the organisation than to 
attributes of the individual. It establishes that an organisation's ethical 
culture has a powerful influence over an individual's behaviour and, 
specifically, that people are more likely to behave unethically where 




organisational values are unclear 
ethical behaviour is not rewarded 
sanctions for unethical behaviour are not clear 
• there is no practical ethics training. 
These findings highlight the need for a multifaceted approach to reducing 
corruption risks and enhancing ethical performance. In fact, they point to 
the crucial importance of building organisational integrity to create a 
corruption resistant organisation. 
Building organisational integrity 
An organisation's systems, policies and procedures indicate what its leaders 
say they want done, but an organisation's culture determines what is actually 
done. An organisation's culture is strongly influenced by the ethical tone 
set by its leaders. 
An organisation's leaders play the key role in building and maintaining 
a strong ethical culture . A strong ethical culture is a prerequisite to 
organisational integrity. Many of the management initiatives leaders 
introduce to ensure operational effectiveness also contribute to their 
organisation's culture. The focus of this section is simply to provide guidance 
on strategies to integrate the ethical dimensions of good management into 
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overall management objectives and practices . Many CEOs and senior 
managers will already be doing some or all of these things. 
What does a strong ethical culture look like? 
An organisation's culture evolves from a complex web of influences, and a 
strong ethical culture certainly doesn't just happen nor is it necessarily 
instantly recognisable. 
However, ICAC research and experience suggests there are certain signs 
that an organisation has a strong ethical culture. These signs include 
• a sense of common purpose 
• wide recognition of the importance of individuals' 
contributions to achieving the common purpose 
• a high level of trust amongst all staff and especially between 
management and others 
• a strong sense of public duty and a natural tendency to use 
agreed values to guide actions and decisions 
• a willingness to share responsibility for ethical performance 
• a high level of willingness by staff to participate in 
decisionmaking, discuss concerns, seek advice about ethical 
dilemmas, suggest improvements, attend training, contribute 
to corporate activities and so on 
• wide understanding of, and support for, mechanisms for 
handling complaints, grievances and reports of corrupt conduct 
• a focus on how best to achieve desired outcomes rather than on 
unquestioning acceptance of 'this is the way we do it round here' . 
Clearly, these signs have a lot in common with those a CEO or senior 
manager would be looking for to confirm their organisation's operational 
effectiveness. 
What are the prerequisites of an ethical culture? 
While there is no one-size-fits-all vers ion of an ethical culture , an 
organisation's culture is determined by the underlying values and attitudes 
shared by its members. In turn, those shared values and attitudes are shaped 
by features of the organisation such as its functions, its structure, the quality 
of its systems and procedures, its staff profile, its history and, most 
importantly, the values of its leaders. 
Do you know your organisation's existing culture? 
Leaders seeking to build organisational integrity need to know what their 
organisation's existing culture looks like so that they can tailor the broad 
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strategies suggested in the next section to the needs of their particular 
organisation. 
One way to find out about your organisation's culture is to carry out a 
survey. The ICAC has developed a survey, Perceptions o/Your Workplace, for 
this purpose and has piloted the survey with a random selection of public 
sector agencies and local councils, with positive results. An Ethical Culture 
Survey Kit is available to NSW public sector agencies. It contains the survey, 
tips on conducting a successful survey, a report of results of the pilot, and 
practical guidance to assist organisations respond to survey outcomes. 
Strategies for leaders 
Obviously, a CEO or senior manager seeking to enhance the ethical 
performance and therefore corruption resistance of his or her organisation 
will need to acknowledge the particular features of the organisation that 
may have contributed to its existing culture. 
For example, if an organisation has a history of failing to deal appropriately 
with allegations of corruption or hostility between management and other 
staff, strategies for building an ethical culture will need to acknowledge 
these issues through open and honest discussion about 
• the fact that they occurred 
• why they might have occurred 
• what the organisation might do to overcome these problems. 
This chapter does not propose to consider every possible obstacle a leader 
may face. Rather, its focus is on promoting broad strategies that can be 
adopted by all public sector leaders. 
Leaders can demonstrate their commitment to creating and/or 
maintaining a sound ethical culture by adopting five key strategies. 
e Identifying appropriate organisational values. 
• Acting in accordance with those values. 
• Promoting the values to others. 
• Ensuring the values are built into every decision and action of 
an organisation. 
• Striving for excellence. 
Identifying appropriate values 
Everyone has a personal set of ethical values and the vast majority of public 
officials have positive ethics. The focus here, however, is on organisational 
rather than personal values. 
A set of values, whether stated or not, is implicit in the way each public 
sector organisation aims to operate. But the ICAC has found that the absence 
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of an explicit set of common ethical values or principles and a shared 
understanding of how they may be applied to an organisation's work can 
lead to inconsistent decisionmaking and poor resolution of ethical dilemmas. 
In the worst cases it can lead to corrupt conduct. 
At the heart of public sector ethics lies the concept of public duty, of 
serving the public interest above all else. Public duty underpins the public 
sector's reason for being. It remains a principal objective of all public sector 
organisations-ranging from local councils and government departments 
to public sector boards and government trading enterprises-regardless of 
their purpose. 
A range of values and principles already feature, in one form or another, 
as probity principles in ICAC publications and are implicit in the Model 
Code of Conduct for NSW Public Agencies. Both the Ombudsman's Office 
and the ICAC have provided guidance on values. The Ombudsman's Office 
has published Principles of Administrative Good Conduct and the ICAC has 
developed a Model of Public Duty that was published in its 1998-99 
Annual Report (Independent Commission Against Corruption 1999b) . 
The ICAC model aims to identifY a set of key ethical standards, give 
them some structure and provide a reference point for guiding public sector 
actions and decision making. The key ethical standards include 
• serving the public interest 
• acting with integrity by being honest, open, accountable, 
objective and courageous 
• demonstrating leadership . 
Identification of key values or principles is just a starting point. More 
important is the expression of those values, which is found in the quality of 
leadership, communication and support for staff and in the systems, policies 
and procedures an organisation chooses to adopt. 
In NSW, the ICAC encourages all CEOs and senior managers to take 
the lead by adopting and promoting the values contained in the model 
both within their organisations and in dealing with clients, contractors 
and the wider community. 
Acting in accordance with agreed values 
People in organisations are far more likely to be influenced by what their 
CEO and senior managers do than simply by what they say. Therefore, 
CEOs and senior managers need to lead by example. Acting in accordance 
with your words is crucial to creating trust. A breakdown in trust will 
undermine the best efforts to build an ethical and effective organisation. 
Consider the effect on trust of the following examples. 
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• A CEO discusses budget cuts with staff and emphasises the 
need to trim costs, but makes no concessions himself, and 
continues to claim his full entitlements (such as first class air 
travel) . 
• A manager talks to staff about conflicts of interest that can arise 
from inappropriate relations with contractors, but regularly 
lunches with contractors herself. 
Consider the following examples of leaders' actions that might flow from 
adopting the values outlined in the Model of Public Duty. 
Public interest. Leaders should always put the public interest first by 
• guarding against making decisions and taking actions that put 
their own or their organisation's interests above the public 
interest-for example, they should not form strategic alliances or 
accept speaking engagements simply on the basis that they may 
enhance future employment opportunities. 
• always fully disclosing conflicts of interest promptly. 
• acting to minimise the impact of perceived conflicts of interest. 
Honesty. Leaders should be honest. In this respect, they should 
• always comply, and be seen to comply, with an organisation's 
code of conduct, policies and procedures-for example, declare 
gifts and benefits without being asked. 
• ensure their decisions are consistent with government policy 
and guidelines. 
• examine their actions in the context of what they are asking 
others to do and make sure they are consistent-for example, 
leaders should always apply the same rigour to the recruitment 
of their own staff as they expect of other managers when they 
are recruiting. 
Openness. Leaders should seek to be open; they should try to 
• communicate openly, honestly and consistently with staff and 




ensure they communicate with clarity and sensitivity . 
encourage staff to have an active part in an organisation's 
decisionmaking processes and acknowledge and consider diverse 
views, ideas and concerns-for example, leaders should involve 
staff early in corruption prevention planning initiatives (such as 
in identifYing corruption risks and suggesting ways to minimise 
them) otherwise they may consider suspicion is being cast on 
them and therefore resist change. 
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• maintain a high profile and build informal opportunities for 
interacting with staff. 
Accountability. Leaders should strive to be accountable, which involves 
• practising ethical decisionmaking and being prepared to give 
reasons for decisions. 
• Attempting not to hide actions and decisions from scrutiny or 
appearing to do so. 
Objectivity. Leaders must always be objective. Thus, they must 
• examine their decisions for consistency with agreed values or 
principles. 
• consider only relevant issues and guard against the appearance 
of favouritism. 
• ensure their decisions are fully informed. 
Courage. Leaders must always demonstrate courage, by 
• applying public duty principles consistently, regardless of 
pressure to do otherwise. 
• providing frank and fearless advice. 
• supporting staff even in the face of adversity (they must avoid 
making scapegoats). 
• dealing properly with reports of suspected wrongdoing. 
Of course, appropriate actions and decisions will reflect decisionmaking 
that has involved weighing up each of the relevant values. For example, 
• brutal honesty in dealing with a staff error could inhibit future 
openness and accountability and should therefore be tempered 
with sensitive communication 
• in dealing with disclosure of personal information, openness 
would be tempered with the need to protect confidentiality 
(where disclosure is not in the public interest) . 
Promoting the values to others 
Acting in accordance with an organisation's values or principles is one way 
of promoting them to others. There are, however, other strategies that a 
leader can adopt to enhance understanding about the importance and 
relevance of the values. 
Leaders can reinforce what they practice by 
• translating abstract values into practical ethical issues that are 
relevant to the workplace and communicating these at every 
opportunity-for example, discussing the risk to the public 
interest and objectivity of accepting hospitality from a would-
be contractor 
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• telling and retelling stories about appropriate and inappropriate 
ethical action until they become part of the organisation's history 
and signal the type of behaviour that is valued by the organisation 
• ensuring the organisation has in place practical, relevant ethical 
awareness programs and that all staff have access to them 
• ensuring that all training and development, whatever its focus 
(from computer or leadership skills to procurement best 
practice), covers relevant ethical issues 
• ensuring the organisation effectively communicates the 
principles by which it operates and its expectations of its 
clients, contractors and suppliers. 
Leaders can encourage others to share responsibility for maintaining 
high ethical standards by creating a culture founded on trust. Trust is 
confidence that an individual or organisation will do the right thing. 
Individuals are more likely to accept responsibility where 
• they trust an organisation and its leaders 
• they feel trust is placed in them 
• breaches of trust by others in the organisation are swiftly 
addressed. 
Trust does not exist in a vacuum. Leaders can help create an environment 
of trust, respect and cooperation by communicating with honesty, clarity 
and sensitivity. 
Trust must have boundaries. Even the most trustworthy employee should 
be prepared to be subject to scrutiny. Unlimited trust can provide 
opportunities for corruption-for example, the ICAC's investigation into 
the conduct of a former purchasing officer at a Sydney council uncovered 
an example of excessive trust. In that instance, the officer was able to subvert 
the policy of obtaining three quotations, by creating false quotes or calling 
in favours from other contractors to submit excessive quotes, to ensure that 
particular suppliers were awarded contracts. There was unquestioning 
reliance on the officer's recommendations and, in the absence of reasonable 
limits on his discretionary powers (such as regular review of the purchasing 
process), the officer was able to act corruptly. 
Leaders need to establish boundaries within which values can guide 
acceptable behaviour. Codes of conduct, systems (including reward and 
disciplinary systems) and appropriate policies and procedures provide such 
boundaries. For example, 
• measuring an applicant's apparent suitability for a job against 
referees' comments 
• checking the probity of new recruits 
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• requiring passwords for computer access 
• having more than one person involved in tendering processes 
• implementing performance measures that can test the degree to 
which staff carry out their responsibilities efficiently, effectively 
and ethically. 
Appropriate boundaries that ensure public accountability enable an 
organisation to trust its staff to exercise reasonable discretion and to reduce 
its reliance on prescriptive rules . 
Ensuring the values are built into every decision and action of an 
organisation 
Identifying the right values, acting in accordance with them and promoting 
them to others goes some way towards establishing a culture of trust. But 
leaders should also examine other aspects of their organisation to ensure 
they reflect the values if they are going to build a sound ethical culture. 
Policies, procedures, training programs, organisational structures and 
so on can be analysed in terms of the values they express. How consistent 
they are with the right values is likely to coincide with how resistant they 
are to corruption and how effective they are operationally. 
An analysis of an effective corruption resistant tendering process would, 
for example, have integrity and the public interest as its guiding principles. 
Public interest. To the serve the public interest, the process would be 
competitive, selectors would be suitably qualified, conflicts of interest would 
be well managed, and the best value achieved. 
A number of factors contribute to maintaining the integrity of a tendering 
process. These include 
• openness-a corruption resistant tendering process involves 
advertising for tenders, disclosing selection criteria, and 
publishing decisions (key details of winning tender) . 
• honesty-the process complies with the letter and spirit of the 
law and relevant policies and participants disclose conflicts of 
interest promptly. 
• accountability-the decisionmaking process is recorded 
appropriately (avoids hiding detail behind unjustified 
'commercial in confidence' clauses), and tenderers are given 
reasons for decisions. 
• objectivity-the tendering process establishes relevant selection 
criteria and engages independent participation in the selection 
process. 
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• courage-the process maintains probity even if stakeholders 
push for improper outcomes; the process refuses to take short 
cuts for the sake of expediency. 
• leadership-the process promotes values to suppliers/ 
contractors and indicates expectation that they will uphold 
them; it also strives for best practice. 
However, individual policies or procedures, no matter how well they 
respond to corruption risks and reflect appropriate values, do not function 
in isolation. For example, public sector organisations are strongly encouraged 
by the NSW Protected Disclosures Act to have in place an internal reporting 
system to enable staff to report corruption and other unethical behaviour 
without fear of reprisals . A good CEO or senior manager, however, 
understands that the existence of a reporting system alone will not encourage 
reports. People will make reports only if they know about the system, 
understand what constitutes corruption and why it is important to expose 
it and, importantly, only if they are confident their report will be dealt 
with appropriately and that they will be protected from retaliation. 
In other words, a good system depends on the support of 
• leaders and managers (who clearly communicate a strong 
commitment to it) 
• appropriate training and raising of awareness for both potential 
users and administrators of the system 
• clear administrative and responsibility structures. 
The same is true for any of the key corruption-prevention tools that the 
ICAC considers essential to enhancing an organisation's resistance to 
corruption. These include 
• corruption prevention and corruption risk management plans 
• a code of conduct 
• internal reporting, grievance handling, complaints handling, 
recruitment, performance management, disciplinary, rewards, 
internal auditing and internal investigation systems 
• gifts and benefits, conflicts of interest, secondary employment, 
procurement and disposal policies and procedures 
• leadership and ethical awareness programs. 
Their effectiveness is dependent on their content, the extent to which 
they are understood and used and the outcomes that they deliver, which are 
largely determined by the quality of leadership and organisational culture. 
An organisation's leaders should be used to looking at the organisation as 
a whole and to determining the components necessary to enable the whole to 
perform effectively. It is worth looking at ethical culture the same way. 
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Mapping ethical culture 
An ethical culture can be represented as a dynamic system of interdependent 
elements (illustrated in Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 takes the key elements identified in the ICAC research as 
critical to an ethical culture (values, communication and leadership) and 
sets them in an organisational context. 
Corruption resistance depends on the key elements being supported by 
management tools, reflected in organisational structures and strategies and 
utilised to manage an organisation's external environment. 
These key elements include 
1 Ethical values, which underpin everything organisations do (the 
right values are a prerequisite to organisational integrity) . 
2 Leadership, which drives the development and integration of 
the values. 
3 Communication, which ensures shared knowledge and 
understanding of the values and their impact on the 
organisation's operations. 
Encircling this core are the tools and structures which support and reflect 
the key elements. By expressing an organisation's values in practical terms, 
they guide behaviour which will help an organisation achieve its goals. 
Management tools should incorporate 
1 Codes of conduct, which help communicate values and provide 
benchmarks for behaviour. 
2 Systems, policies and procedures, which assist in maintaining 
shared values and translate them into practical, flexible and 
effective actions and decisions. 
3 Training and development, which enable individuals to apply 
values effectively to their work. 
Organisational structures and strategies should encompass 
1 Corporate strategies, which translate values into 'big picture' 
plans of action. 
2 Administrative structures, which contribute to the effectiveness 
of management based on values. 
3 Resources, which ensure services are provided in accordance 
with values. 
The external environment can include the government of the day, clients, 
contractors and the wider community, which can influence an organisation's 
ethical performance and exposure to corruption risks. 
The ICAC encourages CEOs and senior managers to consider the 
interdependencies that exist in their own organisations-how changing a 
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Figure 5.1 Ethical culture 
corporate strategies 
part will affect the whole. If the right values are to underpin everything an 
organisation does, there may be a need to change relevant systems and 
procedures and the way staff are managed, trained and supported. 
For example, this may involve one or a number of the following activities. 
• Reviewing the code of conduct for continued relevance. 
• Updating corruption risk management strategies and 
corruption prevention plans. 
• Changing the way the organisation communicates its values to, 
and manages the expectations of, its clients and contractors. 
• Revising leadership training, induction, and general ethical 
awareness programs. 
• Restructuring workgroups and functional areas. 
• Reviewing job descriptions and duty statements. 
• Revising policies and procedures such as those on auditing, 
conflicts of interest, gifts and benefits, and reporting wrong 
doing as well as those guiding operational tasks. 
• 
• 
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Reviewing recruitment, performance management and 
disciplinary systems. 
Introducing new technology. 
Striving for excellence 
The final key to organisational integrity is a leader's commitment to the 
pursuit of excellence. This means aiming for best practice, especially as it 
applies to public duty and the obligations it imposes, and applying it 
consistently. As research has shown, strong ethical leadership will create an 
ethical organisational culture that has a positive impact on: 






staff commitment and job satisfaction 
staff stress and turnover 
organisational reputation and competitiveness. 
Organisational integrity checklist 
As a leader, 
• do you know your organisation's culture or cultures? How? 
• can you identifY your organisation's values? 
• do those values include, or are they consistent with, public 
duty principles? 
• do you act in accordance with those values? 
• do you promote those values to others? How? 
• do those values underpin decisions and actions of the 
organisation? How do you know? 
Have you ensured the organisation has 
• sound corruption prevention and risk management plans? 





sound corporate, strategic and business plans that are consistent 
with the organisation's purpose and values? 
clearly stated and understood roles and responsibilities? 
a commitment to, and strategies in place for, open and honest 
communication? 
effective awareness programs for staff, clients, contractors, 
suppliers and the community (including practical ethics training 
for staff, guarantees of service for clients, publicity on rights and 
responsibilities for clients, contractors and suppliers)? 
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• rewards for those who act ethically and punishments for those 
who act un ethically? 
• clearly stated and understood policies, systems and procedures 
that enable individual staff, clients, community members to 
have their concerns resolved without reprisals or detriment to 
themselves (including internal! external reporting, grievance 
handling, complaints handling)? 
• a commitment to recruiting the right people (those that most 
closely share the values of the organisation) and developing 
them so that they continue to provide high quality, ethical 
contributions and services (for example, recruitment policy and 
procedures, individual performance management, ongoing 
training and development)? 
• sound internal boundaries to behaviour which reflect core 
ethical values (policies and procedures for organisation's 
operations such as gifts and benefits, conflicts of interest, 
procurement, contracting out, revenue collection) and that are 
conducive to high ethical performance (flexible and efficient, 
not rigid and overly bureaucratic)? 
• sound audit processes? 
• a commitment to and policies and procedures that encourage 
learning and enable continual improvements to the 
organisation's corruption resistance and ethical performance 
(monitoring and evaluation, participative decision making, 
training and development)? 
How do you know that 
• the messages you are sending about ethical behaviour are being 
received and accepted by staff, contractors, suppliers or clients? 
• the strategies your organisation decides to use to promote ethical 
behaviour and enhance corruption resistance are effective? 
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Note 
1 Executive Service Model Contract of Employment (Premier's Memorandum No 98 -
37) specifically requires CEOs to behave ethically and maintain high ethical 
standards. Therefore CEOs' performance agreements are likely to make them 
accountable for carrying out this responsibility effectively. 
6 
Controlling corruption by 
heads of government and 
political elites 
David A. Chaikin 
Grand corruption 
The fraudulent enrichment and corruption of heads of states and senior 
government officials is a problem which has only recently begun to interest 
international lawyers. The organised and systematic plundering of national 
treasuries or spoliation of assets by political and military elites has ravaged 
many developing countries, exacerbating poverty and undermining 
economic and social development. 
When a greedy authoritarian leader or despot is in power, there are 
few (if any) opportunities for taking legal action to prevent or interdict 
stolen monies or the proceeds of corruption. If, however, the authoritarian 
leader is deposed, the new government may seek the assistance of foreign 
governments and courts to investigate and recover stolen assets which are 
located abroad. 
Although grand corruption is not a new problem, it has more serious 
consequences when practised by modern dictators . First, even if the 
dictator is overthrown, this does mean that the stolen money will be 
recovered, for the mobility of wealth has had the consequence that money 
may be deposited outside the country. Another consideration is the sheer 
size of the theft. The following examples are worth considering. 
• The former Shah of Iran misappropriated an estimated 
US$35 billion over 25 years of his reign, largely using various 
foundations and charities to conceal his illegal acts. No 
monies were recovered by the new Islamic regime of Ayatollah 
Khomenei. 
• Ferdinand Marcos abused his position as President of the 
Philippines from 1965 to 1986 to acquire vast amounts of 
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property and wealth-including gold-belonging to the 
people. The Guinness Book of Records states that Marcos is one 
of the biggest thieves in history. But Switzerland only 
'discovered' a mere US$340 million of Marcos money, and after 
ten years of litigation those millions plus interest were 
repatriated from Switzerland to the Philippines. 
• Papa Doc Duvalier and his son, as Presidents of Haiti from 
1957-86, used the entire machinery of the state to extract 
between US$500 million and US$2 billion. It is estimated that 
during 1960-67, 877 per cent of government expenditure was 
paid directly or indirectly to Duvalier and his supporters. Only 
a relatively small amount of money was ever recovered by the 
Government of Haiti. The case was handicapped by a lack of a 
criminal conviction against Duvalier. 
• Manuel Antonio Noriega, convicted cocaine trafficker and 
former commander of the Panamanian Defence Forces, 
transferred nearly US$20 million of his fortune to banks in 
Europe in 1988. A significant part of this fortune was obtained 
through bribes from Colombian drug traffickers, but the fact 
that the US intelligence service also provided large amounts of 
finance to Noriega complicated the question as to whether his 
monies were licit or illicit. 
• Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire stole billions of dollars from one of 
the poorest countries in the world, and yet the Swiss authorities 
and banks have only found US$3.4 million in Switzerland. 
Mobutu's untimely death while in exile, and the international 
legitimacy of the new government have complicated the 
recovery process. 
• The former communist leader of Romania, Nicholas Ceausescu, 
acted as a feudal lord over his estate-he treated it as a resource 
to be plundered at will. During his more than twenty years in 
power, Ceausescu stole millions of dollars for the benefit of his 
family, while Romanians suffered abject poverty. An 
investigation by a Canadian team of investigators in 1990 
traced significant assets corruptly diverted by Ceausescu, but a 
lack of political will in Romania meant that there was no 
effective follow-up action. 
• The self-proclaimed Emperor Bokassa of the Central African 
Republic looted his country to the point of starvation. 
President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, President Ahidjo of 
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Cameroon, and former President Amin of Uganda are all 
accused of looting the treasuries of their respective countries. 
It has been often stated that corruption by the political elite is perhaps 
the most important obstacle to economic development. There is plenty of 
evidence that corruption may render a country bankrupt. 
Criminality of political alites 
The case of Ferdinand Marcos provides a useful illustration of grand 
corruption. Marcos was President of the Philippines from November 1965 
until his flight from the Republic in February 1986. In an act of infamy, 
on 21 September 1972, Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines 
and then imposed an unjust dictatorship. 
For various geopolitical reasons, the Marcos regime was strongly 
supported by the United States and its allies. For example, between 1962 
and 1983 the United States provided US$3 billion in economic and military 
aid. During this same period the World Bank lent US$4 billion to the 
Philippines government. The large-scale borrowing from official lenders 
and foreign banks was seen as a major source of economic development. 
Unfortunately, a substantial part of the Philippines' external borrowing 
was redirected out of the country via capital flight, which for the most part 
was in violation of Philippines law. Former-President Marcos must take the 
lion's share of responsibility for this capital flight. By 1985, the Philippines 
had the heaviest external debt burden (measured by the external debt to 
national income ratio) of any country in East and Southeast Asia. An 
important new feature was that, while the external debt was largely public, 
the external assets were strictly private. 
The Marcos rule was undoubtedly economically disastrous for the 
Philippines. The causes were varied but greatly facilitated by the criminality 
of the former President, his family, friends and cronies. Evidence of their 
predatory criminality is found in various published materials. A Racketeering 
Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) claim brought in 1989 in 
California sets out in some 100 pages the details of how Ferdinand Marcos, 
Imelda Marcos, and others conspired to loot, divert and launder public 
assets for their personal use and benefit. The RICO claim estimated that 
US$5 billion in ill-gotten wealth was taken by the Marcos family, their 
associates and accomplices. 
The illicit wealth was gleaned by looting of money and property owned 
by the Philippines government and the central bank; diversion of 
entitlements to foreign economic assistance, including assistance from the 
United States and Japan; and extortion of and/or soliciting of bribes and 
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commissions in exchange for the granting of government employment, 
government contracts, licenses, concessions, permits, franchises and 
monopolies. 
It is difficult to believe that the United States was unaware of the looting 
of the property of the Republic of Philippines for the benefit of the Marcosl 
Romualdez family and their associates. The display of public indifference 
by the US government to the Marcos family's predatory criminal activities 
may be justified as realpolitik. It had the side-effect, however, of giving 
comfort to Swiss banks and other financial institutions who were assisting 
the Marcos family in investing and disguising their illicit wealth. 
The meaning of illicit wealth 
The distinction between illicit assets and property lawfully belonging to a 
dictator or authoritarian leader is by no means clear in countries that suffer 
appalling regimes-for example, that imposed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq. 
Where the authoritarian leader takes control of all the institutions of 
government, where there is no distinction between the head of state and 
the state itself, and the law is changed to 'legitimise' if not justify the 
economic plunder, then the law of the dictator authorises economic crimes. 
Moreover, where there is no legal distinction between the funds of the state 
and those of the ruling class, it is problematic to define 'illicit assets'. Abuse 
of political power for economic ends is thereby sanctioned by the state. 
Furthermore, if the authoritarian leader is deposed and the state brings 
into play a new constitution and laws which retrospectively criminalise 
acts of spoliation by the former leader, then the question arises as to whether 
courts in other countries will recognise retrospective criminal acts. Under 
the laws of most countries, the answer to this question is no. 
Intelligence and investigatory techniques 
The significance of practical investigatory and legal problems in tracing 
and recovering of assets in an offshore setting cannot be underestimated. 
Even well-resourced international banks write off billions of dollars each 
year in bad debts which are sourced through fraud. The usual procedures 
for tracing of assets, liquidators and official receivers often do not result in 
adequate recovery. 
The problems are extensive. First, the illicit assets must be located and 
shown to be owned or controlled by the target-for example, a deposed 
dictator. The tracing of assets is an extremely complex task, which has been 
made more difficult in a world where wealth is mobile and money laundering 
more sophisticated. The facilities of tax havens and the instruments of bank 
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secrecy must be overcome. Second, the recovery of illicit monies may take a 
considerable period of time because of procedural and substantive laws in 
the requested country. Where third parties make claims on the same assets, 
the recovery process is complicated. 
Few international investigations are supported by adequate intelligence 
and surveillance systems. The traditional passive methods of obtaining 
information are often unsuitable in the context of detecting serious economic 
crime. The difficult and often time-consuming task of penetrating the target-
especially one that is protected by organised crime or powerful elements in 
the government-suggests a need for alternative mechanisms. Such mechanisms 
will not be elaborated on here. A key part of any recovery strategy is secrecy. 
Net worth analysis 
A simple method of determining whether a political leader has accumulated 
illicit wealth is to carry out a net worth analysis test. A person's net worth 
is the amount by which one's assets exceed one's liabilities. A political leader's 
net worth should increase during his period of public office only to the 
extent that he has legitimate savings from his income and/or capital 
appreciation. Any increase in net worth that cannot be explained should be 
treated with suspicion. Indeed, in some countries such as Hong Kong and 
India, any unexplained increase in wealth by a public official constitutes a 
prima focie criminal offence. 
Net worth analysis is a valuable investigatory tool in circumstances where 
there is no direct link between the political leader and the alleged illegal 
activity, for example, where money has been effectively laundered. It is also 
useful when the target has acquired many assets, or where the records or 
documents showing the financial activities of the political leader are missing, 
destroyed or are unreliable. 
The Marcos family are a prime example of people with political power 
who failed the 'net worth test'. A financial analysis based on the Marcos 
family's income tax returns for the financial years 1966-85 are revealed in 
Table 6.1. It is interesting to note that Ferdinand Marcos was barred from 
practising as a professional lawyer during his entire twenty-year presidency, 
but Marcos claimed that his legal fees represented 'receivables from prior 
years'-that is, prior to the period 1967-84. 
When Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos became the First Couple in 1965, 
their net worth was only P120,OOO (US$7,OOO). When they were thrown 
out of the Philippines in 1986, their estimated assets amounted to more 
than US$S billion. Indeed, the Swiss accounts of the Marcos family which 
were frozen in 1986 amounted to approximately US$357 million. This 
sum far exceeded the Marcos family's legitimate increase in net worth. 
102 Corruption and Anti-corruption 
Money laundering and offshore financial secrecy 
A major obstacle in the recovery of the hidden wealth of the Marcos family 
is that the former President was a master manipulator of financial transactions 
and used an extensive and complex system of laundering monies through 
Swiss and offshore banks. Marcos did not generally use his own name in 
illegal transactions; instead he used nominees such as friends, cronies and 
layers of foundations and companies to conceal his activities. The Marcos 
family thrived on the idea of secret names. For example, in a letter dated 18 
October 1968, Marcos informed his Swiss bank that the 'word John Lewis 
will have the same value as our own personal signatures'. Later President 
Marcos chose the pseudonym 'William Saunders' while Imelda Marcos chose 
the name 'Jane Ryan' in transacting business with their Swiss banks. The 
Marcoses used every laundering scheme available to conceal their investments. 
At the same time his Swiss banks offered him various instruments of bank 
secrecy to protect his interests, such as numbered accounts, Liechtenstein 
Foundations, and attorneys with professional secrecy obligations. 
Much has been written about Swiss bank secrecy. It is well known that 
it is not only based on a contractual relationship between banker and client, 
but is also backed by criminal sanctions. Swiss Bank Corporation explains 
Swiss bank secrecy in the following way 
... that no one working in a bank, be he an officer, employee, authorised agent 
or auditor, may divulge any information whatsoever about any matters dealt 
with in the course of his job. This even includes knowledge of whether someone 
is a client, no matter whether temporarily or permanently, whether the client is 
Swiss or a foreigner, whether he resides in Switzerland or abroad and whether 
the bank transacts business for him only in Switzerland or abroad as well 
(Schutze 1983). 
Swiss bank secrecy has gained a formidable reputation because the Swiss 
authorities take breaches of bank secrecy (which amount to a criminal offence) 
very seriously, and because Swiss bankers fiercely protect the privacy of 
their customers through various practices and technological systems. For 











Source: Republic of the Philippines v Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, Case 
No 0141, Sandiganbayan, 17 December, 1991. 
Heads of government and political elites 103 
example, accounts of VIPs are usually listed by numbers or codes which are 
known only to a limited number of bank employees, and not to all employees 
dealing with the account. The secrecy principle used by government 
intelligence agencies, that is the 'need to know' principle is diligently applied 
by Swiss banks for the benefit of their clients. 
The Swiss banks also offered Ferdinand Marcos the use of corporate 
vehicles to protect his interests. For example, the Swiss bank accounts which 
were originally in his own name were replaced by Swiss bank accounts in 
the name of various Liechtenstein Foundations. Thus Marcos did not appear 
as the account-holder. The advantages of a foundation is that the identity 
of the beneficial owner is concealed in a private fiduciary agreement and 
the existence of a Liechtenstein Foundation does not appear in a publicly 
available record. 
Extreme secrecy was facilitated in Switzerland by the use of lawyers or 
notaries in setting up Swiss bank accounts. Ordinarily, a Swiss bank was 
required to identify its customers so as to prevent the anonymous and illicit 
investment of assets. Indeed, since 1977 the Due Diligence Agreement of 
the Swiss Banking Association set out specific rules on proper identification 
of accounts, the breach of which could lead to a fine of up to SFr. 10 million. 
The Agreement had a serious flaw, however, in that clients could conceal 
their identity by using lawyers who would front for their clients. The banks 
required the lawyers to sign the notorious Form B in which they declared 
that they were familiar with the beneficial owner of the account and that 
they were unaware of any improper business of the owner. Form B allowed 
lawyers to vouch for their client's good standing and in effect also allowed 
the banks to claim that they did not know the true owner of the account. 
There is evidence that the Swiss financial intermediaries used Form B as 
a vehicle to assist President Marcos in hiding his assets. For example, one of 
the documents found at the Malacanang Palace in Manila following Marcos' 
flight was a letter dated 19 May 1983 from a Senior Vice President of a 
major Swiss bank to President Marcos, informing him that due to changes 
in Swiss banking law, the attorneys of his Liechtenstein Foundation, who 
were also bank employees, had resigned and had been replaced by new 
attorneys from a prominent Geneva law firm. The advantage of this change 
was that 'the independent lawyer (can offer) .. . the additional secrecy of his 
professional privilege' . 
The significance of the above transactions is that none of the Swiss banks 
acknowledged that Marcos used Swiss lawyers as a front to conceal Marcos 
assets. Indeed, in 1986, when the Philippine government requested the 
Swiss authorities to freeze Marcos family accounts, there was complete 
silence about the nature of the Marcos family interests. Furthermore, even 
104 Corruption and Anti-corruption 
after the Swiss Supreme Court ruled that the banks must disclose all the 
bank documents concerning the Marcos accounts to the Philippine 
government, the Swiss authorities failed to provide comprehensive information 
about the accounts. Not one Form B document in the name of Swiss lawyer 
was disclosed. The documents disclosed by the Swiss merely confirmed 
what the Philippine government already knew about the Swiss bank accounts. 
In theory, the extent of the problems in the Marcos case would not be 
seen again because Switzerland has abolished Form B accounts and introduced 
a new stringent money laundering law. Indeed, it has been claimed that the 
effects of these changes to Swiss law is that Switzerland is no longer as attractive 
a place for secreting illicit assets . However, the facts suggest that the Swiss 
banks continue to be attractive to foreign dictators and politicians. 
Operation Big Bird and Philippine mutual assistance requests 
Operation Big Bird was a plan devised by a Filipino banker, Michael de 
Guzman, to 'recover' a part of the Marcos fortune in Switzerland. It was 
hatched shortly after the revolution in 1986 when Ferdinand Marcos and 
his family were forced to flee the Philippines. De Guzman, who knew the 
son of Marcos' security chief, flew to Hawaii and obtained powers of attorney 
from both Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. He then flew to Zurich and, on 
24 March, requested Credit Suisse to transfer the money and assets of eleven 
of Marcos' Liechtenstein Foundations to an Austrian bank in Vienna. The 
bank officers stonewalled de Guzman and told him to return the next day. 
Credit Suisse then informed the Swiss authorities that a Marcos agent was 
seeking to withdraw US$213 million. Later that evening the Swiss Federal 
Council imposed an emergency freeze order on the Marcos assets. 
Evidence suggests that, at that stage, de Guzman was acting on behalf 
of the Marcos family and not on behalf of the new Philippines government. 
Only de Guzman knows whether he had a secret agenda to double-cross 
Marcos and steal the money for the Philippines people. What is interesting 
is that Credit Suisse did not act immediately on the instructions of Marcos 
agent, even after its bank officers telephoned Marcos, who confirmed that 
the had issued a power of attorney to de Guzman. One of the reasons for 
Credit Suisse's caution was that the Swiss Banking Commission had ordered 
all banking institutions to report their holdings in Switzerland or their 
management from Switzerland of any assets of the Marcos family, or of 
persons or legal entities connected with them. 
The Federal Council's unilateral freeze order was unprecedented in Swiss 
banking history. Some Swiss bankers claimed that 'it would compromise 
Switzerland's reputation as a haven of banking secrecy' . Its legal justification 
was said to be the external affairs power of the Swiss Constitution. The 
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freeze order was made in anticipation of a claim by the Philippines 
government for Marcos' money. 
The Philippines government welcomed the freeze order. At this time, it 
was confident that the Swiss legal system would provide an expeditious 
mechanism to recover the ill-gotten fortune of the Marcos family. The 
Philippines government hired three politically well-connected and highly 
competent lawyers from Zurich, Geneva and Lugano to handle their case. 
An official request by the Solicitor General of the Philippines to continue 
the freeze was made on 7 April 1986. This was followed by the filing of a 
formal mutual assistance request with a detailed brief, setting out the 
criminal charges which were being investigated in relation to Marcos and 
the evidence of the Marcos family's Swiss bank accounts. The Swiss Federal 
Department of Justice then issued a freeze order in substitution for the 
exceptional freeze order by the Federal Council. This freeze order was later 
confirmed by the Swiss Supreme Court and is still in force today. 
Meanwhile, de Guzman had joined forces with Colonel Jose Almonte, a 
distinguished army officer, in order to recover the Marcos monies. De 
Guzman tried again to withdraw the Marcos money at Credit Suisse but 
without success. He then sought the assistance of the Presidential 
Commission for Good Government (PCGG) and the Solicitor-General. On 
4 July Solicitor General Ordonez filed a request with the Swiss Federal 
Office for Justice and Police asking Credit Suisse to transfer monies in eleven 
Foundations to an Austrian bank account controlled by de Guzman. The 
request was signed by the Solicitor General and Colonel Almonte on behalf 
of the Philippines Government, and de Guzman as the duly authorised 
representative of the Marcos family. It was supported by Swiss government 
officials who promised to arrange for the defreezing of the Swiss accounts. 
However, the money was never sent to the Vienna bank. Solicitor General 
Ordonez had became disillusioned with Operation Big Bird and was 
concerned about a possible diversion of the funds. His concerns were 
supported by PCGG's Swiss lawyers who received information that the 
Vienna bank was in financial trouble. On the instructions of Ordonez, and 
without informing Almonte or de Guzman, the Swiss lawyers requested 
Credit Suisse to transfer the Marcos monies to a new destination, namely 
an account of the Philippines government to be opened at Credit Suisse. 
Before complying with this request, the Swiss bankers contacted Marcos, 
who now said that the powers of attorney were fake and that his only 
representative in Switzerland was his lawyer, de Preux. Subsequently, the 
Swiss authorities rescinded the defreeze order. The monies thus stayed in 
Credit Suisse under the name of the Marcos Foundations, and were subject 
to a freeze order. 
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The Philippines government did not recover any money from Operation 
Big Bird. The failure of this operation has been the subject of a report by a 
Special Committee on Public Accountability by Representative Victorico 
Chaves, as well as a report by Senator Salonga, the first chairman of the 
PCGG. The Chaves report blamed Salonga, Ordonez and the Swiss lawyers 
for aborting what it described as the best chance for recovering some of the 
Marcos money. On the other hand, Salonga says that Ordonez saved the 
Philippines government from a massive theft. 
This is not the place to comment on whether Operation Big Bird was 
an ingenious operation to double-cross Marcos for the benefit of the 
Philippines people or whether it was an operation controlled by a Marcos 
agent to secure money for the former President. I do not wish to add to 
the rumours, speculation and political backstabbing concerning this affair. 
However, I make three observations. First, Swiss lawyers representing the 
PCGG-the body tasked by the Philippine President to trace and recover 
the Marcos assets-have asserted that Marcos must have been sure that if 
and when the money was transferred to Vienna, it would be available to 
him. That is, Marcos would have only agreed to the transfer to Vienna if 
he was sure that he would be the beneficiary. This assertion fails to take 
into account how vulnerable Marcos was in Hawaii and that he was just 
as dependent on de Guzman as was the Philippines government. Second, 
it has been suggested that de Guzman intended to steal the money for 
himself. But for de Guzman to steal money so openly would be stupid. 
Moreover, de Guzman was entitled to over 540 million pesos (that is, a 
20 per cent commission on the US$213 million) if it was recovered. It is 
likely that de Guzman did not trust Philippines officials to pay him a 
commission, and that is why he wished to keep control over the account. 
Third, one of the beneficial effects of Operation Big Bird was that the 
information gathered by de Guzman, together with the documentation 
found at Malacanang Palace, formed the basis of the Philippines 
government's claim on the Marcos fortune. 
International legal cooperation and asset recovery 
In the Marcos case, Swiss cooperation with the Philippines was based on 
the 1981 Swiss federal law on international criminal assistance, the 1982 
implementing ordinance, and various procedural and enforcement provisions 
in the laws of the cantons of Switzerland. Not surprisingly, a team of 
attorneys for the Marcos family waged a vigorous battle against the 
Philippines government's recovery efforts. It is interesting to note that the 
Marcos family have never given an adequate explanation as to how they 
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could fund this expensive litigation, given that their assets in the Philippines, 
United States and Switzerland were frozen in early 1986. It is estimated 
that tens of millions of dollars in legal fees have been expended by the 
Marcos family in protecting their overseas assets. 
The Swiss litigation has essentially involved three stages. First, the Marcos 
family opposed the provisional freeze order, as well as the order that their 
banks hand over to the Swiss authorities information concerning the 
accounts. This stage oflitigation proceeded through various cantonial supreme 
courts and was ultimately heard by the federal (Supreme) court in Lausanne, 
which ruled in favour of the Philippines government on 1 July 1987. 
The second stage concerned whether and when the information and details 
concerning the bank accounts would be transmitted to the Philippines 
government. It took another three years before the Swiss courts reached a 
decision. On 21 December 1990, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled 
that the Swiss authorities were entitled to hand over to the Philippines 
government the information concerning the Marcos family's Swiss bank 
accounts. In particular, the court noted that although no charges had been 
brought against the Marcoses or their accomplices, the Philippines government 
had expressed a clear desire to institute criminal proceedings before the 
Sandiganbayan (anti-corruption) court. The court also observed that the 
Philippines government had delayed opening a criminal proceeding against 
the Marcos family until it received the banking information from Switzerland. 
The third and final stage of the litigation concerns whether and when 
the assets in the Swiss bank accounts will be returned to the Philippines. 
The Swiss Supreme Court, in its decision of 21 December 1990, accepted 
that in principle the assets should be returned to the Philippines. But the 
Court set out certain preconditions for the transfer of the frozen assets to 
the Philippines. First, the Philippines government had to file a criminal 
charge and/or bring a forfeiture proceeding against Mrs Marcos in the 
Philippines by 21 December 1991. If a criminal prosecution or forfeiture 
proceeding was not instituted within this period, not only would the assets 
not be returned to the Philippines but the freezing order would be lifted. 
Second, the assets would only be repatriated to the Philippines when the 
Sandiganbayan or another Philippines court competent in criminal matters 
made a final decision concerning the criminal prosecution and/or forfeiture. 
That is, the Filipino courts had to render a final judgment that the assets 
were stolen property and were to be forfeited and returned to their original 
owner, the Philippines government. Thirdly, the criminal prosecution and/ 
or the forfeiture proceeding were required to comply with the procedural 
requirements of due process and rights of the accused under the Swiss 
Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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No Philippines government official would have predicted that the Swiss 
courts would impose such strict conditions before repatriating the illicit 
Marcos assets. This led Mr Gunigundo, former chairman of the PCGG, to 
voice considerable reservations about the utility of IMAC (International 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters), the Swiss law on judicial assistance. 
In 1996, Mr Gunigundo made the following comment 
I believe that lMAC has really been conceptualised to make it more difficult for 
the requesting state to secure the release of any frozen account given so many 
conditionalities which are involved, and given our experience with the Marcos 
accounts since 1986 which have been frozen for 10 years. l 
Despite these comments, the Swiss authorities made a deal with the 
Philippines government for the repatriation of the monies to the Philippines 
prior to the satisfaction of the conditions imposed by the Swiss Supreme 
Court. Under this deal, the Office of the District Attorney of Zurich ordered 
the restitution of the now US$S70 million frozen in Switzerland to the 
Philippines National Bank, to be held in escrow pending the satisfaction of 
the various conditions. The decision of the District Attorney of Zurich was 
challenged by the Swiss banks and various Marcos foundations . But, in a 
series of decisions in December 1998 and January 1999, the Swiss Supreme 
Court upheld the order of the District Attorney of Zurich. In reaching its 
decision, the Swiss court said 
Today's state of knowledge does not allow serious doubt about the illegal 
provenance of the seized monies. The incompleteness of the records makes it 
impossible to attribute the individual assets to specific offences, and it is 
possible therefore that also legal assets of the Marcos family were deposited 
with the foundations. However, such legal assets could, as established correctly 
by the claimant, only be minor sums compared to the total amount of the 
assets seized. With respect to the overwhelming majority of the assets seized, 
the facts are sufficiently clear to allow the assumption of an obvious illegal 
provenance. Under these circumstances an early restitution of the assets is 
possible in principle if there are sufficient guarantees that the decisions 
regarding seizure or restitution, respectively, will be rendered in proceedings 
according to law and order. The decision whether to seize or restitute monies 
seized must be taken in the Philippines where the criminal actions were 
committed.2 
The court also recognised that 'Switzerland has a considerable interest 
in an early restitution of (the frozen) monies'.3 In essence, the court said that 
the money should be returned to the Philippines where the local court(s) 
would make the final decision as to the lawful ownership of the alleged 
Marcos monies. 
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Limits to international assistance 
The political dimensions in cases of recovery of grand corruption should 
never be underestimated. The Marcos case is a leading example of how different 
interest groups have sought to prevent recovery. The Swiss banks have been 
singled out because they have been the prime beneficiary of grand corruption 
and state theft. There is now considerable evidence that the Swiss banks have 
not fully cooperated with Philippine government pleas for assistance in 
retrieving the illicit assets of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos. The evidence 
of non-cooperation can be found in the following material.4 
• Operation Domino-an undercover operation of the Philippine 
government to trace the gold and cash assets of the Marcos 
family which was sabotaged by the Swiss authorities resulting 
in the laying of criminal charges for economic espionage against 
Reiner Jacobi, an agent of the Philippine Presidential 
Commission on Good Government. In 1991, the German 
courts rejected a Swiss request to extradite Jacobi on the 
grounds that the Swiss charges were of a political nature. 
• The 1994 documentary film on Operation Domino including 
a filmed confession by the Director of Communications of a 
leading Swiss bank admitting to a Marcos account. 
• Failure of the Swiss authorities to respond adequately to 
Philippine government requests in 1998 to freeze the assets of 
Irene Araneta Marcos which were allegedly held at the 
abovementioned Swiss bank. 
• A criminal complaint made by Attorney Francisco Chavez, the 
former Solicitor General of the Philippines, concerning the 
conduct of various Swiss banks, Swiss and Liechtenstein 
fiduciaries , and Swiss public servants. The criminal complaint 
was made in 1999 to the then Swiss Attorney General Carle de 
Ponte. 
• The evidence submitted to the Philippine Senate Blue Ribbon 
Committee, which conducted hearings in 1999 and 2000 into 
an alleged conspiracy between the Swiss banks and the PCGG 
to divert and hide the assets of the Marcos family. 
• German Goverment Intelligence Reports on the 'Money 
Laundering Community in Liechtenstein' which specifically 
identified five Liechtenstein financial advisors to the Marcos 
family and pointed to the intimate links between Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland (1999 , 2000) . Subsequently, Liechtenstein 
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was named as an un-cooperative country by the Financial 
Action Task Force into Money Laundering (FATF). 
In February 2001, Irene Marcos Araneta, the youngest daughter of former 
Philippine President Marcos, visited Germany and unsuccessfully attempted 
to transfer the Marcos family monies out of secret accounts in a Swiss bank. 
The failure of the Marcos family to get access to their illicit funds suggest 
that after the death of Ferdinand Marcos, the Marcos family may have lost 
control of the funds vis-a-vis the Swiss banks and Swiss fiduciaries. 
Criminal sanctions against political elites: extradition and prosecution 
In many cases, the bringing of criminal charges against a former dictator 
will be a vital part of the process of recovering the proceeds of corruption. 
However, the bringing of criminal charges against a deposed dictator raises 
difficult issues, including the following. 
• Criminal trials are usually heard in the presence of the 
defendant. For example, under the Bill of Rights chapter of the 
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the 
accused is entitled to meet the witnesses face to face and no 
trial may take place in the absence of the accused except after 
arraignment, provided the accused has been duly notified and 
his failure to appear is unjustifiable. 
• A criminal trial would require that the deposed dictator be 
extradited from a third country. It is rare for a dictator to be 
returned to his home country, usually because he has been 
given sanctuary or asylum. 
• Even if there was an extradition treaty or arrangement with a 
third country, it is unlikely that that country would consent to 
extradition. Further, the defendant may seek to rely on various 
exceptions to extradition, such as the 'political offence' exception, 
or to rely on doctrines such as 'act of sovereign immunity'. 
• Extradition is not usually granted where there is a substantial 
risk that the accused will not obtain a fair trial in the requesting 
state. It is difficult for a deposed dictator to get a fair trial, 
especially because of the problem of selecting an impartial jury. 
In most cases, the new government will not wish to extradite a deposed 
dictator because of concerns about national security. For example, the 
government of Corazon Aquino considered that the return of former President 
Marcos to the Philippines would provide a rallying point to Marcos loyalists 
and set the stage for a coup detat. There is evidence to show that Marcos 
was conspiring in 1987 to invade the Philippines with a military force and 
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seize power. Indeed, US State Department officials, after learning of Marcos's 
covert schemes, confined him to Oahu Island in Hawaii. 
Another possibility is to arrange for the trial to be heard in a third 
country or the so-called country of asylum. For example, President Aquino 
of the Philippines signed an executive order authorising Sandiganbayan 
(anti-corruption) court to try cases outside Philippines territory and Solicitor 
General Chavez asked US officials whether the tribunal could be convened 
in Hawaii. But the United States would not permit a foreign court to conduct 
a criminal trial within US jurisdiction. 
The remaining option in the case of former President Marcos, was a 
criminal trial in the United States for US offences. Grand juries in New 
York and Virginia were already investigating the Marcos family. Any future 
trial might be heavily politicised, given that Marcos had been a 'staunch 
ally of the United States' and that President Reagan still considered Marcos 
a friend. The US Attorney-General offered a plea bargain to the Marcos 
family whereby if they pled guilty and surrendered certain assets they would 
not be imprisoned. Marcos refused. Consequently, on 21 October 1988, 
the Marcos family was indicted by a federal grand jury in New York for 
RICO offences, including mail and wire fraud, fraudulent misappropriation 
of property, and obstruction of justice. 
Marcos was too sick to attend the arraignment and on 28 September 
1989 he died. On 20 March 1990, Imelda Marcos was arraigned and put 
on trial. On 2 July 1990, Imelda Marcos was acquitted on all counts . A 
number of reasons have been given for the acquittal, but the major weakness 
was the difficulty of linking Imelda to the criminal conduct of her husband. 
Jurors interviewed after the trial told some reporters that they could not 
hold the widow responsible for the crimes of her husband. The Philippines 
government explained the loss in the following terms 
Imelda Marcos (Imelda, for short) was acquitted in New York. There was a 
failure of evidence, an illusion of innocence. The American prosecutor waited 
for the transmittal from Switzerland of documents that would have established 
Imelda's direct participation in the illegal deposits in Swiss banks of money 
belonging to the Filipino people. The Swiss documents never came. Her 
defence that she had neither knowledge nor participation in the illegal dollar 
deposits in Swiss banks by her late husband, was consequentially sustained. 
Somehow, she had hypnotised herself into believing her own lies. After all, she 
got the American judge and jurors to believe her.s 
In the Philippines, more than 100 criminal and civil cases have been 
brought against Mrs Marcos. For example, more than 26 criminal cases 
were filed in the Sandiganbayan, 37 criminal cases were brought in the 
Manila Regional Court and 16 criminal cases were brought in the Quezon 
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City Regional Trial Court. The criminal cases concerned, among other things, 
Mrs Imelda Marcos' involvement with various Liechtenstein Foundations, 
the looting of the Central Bank of the Philippines by the sale of US$125 
million treasury notes to various foundations . Mrs Marcos was accused of 
violating the anti-graft law, and of tax fraud and misappropriation of public 
funds. Most of these cases were filed within the time limits imposed by the 
Swiss court. The filing of the criminal cases was made on the basis of the 
approval of the Ombudsman, who certified that the accused was probably 
guilty of the offences. 
A significant problem in resolving the cases against Mrs Marcos is that 
under the judicial system of the Philippines, long and interminable delays 
are commonplace and the judiciary is inclined to postpone hearings at the 
request of the defense or prosecution. Mrs Marcos' lawyers have successfully 
exploited the Philippines judicial system and made a mockery of the notion 
of timely justice by, for example, filing no less than seven motions for the 
dismissal/quashing of the charges against her, all of which were refused by 
the courts. Mrs Marcos' lawyers also sought to delay the hearing of the 
cases by filing numerous postponements. 
Nevertheless, following a trial of twenty months, Mrs Marcos was 
convicted in 1993 by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. Mrs Marcos 
was sentenced to prison for 18-24 years, with a minimum of 9-12 years, 
and was perpetually disqualified from public office. Mrs Marcos' motion 
for the consideration of her conviction and sentence was subsequently 
dismissed. Her appeal to the Supreme Court was initially unsuccessful, 
but a differently reconstituted Supreme Court reheard her case en banc and 
she was acquitted. Mrs Marcos faces numerous other criminal charges, 
however, which may take years before a hearing and final conclusion is 
reached. Finally, the Sandiganbayan (the anti-corruption court) in Manila 
has held that the Marcos family must forfeit the secret deposits in Swiss 
banks. The civil forfeiture decision is now subject to appeal. 
Defences in civil recovery proceedings 
There are a number of defences which may be available in civil recovery 
proceedings involving former dictators. The relevant doctrines include the 
act of state doctrine, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and the doctrine 
of head of state immunity. 
Act of State doctrine 
Under the 'act of state' doctrine, a court will not conduct a hearing in a case 
which involves it making decisions concerning the conduct of a foreign 
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government under the law of a foreign sovereign. But does this doctrine 
apply to spoliation cases against former dictators of a country? 
In the United States, the act of state doctrine was a significant part of 
the defence of former President Marcos in claims brought by the Republic 
of the Philippines for the recovery of substantial property and assets in 
New York and California. In New York, the Republic of the Philippines 
sought to recover five substantial properties, including a 7l-storey office 
building on Wall Street which was held by, and through, corporations in 
Panama, the Netherlands Antilles and the British Virgin Islands, which 
were allegedly puppets of the Marcos family. 
In New York, the Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction 
restraining the transfer of the properties pending trial, and rejected the 
Marcos defence of act of state. The Court said that a distinction had to be 
drawn between private acts and official acts of a foreign head of state; that 
official acts were not reviewable to US courts, even if they were in violation 
of international law; but acts committed in a private capacity did not fall 
within this exclusion. The court noted and considered significant the fact 
that the Plaintiff in the case was the foreign state which the former head of 
state had controlled. Although the court initially refused an injunction, it 
later reheard the case and decided that the act of state doctrine would not 
be a barrier to the suit and granted worldwide injunctions. 
In contrast to the Marcos case is the decision of the French courts in the 
Duvalier litigation. In 1986, the Republic of Haiti sued the Duvalier family 
in France, claiming that the family had embezzled over US$120 million 
from the Republic during the Presidency of Baby Doc Duvalier from 1971 
to 1986. The French Court de Cassation ruled that it would not exercise 
jurisdiction in order to enforce claims of the Republic which were not 
founded upon public law-that is, their purpose was related to the exercise 
of governmental power. 
Court of convenience/ Forum non conveniens 
Under US practice, a court may decline to hear a case, even if it falls within 
the jurisdiction of the court, in circumstances where the court has decided 
that the case could be more conveniently and appropriately heard in another 
jurisdiction. 
After the fall of the Shah Pahlavi of Iran, the new Islamic Republic sued 
the former Shah in New York and the principal money laundering deposit 
vehicle, the Pahlavi Foundation. It was alleged that the defendants had 
accepted bribes, misappropriated or embezzled many billion dollars in 
Iranian funds. The Court of Appeals of New York upheld the dismissal of 
the suit based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The case ostensibly 
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failed because the Islamic Republic had not established a substantial nexus 
or connection between the acts complained of, and the forum where the 
action was brought. The court reached this decision even though the record 
did not establish that there was an alternative forum where the action could 
be maintained. 
Head of State immunity 
The head of state doctrine was considered in the Noriega case (see United 
States v Noriega 117 F 3d. 1206 (1997». Manuel Antonio Noriega was 
convicted in the US Federal Court of multiple counts of involvement in 
cocaine trafficking. He appealed against his conviction on a number of 
grounds, including his claimed status as a head of state. The relevant facts 
pertaining to Noriega's political status were as follows. At the time of his 
indictment in March 1988, Noriega was the commander of the Panamanian 
Defence Forces in the Republic of Panama. The Panamanian President, Eric 
Arturo Delvalle, dismissed Noriega from his military position, but Noriega 
refused to accept the dismissal. Panama's legislature then sacked Delvalle, 
but the US government continued to recognise Delvalle as the constitutional 
head of Panama. A presidential election was held but the results were hotly 
contested, with allegations of vote rigging and corruption. The US 
government recognised Guillermo Endara as Panama's President and thus 
head of state. On 15 December 1989, Noriega publicly declared that a 
state of war existed between Panama and the United States. The United 
States, on the orders of President Bush, invaded Panama and seized Noriega 
(see United States v Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D. Fla. 1990». 
The District Court, and on appeal the Court of Appeals in the United 
States, rejected Noriega's claim for head of state immunity. On the 
assumption that the head of state immunity is operative, the court looked 
at the Executive Branch for direction on the propriety of a claim for head of 
state immunity (Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995)-
holding that Executive Branch had not recognised defendant as head of 
state) . It had been suggested that in the absence of a formal determination 
by the Executive that the defendant was to be treated as a head of state, no 
immunity should be granted by the courts (In re Doe, 860 F. 2d 40, 45 
(2d. Cir». And prior to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Act the former Fifth Circuit had held that where the Executive Branch does 
not convey clearly its position on an immunity question, the judiciary should 
make an independent ruling on that issue (Spacil v Crowie, 489 F 2d 614, 
618-619 (5th Cir 1978» . In the Noriega case, the Court of Appeal 
considered that Noriega's community claim failed under either the Doe or 
the Special standard. It went on to conclude that 
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[t]he Executive Branch has not merely refrained from taking a position on rhe 
matter: to the contrary, by pursuing Noriegas capture and rhis prosecution, rhe 
Executive Branch has manifested its clear sentiment that N oriega should be 
denied head-of-state-immunity. Moreover given rhat rhe record indicated that 
Noriega never served as the constitutional leader of Panama, and rhat Panama 
has not sought immunity for Noriega and that the charged acts relate to 
Noriegas private pursuit of personal enrichment, Noriega likely would not 
prevail even if this court had to make an independent determination regarding 
the propriety of immunity in rhis case (p. 121). 
Indeed, in re Doe the court noted at 45 that 'there is respectable authority 
for denying head-of-state (immunity) for private or criminal acts'. 
Turning to the question of act of state doctrine, the District Court said 
In order for rhe act of state doctrine to apply rhe defendant must establish that 
his activities are 'acts of state', that is, rhat they were taken on behalf of the state 
and not, as private acts, on behalf of the actor himself. .. That the acts must be 
public acts of the sovereign has been repeatedly affirmed ... Though the 
distinction between public and private acts of government officials may prove 
elusive, this difficulty has not prevented rhe courts from scrutinising rhe 
character of the conduct in question (pp. 1521-2) . 
The court concluded that acts of drug trafficking could not conceivably 
constitute public acts on behalf of the Panamanian state. See also Hilao v 
Estate of Marcos (1994) 25 F.3d 1467, where the claim for immunity by 
the Estate of former President Marcos of the Philippines Government failed 
in circumstances where the Philippines government filed a brief in which 
they asserted that foreign relations with the United States would not be 
adversely affected if claims against former President Marcos and his estate 
were litigated in US courts. 
Head of state immunity was raised in a criminal context in the Pinochet 
case. In December 1998, the British House of Lords was faced with one of 
the most important international human rights legal questions since World 
War H. Was Augustus Pinochet Ugarte entitled to immunity as a former 
head of state from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom 
in respect of acts alleged to have been committed whilst he was head of 
state? According to the Chilean authorities, Pinochet had been President of 
the Government Junta of Chile and then Head of State for the Republic of 
Chile from 1973 to 1990. Pinochet had assumed power in 1973 after a 
military coup in Chile against the democratically elected government of 
Salvador Allende. His militaty regime was recognised by the government of 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Pinochet continued in power 
until after democratic elections, whereupon he handed over his power to 
the newly-elected President Aylwin in March 1990. 
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It was not Chile, the country where Pinochet resided, that sought 
Pinochet's arrest and extradition. It was Spanish prosecutors who sought 
the extradition of the former Chilean leader on the basis that he had procured 
and ordered the most serious of crimes-genocide, murder on a grand scale, 
torture and the taking of hostages-against Spanish citizens in Chile. The 
Government of Chile lodged a formal protest with the British government 
over Pinochet's arrest, pointing out that Pinochet was entitled to immunity 
as a former head of state and visiting diplomat to the United Kingdom. 
The House of Lords held that the crimes of torture and hostage-taking 
fell outside what international law would regard as functions of a head of 
state and therefore General Pinochet was not entitled to immunity from 
criminal process, including extradition. This decision was set aside by the 
House of Lords because of claim of appearance of bias of one of the Law 
Lords. 
Rights of third parties 
One problem facing governments in the recovery of assets from a former 
head of state is competing claims made by third parties. In the case of the 
Marcos assets, claims were made by third party creditors, including unpaid 
lawyers, suspected bogus claimants, and by various torture victims of the 
Marcos regime. 
The most significant non-government claimants are the victims of Mar cos' 
human rights abuses. During Marcos' rule, the political opposition was 
suppressed and massive human rights abuses were inflicted on a large 
number of-mainly poor-Filipinos. In Hawaii, a class action suit was 
brought by nearly 10,000 victims and/or their relatives for summary 
execution, torture, disappearance and arbitrary detention. The class actions 
suit was brought under a unique US federal law, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
28 USC #1350. This statutory provision authorises US Federal Court 
jurisdiction over 'any civil action by an alien for a tort committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States' . Former President 
Marcos, who lived in Hawaii, sought unsuccessfully to dismiss the suit on 
the grounds of head of state immunity, lack of personal jurisdiction, and 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Mter 
ten years of litigation, a judgment of nearly US$2 billion was obtained by 
the Plaintiff class of nearly 10,000 Filipino victims of torture, summary 
execution and disappearance. This judgment has been upheld on appeal to 
the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. But as at today the human 
rights victims have collected an insignificant portion of monies on their US 
judgment. All efforts to collect the judgment have been frustrated. 
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Conclusion 
There is increasing international concern as to the devastating effect of 
grand corruption on developing countries. An important international 
measure to deal with grand corruption is the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
which was adopted by 28 of the 29 OECD countries on 17 December 
1997. The OECD Bribery Convention requires each signatory to introduce 
into domestic law a criminal prohibition for bribery of foreign public officials, 
effective sanctions against such bribery, and accounting and auditing laws so 
as to 'prohibit the establishment of the off-the-book accounts, for the purpose 
of bribing foreign public officials or of hiding such bribery' (OECD 1997). 
A related and equally important development is the introduction of 
new and more comprehensive money laundering rules. In many countries, 
officers and employees of financial institutions render themselves liable to 
prosecution for money laundering if they accept, deposit, invest or transfer 
assets stemming from crime and corruption. For example, since May 2000, 
Swiss banks which intentionally accept funds belonging to foreign holders 
of office and which stem from corruption may be prosecuted for money 
laundering. 
A useful preventative measure is the increased due diligence standards 
adopted by international banks. For example, in 1987 as a direct 
consequence of the Marcos case, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission 
developed a practice requiring Swiss banks to enter into business 
relationships with high-ranking public officials, such as heads of state of 
members of government, only with the approval of senior management. 
Unfortunately, there is considerable evidence that Swiss banks continue 
to accept foreign political leaders as customers. For example, in November 
1999 the Swiss Federal Banking initiated an investigation into nine Swiss 
banks which had accepted and handled funds (of over US$670 million) 
from the entourage of the President of Nigeria, Sanni Abacha. The 
Commission publicly condemned six banks for not handling the customer 
relationship with the necessary due diligence. 
Finally, the case of former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos provides 
a prime example of the obstacles faced by a successor government in tracking 
and recovering corrupt and stolen assets. This chapter has detailed the wide-
ranging legal, political and institutional problems beset by developing 
countries in retrieving such assets. It is time to consider whether the 
proposed International Criminal Court should extend its jurisdiction to 
include cases of grand corruption and economic plunder since such criminal 
activity can have as great an economic and social impact as war crimes. 
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The microeconomics of 
corruption 
the classical approach 
Flavio M. Menezes 
This chapter reviews the classical approach to the microeconomics of 
corruption. Based on the pioneer work of Gary Becker (1968) and George 
Stigler (1970) on the economics of crime, Becker and Stigler (1974), Rose-
Ackerman (1975, 1978) and Banfield (1975), among others, have applied 
standard economic tools to analyse corruption. 
In particular, this chapter focuses on a principal-agent model of 
corruption: the relationship between the principal-the top level of 
government-and the agent-an official, susceptible to taking bribes from 
private firms interested in supplying the government with a particular good 
or service. This chapter provides a simplified version of Rose-Ackerman 
(1975, 1978) to explore the relationship between market structure, 
government preferences and the likelihood of corruption. As a corollary, it 
considers the extent to which corruption can be reduced by revising 
contracting procedures and reorganising market strucrures. 
Although no formal training in economics is required to understand 
this chapter, knowledge of economic principles such as demand, supply 
and market equilibrium is useful. l The only analytical tools used are simple 
algebra and diagrams. There are three types of agents in the stylised economy 
examined; namely, a policymaker, a lower-level bureaucrat, and firms . The 
policymaker is assumed to be an honest individual who establishes the 
government's preferences over goods and services that will be procured by 
the government. The lower-level bureaucrat, who is responsible for the 
purchasing decisions, chooses his actions in order to maximise his expected 
gains from any dealings-which may include bribes. However, the 
policymaker monitors the purchasing decisions. The firms also choose their 
actions to maximise profits. This may include, for example, deciding whether 
or not to offer a bribe to the official and if so the size of the bribe. 
119 
120 Corruption and Anti-corruption 
Throughout the chapter we consider the case where the goods the 
government wishes to buy may be potentially provided by many sellers_ 
Government with well-defined preferences 
This section assumes that the government has well-defined preferences-it 
knows what it wants. For example, the government will accept a less preferred 
alternative only if the price is lower. The likelihood of corruption will depend 
on the homogeneity of the goods and on the existence of private markets 
where these goods are traded. 
Homogenous goods 
Suppose private markets exist and goods are homogeneous. Examples include 
office supplies, computers, furniture and cleaning services. In this case 
corruption is unlikely to occur for at least two reasons. First, sellers have no 
incentive to bribe government officials to sell a good that otherwise would 
be sold in the market. Second, corruption can be easily detected as it will 
be apparent that the government paid more than the market price. 
Now suppose private markets do not exist but goods are still 
homogeneous. Examples include the construction of a children's playground 
or a bridge. These goods are homogenous in the sense that they will be 
built according to a given specification. As the bridge specification is unique, 
however, there is no universally-known pre-existing price. The government 
cannot buy this good in the marketplace and therefore bribery may occur. 
Firms may try to bribe the government official so that he chooses to buy 
their goods or services . Bribery may be eliminated, however, if the 
government uses a tender process in which sealed bids are submitted, the 
winner is the seller with the lowest bid, and bids are made public after the 
winner is selected.2 
Differentiated goods 
Now suppose each seller provides a somewhat differentiated good. Examples 
include the provision of accounting or word-processing software, or the 
design and production of military aircraft or nuclear submarines. If these 
differentiated goods are available in the marketplace, as is the case with 
word-processing software, then corruption is unlikely to occur. T he reason 
is that the prices of word processors are known to all economic agents and 
the government is able to rank the products in terms of their desirability. 
Therefore, the existence of bribery is easily detectible by observing whether 
more has been paid than the price of a preferred product. Under these 
circumstances, corruption can only persist if there are special advantages to 
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the briber in doing business with the government, such as reputation-
building or if the government is a large buyer. Again corruption of this 
type can be eliminated by using a sealed-bid tender process. 
If private markets do not exist, then corruption is likely to occur. For 
example, although there are general accounting software packages available 
in the marketplace, they may not be suitable for use by the government, 
which requires instead the development of a customised package. In this 
case, it is still reasonable to assume that the government has well-defined 
preferences over distinct features of the software. That is, it is prepared to 
pay more for more preferred options. 3 
The assumption has been that an honest policymaker establishes the 
government's preferences and reviews purchasing decisions, but a lower-
level bureaucrat makes the purchasing decisions. There are many potential 
sellers who offer a spectrum of price and quality packages. These goods or 
services are not available in the marketplace. 
Given that firms have perfect knowledge of the government's preferences, 
all sellers' offers should appear equally desirable to the government. If one 
producer clearly dominated the others at the initial offering price, then the 
other sellers could be expected to lower price and raise quality to bring 
themselves into line with the dominant seller (if this can be done without 
causing financial losses). 
Once sellers have equalised their price-quality offerings, the contracting 
official can satisfY the policymaker by purchasing from any of the competitors 
because there are no private markets. Thus, firms may attempt to win the 
contract through bribery. The contracting official is assumed to organise 
the bribery market by truthfully informing each corrupt firm of the size of 
the bribe offers he has received. 
Denote the size of the total bribe offered by seller i to the official as bi , 
and the expected penalty to the official as 
pO(b i )=~ 
2 
The expected penalty is simply the penalty if caught multiplied by the 
probability of being caught. One possible interpretation of the given expected 
penalty is that the entire bribe is confiscated if the official is caught and the 
probability of this event is equal to 50 per cent. Note that this expected 
penalty increases with the bribe. 4 
Thus, the expected gain to the official from engaging in corruption, 
denoted by nO is given by 
nO (b i ) = b i _ pO (b i ) = ~ 
2 
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The official will accept a bribe if, and only if, the expected gain from 
doing so is greater than or equal to zero. Thus, the official will accept any 
non-negative bribe. 
Let p denote the price per unit offered in equilibrium, q the quantity 
demanded by the government, Ti i's total cost of producing q units, and 
pS (b i ) = b i the expected penalty to seller i. One possible interpretation of 
the given expected penalty is that the seller has to pay a fine equal to twice 
the value of the bribe if caught and the probability of this event is equal to 50 
per cent. Note that this expected penalty also increases with the bribe. 
Seller i's expected profit, denoted by ni, is given by the difference 
between total revenue from selling q units at price p and the total cost 
which includes both production costs and the cost of bribing the official 
(bribe plus expected penalty). That is 
ni (b i ) = pq _ Ti _ bi _ pS (b i ) = pq _ Ti _ 2bi 
Seller i is willing to offer a bribe rather than lose the contract as long as 
i's expected profits from doing so are greater than or equal to zero 





The maximum feasible bribe from seller i's point of view is 
pq_Ti 
2 
Therefore, the firm with the lowest cost can offer the highest bribe and win 
the contract. But they will not usually have to offer as much as the maximum 
bribe; they can still win by offering a bribe just fractionally above the second 
firm's maximum. The actual size of the bribe is somewhere between the 
maximum feasible bribe for the winner and the maximum feasible bribe for 
the firm with the second lowest cost (Figure 7.1). Let firm 1 have the 
lowest cost and firm 2 the second lowest cost. The actual size of the bribe is 
somewhere between 
pq_T1 pq_T 2 
and -=----:"-----
2 2 
and is determined by the relative bargaining power of the official vis-tt-vis 




Firm 2'. profit 
function 
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pq . T1 
2 
bribes 
cannot be an equilibrium because at this level firm 2 will also be willing to 
bribe the official in order to win the contract, 
For the bribery market to work as described above there must be at least 
two firms willing to participate. That is, we need pq - T 2 cO . Moreover, 
the resulting allocation is efficient as the contract is won by the firm with 
the lowest cost. 
Bribery when the government's preferences are unclear 
Suppose now that the government is procuring a military training aircraft 
or the construction of a bridge . It is reasonable to assume that the 
government's preferences are not well-defined. Suspension bridges may be 
aesthetically more appealing than the alternative but it is unclear how much 
more the government should pay for such a bridge. A military training 
aircraft that can fly very low may be preferred to one that cannot. Again it 
is not clear how much more the government should be prepared to pay for 
such a feature. 
As before, it is assumed that an honest policymaker establishes the 
government's preferences (which are now not well-specified) and reviews 
purchasing decisions. The purchasing decisions are made by a lower-level 
bureaucrat who can engage in corrupt dealings with firms . This official is 
again assumed to organise the bribery market by informing each seller 
truthfully of the bribe offers received from other firms. As before, there are 
many potential sellers. 
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In this styli.sed model, the quality level of the good provided by seller i, 
denoted by u I, is fixed but the price charged by seller i, denoted by pi, can 
vary. The parameter U I is assumed to be a number between 0 and 1, w.here 
u 1= 0 implies that the good is of the worst possible quality and u 1= 1 
means that the good is of the best possible quality. This parameter can also 
be interpreted as some feature of the good being procured by the 
government-in the example of a bridge, u I could represent the number 
of lanes or the life expectancy of the bridge provided by firm i. 
The expected penalty to the seller is assumed to be 
I 
pS (bi ) = pi ( b i + L ) 
u l 
That is, an increase in the price charged by firm i or a decrease in the 
quality provided increases the expected penalty. This increase can occur 
either because both low quality and expensive goods are more likely to 
attract the attention of the policymaker who reviews the purchasing decision, 
or because penalties may be more severe in the case of either lower quality 
or higher price. For example, an official who was proven to have received a 
bribe for the construction of a bridge that has collapsed because of low 
quality is likely to receive a harsher penalty than an official who was caught 
but whose corrupt dealings did not include procuring a bridge of low quality. 
Suppose firm i produces q units of a good of quality u I, and chooses to 
charge a price pi and offer a bribe V Then firm i's expected profit is given 
by 
i 
ni( pi ,bi ) = piq _Ti _bi _ pi( b i +L) 
u l 
Firm i's expected profit is equal to the revenue obtained from selling q 
units minus production costs and the costs of bribing the government official 
(bribe plus expected penalty) . For a given price t, firm i is willing to offer 
a bribe bi as long as 
ni(pi,bi)~O 
Let the function (bh, pb l denote the price-bribe combination that yields 
zero profits for each firm where 
i 2 
piq_Ti_(P) 
bi ~ _____ ---'U=-l_ 
1+ pi 
The shaded area in Figure 7.2 illustrates all combinations of price pi 
and bribe bi that yield positive profits for firm i. Note that, for prices below 
pi, an increase in the price has to be accompanied by an increase in the 
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bribe in order to keep profits equal to zero. For prices above pi, an increase 
in prices has to be accompanied by a decrease in the bribe in order to keep 
profits equal to zero. The value of pi can be obtained by deriving the 
right-hand side of the above expression, with respect to pi and setting it 
equal to zero. This yields 
pi =~l+(ai p +aiTi -1 
The official's expected penalty is also assumed to be an increasing function 
of the price charged by seller i and a decreasing function of the quality. The 
justification is the same as above. In particular, the expected penalty to the 
official is given by 
20 
Given a price i charged by firm i, the official's expected gain from 
receiving a bribe bi is equal to 
nO(bi,pi )=bi _L(bi +~) 
20 at 
For any price i, the official accepts a bribe bi if 
nO(bi,pi )~O 
Figure 7.2 Firm I's price-bribe combination for 1' ... 5, q - 10 and 
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Denote by (bb, pb l the price-bribe combination that yields at least zero 
gain for the official where 
P
i 
bi ~ . . 
(20- pi )u l 
The shaded area in Figure 7.3 indicates all combinations of price i and 
bribe bi that yield positive profits for the official. Note that, for any given 
pi, one can find the value of bi that makes the official indifferent between 
accepting or rejecting the bribe. 
If expected penalties are sufficiently h igh, bribery is deterred-
( bb, pb llies above (bb, pb l ' so mutual gain is impossible. Otherwise, 
any bribe-price combination satisfYing these two inequalities simultaneously 
is feasible in that both the firm and the official can gain from the transaction. 
In this case, the firm that wins the contract is the one for which the official's 
net gain (measured by the distance between the two curves) is the highest. 
The equilibrium price and bribe combinations are displayed in Figure 7.4 
for the case where firm i can offer the official the highest net gain and Ti = 5, 
q = 10 and u i = 0.7. 
Policy implications 
There are several important implications from the above analysis. First, the 
more efficient is the firm-that is, the lower its costs are-the more likely 
it is to win the contract by bribing the official. Second, firms can also 
Figure 7.3 Official's price-bribe combination for r =5, q = 10 and 
at : 0.7 
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reduce their and the official's expected penalties by offering goods of higher 
quality. Third, political influences can also play a role. For example, firms 
may lobby lawmakers to introduce less severe penalties and reduce the 
likelihood of an audit. This could be accomplished by convincing lawmakers 
to reduce the appropriation to the government department that conducts 
the audits. Finally, perhaps the most important implication is that penalties 
may be ineffective in eliminating bribes unless they are sufficiently large. 
The above models assume away several interesting possibilities. First, it 
was assumed that firms that lose a contract either do not learn of the bribe or 
fail to report the winning firm to law enforcement officials. If, however, a 
losing contractor does credibly threaten to expose corrupt practices, it is in 
the winner's interest to propose a cartel in which contractors share in the 
bribes and the benefits. Whistle-blowing legislation is typically designed to 
create the right incentives for members of the cartel to report other members' 
illegal activities. A more complete model would address such possibilities. 
The above models also assume away informational issues. The official 
may not truthfully inform firms of the bribe offers he has received and may 
exaggerate their value. If firms think that this is possible, they may not 
believe the official's claims. Similarly, a firm's cost may not be known to 
other firms or the official, resulting in strategic behaviour by all agents. 
These information asymmetries may cause moral hazard (hidden actions) 
and adverse selection (hidden information) problems. One of the main 
contributions of economists over the last 20 years has been to try to 
Figure 7.4 Equilibrium price-bribe combinations when firm; offers 
the highest net gain to the official and r - 5, q = 10 
and et= 0.7 
-4 
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understand how information issues can affect outcomes. In particular, under 
information asymmetries, corruption may lead to inefficient outcomes-in 
contrast to the analysis above where the winning firm exhibited the lowest 
cost. Thus, the analysis above may underestimate the costs of corruption.5 
Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to introduce some of the insights from 
the classical microeconomic theory of corruption. The underlying message 
is that the rigorous analytical approach of economists may provide insights 
into the causes of corruption and assist in the design of anticorruption 
mechanisms . A simplified version of the work of Rose-Ackerman was 
provided to point out that the amount of corruption discovered is not a 
function only of the resources devoted to surveillance and law enforcement; 
there are other economic factors as work. In particular, if the market structure 
changes from one of the forms that are more prone to corruption to another 
in which the incentives for bribery are smaller, pre-existing corrupt 
relationships are more likely to be uncovered. For example, if a good that 
was produced exclusively for the government is now sold in private markets, 
bribery will be easily detected. Similar discoveries may occur when 
policymakers can specifY their preferences more precisely. For example, by 
revealing the technical criteria used in the procurement of a certain good, it 
may become clear that officials paid more for a less preferred object. 
This analysis also suggests the wisdom of considering more basic changes 
in the relationship between government and private sector. When there 
may be hidden corruption costs involved in buying goods for the specific 
use of the government, it may be better to purchase standard goods from 
the marketplace, despite possible quality loss. If this is not possible, policies 
should be designed to reduce vagueness in purchasing instructions given to 
officials and to increase monitoring of purchasing decisions. It should be 
stressed that although such policies may help to reduce corruption, they 
may not be able to completely eliminate it unless penalties are very large. 
Appendix 
Further reading 
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The economics literature6 on corruption has grown substantially since the 
seminal work of Banfield, Rose-Ackerman, and Becker and Stigler. Instead 
of providing a complete list of recent contributions to the literature, I indicate 
below some representative papers from the different approaches taken by 
economists . 
One issue that has attracted the attention of economists is the relationship 
between corruption and development. Mauro (1995) provides empirical 
evidence that corruption lowers investment and consequently lowers 
economic growth. His work is extended in Mauro (1998) to include cross-
country evidence on the link between corruption and the composition of 
government expenditure. Bardhan (1997) provides an excellent survey of 
the theoretical research on the link between corruption and development. 
Gray and Kaufmann (1998) and Robinson (1998) provide a more 
interdisciplinary and policy-oriented view on this link. 
A second strand of papers explores the link between market structure 
and corruption-as in Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978). Examples of papers 
in this strand include Banerjee (1997), Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Lui 
(1996). While Banerjee and Lui link the existence of corruption to the 
presence of market distortions, Bliss and Di Tella point out that competition 
may not necessarily lower corruption in certain industries. 
A third stream follows Becker and Stigler (1974) and, for a given market 
structure, investigates compensation schemes for the bureaucrat that may 
reduce or eliminate corruption. For example, Mookherjee and Png (1995) 
propose an optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged 
with monitoring pollution from a factory. Chand and Moene (1997) 
examine the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives 
to officials. They conclude that simply providing bonuses is not enough. 
Finally, there is a strand of the literature that examines corruption within 
an organisation. For example, Kofman and Lawarree (1993) present a model 
of corruption in an organisation that suggests that external auditing can be 
better explained by its role in enhancing the independence of internal 
auditors. Mehmet (1998) examines the more specific problem of the 
existence of corruption in a public organisation. It is shown that there is a 
trade-off in the choice of the supervision procedure and penalties: the 
reduction of individual corruption results in higher risk of organised 
corruption. 
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Notes 
The author thanks Robert Albon and Steve Dowrick for many useful comments. 
There are many outstanding economics principles textbooks that may be helpful to 
the reader such as Gans, King and Mankiw (1999) and Taylor (1998) . 
2 One still has to determine the price to be paid by the government to the seller with 
the lowest bid. With an honest auctioneer (that is, the individual who conducts the 
tender process) and when the sellers' costs are represented by independent and 
identically distributed random variables, the pricing rule chosen does not matter. 
For example, the government's expected price is the same whether it pays the lowest 
or the second-lowest bid (Riley and Samuelson 1981). In particular, the 
government's expected price is equal to the second-lowest seller's cost. However, if 
the auctioneer is corrupt, then the particular mechanism does matter for the 
likelihood of bribery occurring (Jones and Menezes 1995). Moreover, sellers may 
still collude and force an (honest) government official to pay more than the second-
lowest price (Mailath and Zemsky 1991). 
3 This assumption may not be reasonable in the purchase of nuclear submarines or 
military aircraft where preferences over distinct features may be unclear or not even 
specified at the time of design. The next section examines the situation where the 
government does not have well-specified preferences. 
4 One can argue that the likelihood of detecting bribery increases with the size of the 
bribe; larger bribes are easier to detect because the official may exhibit signs of 
wealth, or larger banking transactions may attract the attention of the taxation 
office. In addition, many legal systems impose penalties (fines and jail terms) for 
corruption that increase with the size of bribes. 
5 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) explicitly investigate the effects of corruption on 
resource allocation. 
6 The recent literature on corruption in the related fields of sociology and political 
science is not listed here. See, for example, the citations in Alam (1989). There is 
also a large related literature on tax evasion that is not referenced below. See 
Chander and W ilde (1992) and the references therein. 
8 
Transnational crime 
corruption, crony capitalism and nepotism 
in the twenty-first century 
John McFarlane 
The 1990s saw some of the most dramatic developments in modern history. 
The collapse of the former Soviet Union and consequent conclusion of the 
Cold War has changed the entire security architecture developed over the last 
fifty years. Other substantial changes in the political map in those fifty years 
include the emergence of new political and economic alliances, such as the 
European Union (EU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN); the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO); the 
proposal to establish an International Criminal Court, and the return of Hong 
Kong to Chinese sovereignty. Many nations have come to the conclusion that 
by surrendering some sovereignty they may benefit from the collective security 
and prosperity offered by cooperative arrangements with other states. 
Superimposed on recent political and economic developments have been a 
number of other important changes, mostly derived from the spectacular 
developments in technology over the last decade. There has been a revolution 
in the way we handle information and communicate it to others. The 
globalisation of banking and commerce has changed the way international 
business is transacted. The speed and efficiency of international travel have 
changed our way of thinking as we have become citizens of the 'global village' . 
Our capacity to transport cargoes and provide services at the international 
level would have been inconceivable a few decades ago. 
It is clear that the social, political and criminal environment in the twenty-
first century will be infinitely more complex than that of previous years. The 
end of the Cold War has marked the beginning of a period of dangerous chaos 
in many countries, where good governance has been replaced by anarchy (Russia 
and former Yugoslavia), apparent inter-communal harmony has deteriorated 
into inter-ethnic savagery and 'cleansing' (Rwanda and Bosnia), unemployment 
and poverty have increased dramatically (Indonesia and El Salvador), 
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population disruption has reached serious proportions (Sierra Leone and 
China), religious and cultural schisms have given rise to extreme violence 
(Algeria and India), and many weak states have effectively failed (Somalia and 
Liberia). Other states, including some in the Asia Pacific region, have little 
chance of surviving without massive injections of aid, which they are unlikely 
to receive. Many of the pessimistic predictions made by Kaplan (1994), van 
Creveld (1996) and Huntington (1993) are proving to be accurate. 
Developments to transnational crime 
These changes have also opened up new opportunities for criminals operating 
at the transnational level. Trends such as easier travel, deregulated business 
transactions, and rapid technological change are likely to continue and become 
key causes of crime in the years ahead (Williams 1995a, 1995b). Crime, 
particularly at the transnational level, will become increasingly entrenched, 
widespread and complex. For example, Russia, which initially embraced the 
opportunity for change, was ill-prepared for the market economy and the social 
and political problems which followed the collapse of the previous system, so 
that the only people who appear to have benefited from the changes have been 
corrupt politicians and businessmen, regional warlords and the sophisticated 
and well-established mafiya groups. To say that Russia, a former 'superpower', 
is now on the verge of disintegration and collapse is not an exaggeration. 
Similarly, there is little doubt that greed, poor regulatory practices, corruption, 
crony capitalism, nepotism and criminal extortion were all significant 
contributors to the precipitation of the Asian financial crisis. 
No country has been unaffected by these changes. The micro-states of the 
South Pacific have such limited resources that two small countries have 
generated, quite legally, up to 10 per cent of their national revenue from leasing 
facilities to the operators of international telephone sex lines. One South Pacific 
country, Tuvalu, with a population of only 9,500 people, is hoping to generate 
up to US$65 million per year from the sale of its internet domain name, 'tv' 
(Pacific Islands Monthly, January 1998). Some of these countries are also 
providing offshore banking facilities which appear to have been exploited by 
transnational criminal organisations (Pacific Islands Report, 15 February 1999) 
As a result of these and other changes in the international criminal 
environment, some transnational organised crime groups now have the 
capabilities and enough resources to challenge nation-states. Furthermore, 
transnational crime in its various manifestations can have a significant impact 
on international stability and security. Indeed, transnational crime is now widely 
accepted as part of the new security agenda in an increasingly complex and 
unstable global milieu. 
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Transnational and cross-border crime 
There is no internationally accepted definition of transnational or cross-border 
crime. Andre Bossard, Secretary-General of the International Criminal Police 
Organisation (INTERPOL) between 1978 and 1985, has written that elements 
constituting transnational crime are 
• the crossing of a border either by people (criminals, fugitives on 
the way to commit a crime, or victims-such as in the case of 
traffic in human beings), or by things (firearms-such as when 
terrorists put arms on a plane before takeoff, techniques of money 
laundering). Objects used in the commission of a crime, such as 
drugs on carriers or in containers, or even criminal will may also 
cross borders (such as in computer fraud, when an order given 
from Country A is transmitted to Country B) 
• international recognition of a crime. At national level, according 
to the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege' (no offence, 
no sanction without law), antisocial conduct can be considered as 
a crime only if there is a legal text providing for it. At 
international level, the act must be considered a criminal offence 
by at least two states. This recognition may result from 
international conventions, extradition treaties or concordant 
national laws (Bossard 1990:5). 
In describing transnational crime, WE McDonald (1995:2, 14) noted that, 
as with traditional criminology, the new field can be divided into two loosely 
linked sub-areas. First, there is transnational criminality, its causes, characteristics, 
social and geographic distributions, and effects. Second, new transnational and 
global institutions of crime control are being constructed. He added that 
[t}he international regime being constructed to deal with the new 
transnational criminality represents a post-modern crossing of borders and 
assertions of particular values as universals ... The borders to be crossed are 
not just the political boundaries of nations but legal, cultural, religious, and 
organizational boundaries within states. 
Williams (l995b:6) describes 'transnational criminal organisations' as 
' .. . organised crime groups that have a home base in one state, but operate in 
one or more host states where there are favourable market opportunities'. 
The nature of transnational criminal activity 
In recent years, transnational crime has encompassed a very large number of 
criminal activities, ranging, for example, from art theft, computer crime, and 
illegal immigration, to piracy and crimes involving tourists. It operates at both 
the national and transnationallevels. Supporting these criminal activities are 
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specialist accountants, lawyers, financial advisers, bankers and chemists, as 
well as corrupt or compliant politicians, judges, government officials, law 
enforcement officers, members of the military, businessmen and even priests. 
The underlying motive for criminality is often simple-power and money. 
Transnational criminal organisations are diverse in structure, outlook and 
membership, but they pose formidable challenges for law enforcement at both 
the national and regional levels. One reason for this is their contemporary 
emphasis on loose networks rather than excessively formal and structured 
hierarchies (Williams 1995a). 
Future prospects for transnational crime in the Asia Pacific region 
Most of the current forms of criminality will continue to be of concern in the 
years ahead. However, a number of trends will encourage both new areas for 
criminal exploitation and new criminal enterprises. Probably the most significant 
threats to regional security and stability are the developing sophistication and 
globalisation of organised crime groups. Such groups are likely to increase their 
cooperation in areas of mutual interest-all forms of fraud, money laundering, 
cybercrime and corruption-which will continue to have a significant impact 
on regional economies. There is likely to be an increase and diversification in 
regional drug production, abuse and trafficking, and it is likely that insurgency 
groups in the region will become more dependent on crime-particularly drug 
production and trafficking-to finance their political campaigns. 
In spite of the predicted expansion and diversification in crime within the 
region, it is highly unlikely that manpower or financial resources will be available 
to increase law enforcement resources at the same rate. The only realistic way 
in which regional law enforcement agencies will be able to effectively address 
future trends will be to recruit or train specialists to address the new and more 
sophisticated criminal threats and to place a higher priority on regional 
cooperation and intelligence-sharing on criminal matters. 
Corruption, crony capitalism and nepotism-the CCN factor 
Currently, corruption-like terrorism-is not recognised in international law 
as a crime in itself, but rather a term that describes a set of activities or behaviours 
that can have a very serious impact on the way in which decisions are made at 
numerous levels. In particular, corruption facilitates crime (at both the national 
and transnationallevels) because it protects the secrecy of criminal activities, it 
diverts or compromises law enforcement resources and distorts the 
decisionmaking process. 
Williams (1995b) notes that corruption is used to create a congenial 
environment in which criminal organisations can carry on their activities with 
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impunity. It can range from the bribery of low-level law enforcement officials 
to ignoring particular criminal activities, to the offering of inducements to 
high-ranking government officials to acquiesce in the group's activities and to 
provide information about countermeasures by the government. Corruption 
can be used to neutralise individuals and institutions and can have deleterious 
effects on political culture and the social fabric. 
Lupsha (1996:35) describes corruption as 'the ability to acquire information, 
take actions, acquire influence, access to rule makers and rule enforcers, and to 
penetrate opponents and targets of interest'. 
The Queensland Criminal Justice Commission (CJc) notes that corruption 
is often motivated by greed and flourishes in an atmosphere of management 
neglect or where there are inadequate controls, checks and balances (1993). 
Transparency International (TI), an international anti-corruption non-
government organisation established in 1993, use the term 'grand corruption' 
which covers 'massive payments that feed greed, not need' (Transparency 
International Australia 1995:7) . 
Change and corruption 
In a paper written in 1968, Huntington suggested four reasons why a state's 
modernisation process increases the incidence of corruption. First, in many 
pre-modern societies, patronage, favouritism and the appropriation of public 
funds for personal use were acceptable and legitimate forms of behaviour. In 
some countries undergoing 'modernisation' these traditional practices have 
persisted. Second, the process of modernisation actually increases the potential 
for corrupt practices due to confusion over the issue of public and private 
domain during the change process. Third, people with new wealth used that 
wealth to buy power, often through bribery, from the nobles, landlords or 
bureaucrats who dominated the old order. Corruption became a technique for 
'new men' to overcome their alienation from the political process and achieve 
political participation equivalent to their wealth and economic power. Finally, 
the modernisation process in newly independent nations or in newly developing 
countries goes hand in hand with the expansion of the state apparatus in the 
economic and social spheres. This invariably leads to an increase in bureaucratic 
control over economic activities, which tends to increase costs and reduce the 
profitability of business undertakings. More controls means more corruption. 
In the same article, Huntington traces the links between corruption and 
political stability. When politicians are seen to be using financial power to secure 
support or to control the behaviour of individuals, or when politicians are seen 
to be entiching themselves from public funds rather than executing the public 
projects which they have promised, the decline in public confidence can open 
the way for coups, revolts and other forms of violent change (Huntington 1968). 
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These analyses have some relevance to understanding the environment in 
which corruption operates in the Asia Pacific, particularly during periods of 
social or political instability. 
Corruption and transnational crime 
As Lupsha observes, transnational crime is not a new phenomenon, but 
[wlhat is new is the scale of activity and the fact that organised crime now 
possesses tools once reserved for nation states. It is the dispersion of 
technology access, global mobility, expertise for hire, cheap easily acquired 
weapons of mass lethality, and the vast illicit capital and financial resources of 
modern organised crime permit it to threaten, rival, and undermine the 
stability of nation states, and to corrupt civil society .. . (1996:23--4) . 
Lupsha believes that underlining transnational criminal activity is the 
scourge of corruption, without which the criminals undertaking these 
transnational criminal activities would be far less successful. Criminals have 
been able to subvert politicians, judges, local government officials, law 
enforcement officers, businessmen and other influential people through threats, 
extortion, and blackmail. Probably the greatest incentive is greed coupled with 
an assumption that they will not be discovered, or if discovered, that they will 
be protected by others in power. 
Souheil El Zein, the Director of Legal Mfairs for INTERPOL, recently 
wrote that '[c]orruption is becoming an increasingly international problem 
which needs to be addressed by the entire community . .. The need for 
international action against corruption may never have been more acute than 
today' (El Zein 1998:28) . The link between organised crime (both national 
and transnational) and corruption is of considerable importance. 
Financial resources to support corruption 
It is not difficult for sophisticated criminals to play on the greed of politicians 
and government officials, if only due to the enormous amounts of money 
generated by criminal activities. 
The United Nations has estimated that global organised crime earns 
US$l.l trillion per year (Mosely 1995 :4). According to the best estimates 
currently available, the annual value of the international illicit drugs trade 
exceeds US$400 billion per year which, according to the United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme, is ' ... equivalent to approximately 
eight percent of total international trade' (UNDCP 1997: 124). In any event, 
the international drugs trade is reported to exceed the value of the 
international oil trade and is exceeded only by the value of the international 
arms trade (The Economist 1997: 19-21; Kraar 1988:27-38). Journalist Philip 
Knightly recently wrote that 'drugs are now too big a part of the global 
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economy and the US and Australia have found, to their cost, that they cannot 
buck the market' (Knightly 1999:3). 
In the same article, Knightly quotes Nobel Prize winner, Professor Milton 
Friedman, and former US Secretary of State, George Schultz, agreeing at a 
conference at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, that 'the war on 
drugs [hadl not only failed miserably [butl did not even have a moral 
dimension'. Friedman asked '[clan any policy, however high-minded, be moral 
if it leads to widespread corruption?' (Knightly 1999:6). 
In 1996, an International Monetary Fund working paper assessed 
international money laundering at about US$500 billion, which represents 2 
per cent of global GDP. Robinson (1996:13) claims that money laundering is 
'the world's third-largest business'. A 1997 study by the Chulalongkorn 
University in Bangkok put the economic value of crime in Thailand during 
1993-95 at between US$24-32 billion, equivalent to 14-19 per cent of 
Thailand's GDP (Money Laundering Bulletin, February 1997:3). 
With these kinds of financial resources at their disposal, it is hardly surprising 
that there is such a strong link between corruption and transnational criminal 
activities. The Russian Prosecutor-General, Yuri Skuratov, recently wrote to 
the Duma (the Russian Parliament) alleging that that the Russian Central Bank 
had secreted US$50 billion (including IMF money) in the account of an 
offshore company established in Jersey, Channel Islands, apparently to hide 
Russian assets from creditors. Commenting on this matter, Dr Andrei 
Piontkovsky of the Russian Strategic Studies Centre was quoted as saying, 
'[i]t's not corruption. It's beyond corruption. It's complete collusion between 
money and power in Russia (Lewis 1999:20). 
The regional impact of corruption 
Recent revelations of high-level corruption in South Korea and Japan and 
alleged corruption in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have emphasised the 
importance of international initiatives, such as those taken by the OECD. 
Clearly, such behaviour-most of which has international implications-
constitutes a serious abuse of power. It bypasses the desirable standards of 
transparency and accountability in decision making and can lead to a substantial 
loss of confidence in the government of the day, and hence threats to the 
stability of the governing regime. 
Since his fall from power, former President Suharto of Indonesia, and his 
family, have been under investigation for alleged corruption and nepotism. In 
1996, a former President of the Republic of Korea, Chun Doo-wan, was 
convicted of corruption and his involvement in the 1980 Kwangju massacre. 
His successor, Roh Tae-woo, was also convicted of bribery allegedly amounting 
to some US$650 million. 
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Similar problems of serious corruption at the political level have occurred 
in recent years in Japan, Pakistan, China, Russia, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea 
and a number of other countries in the Asia Pacific region. This has led to 
popular movements against political corruption and nepotism, and against 
those who appear to have benefited accordingly (see Rashid and Islam 1997: 18; 
Imbaruddin 1997:12-15; Tampipi 1997:16-18). 
Pasuk attributes the 'wave of anti-corruption sentiment [which] has swept 
across Asia' to press publicity of corruption scandals, a new generation of 
politicians and lawyers who have spear-headed the attack on corruption, and 
the judiciary, for converting corruption charges into criminal convictions 
(Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 1966:iv, vi). 
There have been major problems with crime and corruption in Australia. 
Over the last 30 years, there have been many Royal Commissions and other 
inquiries into organised crime, drug trafficking, paedophile activities and 
corruption, particularly at the police level. The best known of the recent 
inquiries in relation to police corruption were the Fitzgerald Inquiry in 
Queensland (Fitzgerald 1989) and the Wood Royal Commission in New South 
Wales (Wood 1997). Arising out of these Royal Commissions and Inquiries, 
several specialised agencies were established, such as the National Crime 
Authority (established in 1984), the New South Wales Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (1988) the Queensland Criminal Justice 
Commission (1990), the Western Australian Anti-Corruption Commission 
(1997) and the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission (1997) . The 
Commonwealth Ombudsman exercises certain review responsibilities in relation 
to police corruption at the Commonwealth level. 
Corruption in international organisations 
On 16 March 1999, the European Union was plunged into crisis after the 
publication of a report into fraud and corruption forced the resignation of the 
President of the European Commission and all 19 Commissioners. The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) has also been plagued by allegations 
of corruption and nepotism, resulting in serious damage to the reputation of the 
Olympic movement and recommendations of expulsion of several IOC members. 
International anti-corruption efforts 
On 16 December 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions. Although other international organisations, such as the OECD 
and the World Bank, have placed emphasis on combating bribery of foreign 
officials in business dealings, the impact of high-level corruption on good 
governance has only recently been acknowledged. Now corruption is of concern 
at the highest level of global policymaking (Walsh 1998:37-43). 
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In 1994, the OECD issued a set of 'Recommendations on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions' which called on member governments to 
take effective action to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign business 
officials. Such measures include reviewing their criminal, civil, administrative, 
tax, business accounting and banking laws. In October 1995, the OECD took 
the matter further with specific recommendations on the tax treatment of 
illicit payments (Bosch 1997). An OECD convention incorporating these 
proposals was signed in Paris on 17 December 1997 by 34 countries, together 
accounting for 70 per cent of world trade and 90 per cent of foreign direct 
investment. The Convention obliges signatories to criminalise bribery of foreign 
public officials and to cooperate in mutual monitoring of implementation. 
The Convention entered into force on 15 February 1999 with ratification by 
Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, 
Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States (USAid Center for 
Democracy and Governance 1999). 
Good governance and anti-corruption 
In recent years much emphasis has been placed by bodies such as the World 
Bank, the IMF (see IMF 1998), and the Asian Development Bank on the 
concept of 'good governance', which the Australian Foreign Minister, Hon. 
Alexander Downer, has described as 'the effective management of a country's 
resources in a manner that is open, transparent, equitable and responsive to 
people's needs' (Downer 1997). 
Larmour notes that "'governance" [is] a polite way of raising awkward issues 
of corruption, incompetence, and abuse of power'. 
Good governance works by statistical comparison, the creation of league 
tables, visiting missions, international conferences and the emulation of best 
practice. It may be imposed by conditionality, but may also be self-imposed 
for fear of being left behind, or outside the club 0998:4). 
Such institutions as parliamentary democracy, a free press, an independent 
judiciary and the role of ombudsmen all contribute to maintaining scrutiny 
over good governance by highlighting corrupt practices, incompetence and 
abuses of power. Where such institutions are either absent or weak, the 
opportunities for abuse are obviously greater. 
Planning for the twenty-first century 
In the rapidly changing environment previously described, transnational 
organised crime and corruption flourish. The efforts which Hong Kong has 
made to counter corruption, particularly since the establishment of the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) 25 years ago, have set 
an international standard for others to emulate. In recent years, the People's 
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Republic of China has also placed a much higher priority on anti-corruption 
measures, which have resulted in intervention at the highest levels. The fight 
against corruption is a high priority for Premier Zhu Rongji. 
. Dealing with the threats of transnational crime and corruption requires a 
set of carefully crafted action plans. The formulation of such plans depends on 
local circumstances and contemporary events. It is important that specific forms 
of corruption are identified and dealt with specifically, rather than attempting 
to fight corruption as if it were a homogeneous phenomenon. In this way, it is 
possible to identifY the forms of corrupt behaviour which have the greatest 
impact on the security and stability of the state. To do this it will be necessary to 
collect and analyse information to better understand the dynamics and mechanics 
of the different types of corrupt conduct. Then, through a systematic and scientific 
study of corruption, appropriate countermeasures can be developed that are 
relevant to the circumstances in which the corruption is identified. 
The response to transnational crime 
With the growing awareness of the increasing threat of transnational crime in 
recent years, initiatives have been taken at the national, regional and international 
level to deal with this problem. The United Nations, particularly through the 
United Nations International Drug Control Program,l has been particularly 
active in counter-narcotics initiatives2 and in anti-corruption measures.3 
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, 
which was opened for signing at an international conference in Palermo, Italy, 
between 12-15 December 2000, was the culmination of six years of intensive 
effort by the Vienna-based United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention, under the leadership of Pino Arlacchi. This process began with 
the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan Against Organised 
Transnational Crime, which the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 
1994, to deal with the increasingly insidious threat of transnational crime. 
The Convention will become an instrument of international law when 40 
countries have ratified it. RatifYing the treaty is done when each country brings 
the terms of the Convention into force within its own jurisdiction. The United 
Nations expects this to take about two years. 
The Convention, and its accompanying Protocols, oblige countries which 
ratifY them to take a series of measures against transnational organised crime. 
The Convention establishes four specific crimes: participation in organised 
criminal groups, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice. The 
Convention seeks to align national laws in criminalizing acts committed by 
organised criminal groups. Under the Convention, this behaviour includes 
organizing, directed or aiding serious offences committed by an organised 
criminal group. It entails agreeing with one or more persons to commit a serious 
Transnational crime 141 
crime for financial or other material gain. To combat money laundering countries 
would have to require their banks to keep accurate records and make them available 
for inspection by domestic law enforcement officials. Anonymous bank accounts 
would not be permitted and bank secrecy could not be used to shield criminal 
activities. Corruption must be criminalised where there is a link to transnational 
organised crime. This includes offering, giving, soliciting and accepting any form 
of bribe, undue advantage or other inducement, where the proposed recipient is 
a public official and the purpose of the bribe relates to his or her official functions. 
The Convention will attempt to make extradition easier. It will also be easier fo r 
investigators and law enforcement officials to obtain evidence, conduct searches, 
obtain bank or corporate documents and question suspects. The convention 
contains a general basis for conducting joint investigations and measures for 
cooperation in special investigative procedures, such as electronic surveillance. 
Accompanying the Convention are three Protocols. The first, titled Protocol 
Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, addresses the problem 
of human smuggling. The second, titled Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, is concerned with sex 
trafficking. The third, titled Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition, deals 
with the illicit trade in firearms . In addition to the Protocols, the UNODCCP 
is working on an implementation strategy for a Global Program Against 
Corruption and a Global Program Assessing Tramnational Organised Crime Groups: 
Dangerousness and Trends. 
Initiatives taken on a regional level include 
• the expressed desire of Ministers at the yd ASEAN Regional 
Forum in Jakarta in July 1996 to consider 'the question of drug 
trafficking and related transnational issues, such as economic 
crimes, including money laundering, which could constitute 
threats to the security of the countries of the region' 
• the ASEAN Ministers' Declaration on Transnational Crime, 
concluded in Manila on 20 December 1997 
• the Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of 
Transnational Crime, concluded in Manila on 25 March 1998 
• the Joint Communique of the 2nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime, held in Yangon, Myanmar, on 23 June 
1999, including the adoption of the ASEAN Plan of Action to 
Combat Transnational Crime 
• the ongoing work of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
• the ongoing work of the International Criminal Police Organisation 
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the ongoing work of regional police cooperation, through 
ASEANAPOL 
the establishment of the International Law Enforcement Academy in 
Bangkok in 19974 
the establishment of the Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime 
in Manila in March 1999 
• the proposal by ASEAN Ministers to consider establishing an 
ASEAN Centre for Combating Transnational Crime 
• the establishment of an ASEAN Regional Forum Experts Group on 
Transnational Crime. 
Finally, at the 'Second Track'5 level, in December 1996, the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)6 decided to establish a 
Working Group on Transnational Crime, chaired jointly by Australia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. The Working Group has now met on eight occasions 
and has dealt with a very wide range of transnational criminal issues from the 
operational and policy perspectives, as well as assessing the relevance of such 
activities to regional security and stability. 
In most circumstances, the capacity of a state to intervene operationally 
against transnational crime is limited to its own jurisdiction, nevertheless 
there are a number of strategies which can be employed at the national and 
regional levels to deal with this threat. The basic investigative tools apply 
transnationally, as they do nationally, but the emphasis is on sound liaison 
relationships, good information and intelligence exchanges, a sound 
understanding of the law enforcement systems in place in the other 
jurisdictions, a preparedness to consider mutual support andlor joint 
operational approaches, and professional trust. 
There are a number of guidelines for dealing with transnational crime. These 
include the encouragement of greater legal and administrative compatability, 
accession to relevant conventions, and bilateral and regional cooperation. 
The relationship between corruption and organised crime is the most 
dangerous, along with the illicit financing of political parties. Corruption is 
often the cornerstone of the activities of some criminal organisations. Its 
general effect on administrative departments (for example those delivering 
identity documents, customs services, tax offices) can facilitate all types of 
fraudulent activities including, particularly, international trafficking. It also 
protects criminals, since the officials who have been corrupted are frequently 
those who should be investigating the criminals' activities, or at least 
contributing to such investigations. Furthermore, the funds available to 
criminal organisations make it possible to offer bribes that are difficult to 
resist. It is their success in accumulating wealth that gives criminal 
organisations their power and makes them dangerous. 
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Conclusions 
There is little doubt that transnational crime, in its various manifestations, is 
on the increase in the Asia Pacific region. Transnational crime is becoming far 
more sophisticated, wide-ranging and serious in its impact on national and 
regional security and stability. The East Asian financial crisis and the internal 
disruption faced by several states have created circumstances in which it will 
be even more difficult for states to allocate the appropriate resources and 
expertise to counter the increasing threat of transnational crime, particularly if 
police resources need to be diverted to undertake public order tasks. 
There is a close nexus between corruption and the rise of transnational 
crime-drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, money laundering, sex slavery 
and paedophilia, and many other types of criminal activity. The massive funds 
generated by transnational crime-particularly drug trafficking-can corrupt 
or suborn almost any system. Undoubtedly, the money so generated can be, 
and is being used, to corrupt politicians, judges, officials, police, and other 
people responsible for maintaining good governance and the rule of law. 
Corruption provides the lubricant that enables transnational crime to flourish, 
both within the states immediately affected and across jurisdictional borders. 
Transnational crime will never be contained, let alone overcome, unless there 
is a major global assault on the citadels of corruption. 
Corruption is a major threat to democracy, economic and social development 
and good governance. It has been described as 'a moral and financial gangrene 
which stops society from functioning normally' (Transparency International and 
Worldaware 1994:3). It is an economic as well as a moral problem in that it 
discourages good business practices and, by creating a barrier against trade and 
investment, acts as an impediment to development. It raises the cost of goods 
and services. It is gives rise to waste and inefficiency through diverting tenders 
away from the best and most suitable supplier. The losses caused by corruption 
by far exceed the sum of the individual profits derived from it, because it distorts 
the whole economy. Finally, it taints the international reputation of the country 
concerned, making it more difficult to attract foreign investment. 
Even more importantly, corruption is damaging because it strikes at the 
core of integrity and trust in the state and the way it operates, through 
undermining fairness, stability and efficiency. As an African Head of State 
once observed, ' [y]oung people in my country now have as their role models 
the leaders who have made money from corruption. Corruption is destroying 
the future of our society' (Olesegun Obasanjo, quoted in Transparency 
International and Worldaware 1994:3). President Jiang Zemin has repeatedly 
called the fight against corruption in China 'a matter of life and death for the 
party and the state' (Lawrence 1998:10). 
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In a corrupt environment, resources will be directed towards such non-
productive areas as the police, armed forces and other organs of social control 
and repression as the elite move to protect themselves, their positions and 
their material wealth. Laws will be enacted and resources otherwise available 
for socioeconomic development will be diverted into security expenditure 
(Transparency International 1995b:5). 
Although transnational crime and corruption continue to present 
considerable threats to the security and stability of the countries of the Asia 
Pacific region, there are some grounds for optimism. At both the United Nations 
and regional levels, there is now a much greater awareness of the dangers posed 
by transnational crime in its various manifestations, and practical legal, law 
enforcement and political measures are being taken to deal with this problem. 
The fight against transnational crime has gained momentum over the last two 
years and cooperation at both the international and regional levels has probably 
never been better. This cooperation transcends the national, political, cultural 
and other divisions which so often make international cooperation difficult. 
Similarly, as a result of greater regional cooperation against transnational 
crime, shared concern over such issues as the Asian financial crisis, and the 
prgblems in particular countries, there is a much greater awareness of the serious 
implications of allowing corruption, crony capitalism and nepotism to flourish. 
Almost every government in the region is taking these problems much more 
seriously, and there is certainly a groundswell throughout the region against 
corrupt practices and those who benefit from them. Realistically, there is an 
increasing awareness that international capital and aid could be denied to those 
countries that allow corruption to thrive. 
Perhaps one of the few rays of hope to emerge from the Asian financial 
crisis is that each nation in the region is seriously reviewing the way its economic 
and social systems have been operating. The financial crisis exposed not only 
the weaknesses in financial regulation and fiduciary responsibility, but also the 
corruption and nepotism which contributed to precipitating the crisis. The 
opportunity has now presented itself to address the problems of the past and, 
above all, to introduce the transparency, accountability and political changes 
necessary to ensure that the likelihood of such problems arising again is 
minimised. Failure to grasp this opportunity will not bode well for the future 
security and stability of the Asia Pacific region. 
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Notes 
I See, for example, the United Nations International Drug Control Program World 
Drug Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
2 The three principal initiatives taken by the UNDCP have been encompassed by 
three international Conventions: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 
whose purpose is to prevent and combat drug addiction by means of coordinated 
international action, using two complementary forms of intervention and 
control: prevention and repression; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 
1971, which establishes an international control system for psychotropic 
substances which are generally produced by the pharmaceutical industry; and the 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
1998, which provides for comprehensive and innovative measures against drug 
trafficking, such as provisions against money laundering and against illicit 
activities related to precursor and essential chemicals and provisions for new 
methods of international cooperation such as transfer of proceedings, controlled 
deliveries and extradition of drug traffickers. 
3 The United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions, was concluded in New York in December 1996. This 
lead to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business 
Transactions, which was concluded in Paris on 17 December 1997, and has since 
been the model for anti-corruption legislation in many countries, including 
Australia. 
4 The ILEA is sponsored by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration. 
5 The 'Second Track' is a dialogue process involving academic and other regional 
subject experts, as well as 'officials operating in their private capacities'. 
6 The current membership of CS CAP comprises Australia, Cambodia, Canada, 
China, European Union, Indonesia, India, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and the United States. It is likely that the 
Pacific Islands Forum, based in Fiji, will be granted observer status in CSCAP 
later this year. 
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The prevention and control of 
• • economic crime 
Peter Grabosky 
Economic crime, by which I refer generally to fraud in its various 
manifestations, is among the most costly of all criminal activities. Although it 
would be interesting to determine its cost with some precision, the total impact 
is unquantifiable. There are a number of reasons why attempts to estimate the 
costs of economic crime are bound to be futile. First, the most skilfully 
perpetrated offences are not even detected by victims. Even when an offence is 
detected, and the victim knows that he or she has sustained a loss, they may be 
reluctant to report. In the case of an individual, he or she may simply be too 
embarrassed, and the expectation of recovering lost assets may be remote or 
nonexistent. In the case of an organisation, they may be concerned about 
possible damage to their commercial reputation, and decide as a matter of 
business judgment not to disclose their vulnerability. 
Statistics aside, the reasons for being concerned about economic crime 
should be obvious to many. The essence of fraud is a breach of trust. Trust is 
the very foundation of commerce and of civil society. Economic crime thus 
jeopardises basic interpersonal relations, economic development, and in some 
cases, even the stability of governments. One wonders, for example, what the 
economy of the former Zaire might have become had its corrupt leadership 
not plundered the nation's wealth. The collapse of the Albanian regime following 
massive losses sustained by thousands of citizens in an investment fraud 
constitutes another example. One could compile a long list of cases, but the 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss the risks of economic crime and the 
countermeasures which might be put in place to minimise them. This chapter 
places special emphasis on computer-related crime, because the convergence 
of computers and communications will become the dominant factor in 
commerce in the new millennium. 
Crime is a changing phenomenon. Some activities, such as criminal 
exploitation of online commerce, which were inconceivable less than a decade 
ago, now pose significant risks to the economy and society of many nations. 
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Fraud is one general type of crime which, whilst as old as commerce itself, may 
be expected to take new forms as the twenty-first century progresses. In some 
cases, these forms have already begun to emerge. This chapter outlines a number 
of social, demographic and economic developments which may be expected to 
influence the shape of economic crime in years to come. It is of note that these 
trends, and the variety of economic crimes which may be expected to accompany 
them, are beyond the capacity of law enforcement agencies alone to control. 
The environment of economic crime 
It has become trite to suggest that the world is shrinking. The world is now 
characterised by unprecedented mobility of information, finance, goods and 
services, people, cultural artefacts, flora and fauna, even viruses-both those 
of the microbial variety as well as those which infect one's hard drive. 
The globalisation of finance, where electronically mediated exchanges occur 
in nanoseconds, is far removed from the days where deals were sealed with a 
handshake, and a man's word was his bond. In recent times, the Barings and 
Sumitomo experiences have had significant global repercussions, with adverse 
effects on financial markets and commodity prices. In brief, the proliferation 
of anonymous financial transactions is accompanied by a commensurate 
proliferation of opportunities for betrayal of trust. 
Varieties of economic crime 
There are several major forms of economic crime which confront society in 
the new millenium. The following categories are not murually exclusive, but 
are intended to illustrate the range and variety of economic crime. 
Insurance fraud 
Insurance is a most important institution, enabling us to spread risk and thereby 
engage in activities of tremendous commercial or individual benefit. With 
insurance, however, comes the opportunity for fraud. The fabrication of false 
insurance claims is as old as the institution of insurance itself. Whether at the 
hands of opportunistic individuals or criminal organisations, the cost of 
insurance fraud is substantial and often borne by honest and law-abiding 
policyholders. 
Fraud against governments 
Governments are at great risk of fraud. They dispense benefits, and many 
citizens are not beyond obtaining these benefits fraudulently. They buy goods 
and services, and many purveyors of these goods and services are not beyond 
providing inferior products or otherwise inflating their invoices. Governments 
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raise taxes, and many taxpayers evade payment. Government employees may 
divert public assets for private use. When governments are defrauded, all honest 
citizens pay the price. To the extent that funds defrauded would otherwise be 
spent on worthwhile government programs, the public suffers twice. 
Fraud against employers 
Organisations, whether in the public or private sector, may be at risk from 
their employees. Embezzlement or theft of money, goods or services by 
employees can mean the difference between economic survival and bankruptcy. 
When an employer's business fails because of employee theft, law-abiding 
employees are among those who pay the price. 
Fraud against consumers 
Purveyors of goods and services can cheat their customers in many ways. They 
may provide defective or inferior products or fail to deliver goods and services 
altogether. They may advertise their products in a deceptive manner. In the 
extreme, this can lead to death or injury in the case of dangerous products 
purported to be safe. At the very least, the consumer or will pay more for a 
product than he or she should. 
Telemarketing fraud 
The media of commerce are also changing. The days of face-to-face exchange 
are giving way to an increased volume of sales by mail-order and telemarketing. 
Telemarketing may involve the use of the telephone or increasingly the internet, 
which may well become the dominant medium of commerce this century. 
While these new forms of media offer greater opportunity and choice for 
consumers, they also pose greater risk. Ceteris paribus, the greater the uptake of 
new technologies for commercial application, the greater the risk that they 
will be exploited for criminal purposes. 
Fraud against shareholders and investors 
The directors of large companies may divert company assets for personal use. 
When this occurs on a scale sufficient to affect the company's financial 
performance, shareholders and investors suffer. At the extreme, companies 
may collapse, leaving investors and creditors at a loss. Endemic fraud can taint 
an entire economy, leading to capital flight and discouraging foreign investment. 
Superannuation fraud 
The world's industrialised nations are at present experiencing certain economic 
changes at a dramatic pace. One of the most dramatic examples is the growth 
of the superannuation industry, which establishes and manages private pension 
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funds . Over 100,000 superannuation funds currently exist in Australia alone. 
Around the world, vast sums have accumulated, and the superannuation savings 
pool contains trillions of dollars. 
This is not to suggest that persons charged with the stewardship of such 
funds have unusual criminal propensities, but the sheer volume of money 
constitutes what may be an irresistible temptation to the unscrupulous. Abuses 
of superannuation funds in the United States and the United Kingdom illustrate 
the attractiveness of such enormous amounts of money to those who would 
commit fraud. Short of the risk of outright fraud, the risk of imprudent 
management cannot be ignored. 
Bribery and corruption 
Public officials may demand or accept a financial or other consideration as a 
price of doing business. This can erode the legitimacy of an entire government. 
Companies in the private sector may require side payments from suppliers. In 
the long run, the cost is borne by consumers. Widespread, entrenched 
corruption can detract from a nation's economic competitiveness and may 
discourage foreign investment. 
Money laundering 
The term is used to describe the process by which the proceeds of crime ('dirty 
money') undergo a series of transactions which disguise their illicit origins and 
make them appear to have come from a legitimate source ('clean money'). 
This makes criminal activity more difficult to detect, can lead to the criminal 
infiltration of legitimate business, and can distort the economies of small 
nations. 
Telecommunications fraud 
As telecommunications services become more widely accessible, the theft of 
such services becomes more common. From the 'cloning' of cellular telephones, 
to the unauthorised access and use of telephone switchboards, and the 
fabrication of stored-value telephone cards, millions of dollars of 
telecommunications services are misappropriated. 
Credit card fraud 
There are four basic vulnerabilities of plastic card payment systems. 
• Vulnerability of cards to alteration and counterfeiting. 
• Vulnerabilities arising from the issue of cards. 
• Vulnerabilities arising from card holder identification systems (PINs). 
• Vulnerabilities arising from the misuse of cards. 
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As plastic cards eclipse currency as a method of payment, opportunities 
for their misuse will increase. The costs will be borne by merchants and by 
card issuers. 
Industrial espionage 
The world of international business is in some respects a jungle. Competitors 
at home and abroad, and nations which might be hosts to a company's 
investment, may have a strong interest in a company's trade secrets and other 
economic intelligence. The lengths to which some will go in order to acquire 
such information are substantial, and at times illegal. Industrial espionage by 
governments and private sector institutions is a fact of contemporary commercial 
life. Companies', indeed, nations' competitive advantage may be at stake. 
Theft of intellectual property 
Copyright infringement can occur quickly and easily, greatly facilitated by the 
advent of digital technology. Text, video, sound, designer labels and computer 
software can be copied and reproduced as never before. Unrestrained, such 
modern forms of piracy can discourage invention and innovation and deprive 
artists and creators of the royalties to which they are entitled. 
Forgery 
Currency, negotiable instruments and a variety of other valuable documents 
may be forged or counterfeited. The advent of digital technology, including 
scanning and copying, enables almost perfect reproduction. Not only may the 
recipient be left holding a worthless piece of paper, but forged documents can 
be used to facilitate a variety of other economic crimes. 
Business opportunity fraud 
In the industrialised world, the downsizing of organisations in both the public 
and the private sectors has generated growing numbers of individuals in mid-
career with significant disposable income. With increasing sums of money to 
invest, the temptations of fiduciary fraud are bound to increase. 
In addition to entrusting their funds to financial managers, those with 
money to invest may wish to start a small business. Unfortunately, they are 
also within reach of others who can exploit them. Business opportunity fraud 
or other 'get rich quick' scams may be an unfortunate by-product of nation's 
transition to a more competitive economy. 
One of the easiest avenues into small business is through purchase of a 
franchise. It has been estimated that, in the United States, over half of all retail 
sales were through franchised establishments in 2000. Short of the most blatant 
form of franchise-related fraud-simply taking the new franchisee's up-front 
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money and disappearing with it-there remains the potential for a variety of 
lesser misrepresentations, such as overstatement of earnings potential and 
understatement of risks or other hidden costs of a franchise agreement. 
Electronic funds transfer fraud 
The move to a cashless society has significant implications for both law 
enforcement and society. Although reducing the use of cash in the community 
may help minimise traditional forms of bank robbery and theft, new cashless 
payment systems will create new problems. The proliferation of electronic 
funds transfer systems will enhance the risk that such transactions may be 
intercepted and diverted. Existing systems such as automatic teller machines 
(ATMs), and electronic funds transfer at point of sale (EFTPOS) technologies 
have already been the targets of fraudulent activity. Most of the large-scale 
electronic funds transfer frauds that have been committed have involved the 
interception or alteration of electronic data messages transmitted from bank 
computers, sometimes with the complicity of bank employees. The development 
of electronic commerce will be impeded to the extent that the security of 
electronic transactions is threatened. 
Commonalities 
One common thread running through most if not all of the types of economic 
crime listed above is that they are greatly facilitated by recent developments in 
information technology. This does not mean that we should 'pull the plug' on 
our computers. Indeed, if mankind were to reject all technologies because of 
their potential for abuse, we would have rejected the wheel. Rather, we must 
learn to exploit the benefits of new technologies and manage the risks which 
accompany them. But we should not underestimate the challenges the digital 
age poses to those involved in the prevention and control of economic crime. 
Where computers are used in the commission of fraud, difficulties of 
investigation are exacerbated as offenders are able to disguise their identities 
and activities through the use of complex electronic technologies. Those who 
seek to mask their identity through the use of computer networks are often 
able to do so by means of looping or weaving through multiple sites in a 
variety of nations. Electronic impersonation-colloquially termed 'spoofing'-
can be used in furtherance of a variety of criminal activities, including fraud. 
Anonymous re-mailers and encryption devices can shield one from the scrutiny 
of all but the most determined and technologically sophisticated regulatory 
and enforcement agencies. As a result, some crimes may not result in detection 
or loss until some time after the event, thus making the process of investigation 
even more challenging. 
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Other issues which may complicate the investigation of computer-based 
fraud entail the logistics of search and seizure during real time, the sheer volume 
of material within which incriminating evidence may be contained, and the 
encryption of information, which may render it entirely inaccessible or accessible 
only after a massive application of decryption technology. 
Economic crime in a shrinking world 
It is worth noting that not only can many fraudulent initiatives originate on 
the other side of the globe, but few remedies are available to the unfortunate 
individual who might fall victim to transnational economic crime. Even if one is 
able to mobilise the law, the chances oflocating the offender, obtaining extradition, 
mounting a prosecution, or recovering compensation may be minute. 
Particular problems arise when financial crimes are committed against a 
local company or government agency by a person situated in a foreign country. 
Enlisting law enforcement assistance in the foreign country may be difficult, 
as their resources are limited and their priorities may well lie elsewhere. 
Even where a perpetrator has been identified, two problems arise in relation 
to the prosecution of offences which have an international aspect. First, the 
determination of where the offence occurred in order to decide which law to 
apply; and second, obtaining evidence and ensuring that the offender can be 
located and tried before a court. Both these questions raise complex legal 
problems of jurisdiction and extradition. 
Additional problems are reflected in the difficulty of exercising national 
sovereignty over capital and information flows. Jurisdictional issues may arise 
from transborder online transmission. If an online financial newsletter 
originating in Albania contains fraudulent speculation about the prospects of 
a company whose shares are traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, where has 
the offence occurred? 
Even if the host law enforcement agencies are willing and able to assist, 
collection of evidence in the foreign country may be problematic. Distance 
will be more of an impediment to the thief-taker than to the thief The cost of 
sending law enforcement officers abroad to assist in an investigation, or the 
cost of bringing witnesses from abroad to testify in proceedings, may be 
prohibitive. Even then, there are often legal impediments which must be 
overcome. The laws of evidence of one's own country are not likely to be 
instantly hospitable to all evidence obtained from abroad. In nations where a 
degree of thought has been given to these issues, mutual assistance arrangements 
may be reached with selected nations for the collection of evidence on their 
soil, and special legislation may be enacted to provide for the admissibility in 
one's own courts of evidence taken abroad. 
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It must be emphasised that none of these impediments to the investigation 
and prosecution of transnational economic crime are unique to high technology 
offences. They exist for more conventional forms of criminality as well. 
However, their significance is heightened, given the increased opportunities 
for transnational offences which new technology provides. 
Extraterritorial law enforcement costs are also often prohibitive. Moreover, 
the cooperation across international boundaries in furtherance of such 
enforcement usually requires a congruence of values and priorities across nations 
which, despite prevailing trends towards globalisation, exists only infrequently. 
This may be less of a problem with fraud than with matters relating to political 
or artistic expression. 
Countermeasures 
The extreme diversity of economic crime means that no single institution of 
prevention or control will suffice. The police alone are unable to cope with 
economic crime; there can be no 'magic bullet' or panacea. Rather, each separate 
type of economic crime is best addressed by a combination of countermeasures. 
Some of these will be governmental, some will lie in the hands of the prospective 
victim, and some will be at the disposal of third parties. 
• The first line of defence against economic crime is awareness of 
one's vulnerability. 
The popular term for this is 'risk assessment'. This applies to the individual 
consumer or investor, who should become familiar with the basic pitfalls of 
the marketplace; to companies, who should be aware of the procedures and 
processes which are likely targets; and to governments, whose various functions 
(such as payment of benefits and the purchase of goods and services) may be 
targeted for criminal exploitation. 
• The next step is to take necessary precautions. 
The key to fraud prevention on the part of organisations, whether public 
or private, is the development and refinement of a fraud control system. Having 
identified points of vulnerability, individual systems and processes should be 
put in place to protect these vulnerabilities from 'attack'. These principles apply 
to the control of 'electronic' economic crime, those offences committed with 
or against telecommunications and information systems, as well as the more 
conventional forms of crime. The foundation for such a system is a management 
philosophy which is sensitive to fraud risk. The basic elements of such a system 
are careful recruitment of staff, a culture of integrity and loss prevention within 
the organisation, and formal procedures for the protection of assets . 
The design of systems can be an important means of fraud prevention. The 
introduction of a requirement that the recipients of public funds have an account 
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with a financial institution in which the funds can be deposited automatically, 
has dramatically reduced the risk of lost or stolen cheques and fraudulent 
claims. Fraud control systems may include technologies as diverse as the 
requirement that company cheques be signed by two people, to sophisticated 
systems of biometric authentication (based on physical characteristics 
such as fingerprints or retinal images) required for access to a computer 
system. 
There are some basic principles for the prevention and control of economic 
CrIme. 
Audit 
The scrutiny of a company's accounts by an independent auditor is an important 
safeguard against economic crime. It is by no means fail-safe, as accountants 
often fail to detect irregularities, but the very necessity of having to prepare 
accounts in a form suitable for independent scrutiny and then subjecting them 
to a degree of examination is an important first step. 
Transparency 
It was once said that 'sunlight is the best disinfectant' . Procedures for the public 
disclosure of basic aspects of a government's or a company's operations can 
help safeguard against a variety of crimes. Freedom of information legislation 
can facilitate citizen access to government information. This is not to suggest 
that trade secrets-or military secrets for that matter-be made available to 
anyone who wants them. Rather, it means that fundamental information is 
available to keep markets and citizens informed. 
The requirement that organisations in both the public and private sectors 
publish regular accounts which disclose details of income and expenditures, 
including the salaries of executives and liabilities relating to environmental 
pollution, has become an international standard of best practice. Markets are 
beginning to expect nothing less. 
Procedures for independent review of administrative decisions 
The possibility of bias or other irregularities in the administrative decisions of 
governments can be addressed through the system of administrative law (Allars 
1997). Procedures for the independent review of administrative decisions by a 
specially constituted court (Aronson and Dyer 2000), the institution of an 
Ombudsman with investigative powers who can hear complaints by individual 
citizens (Caiden 1983), and freedom of information legislation which provides 
public access to government documents (Birkinshaw 1997) are three elements 
of an administrative law system which can contribute to the integrity of 
governments. 
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Specialised bodies for the Investigation and prosecution of serious 
economic crime 
In many nations, the investigation of complex and sophisticated economic 
crime lies beyond the capacity of conventional law enforcement agencies. Some 
have thus created new agencies with special powers and expertise to address 
specific issues. The Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong 
Kong, the Serious Fraud Office in the United Kingdom, and their variations 
elsewhere, are all examples of such agencies. This is not to suggest that specialised 
bodies are essential to resolving all problems in all jurisdictions. Where more 
general law enforcement bodies are adequate, there may be no need to create 
new ones. Indeed, a proliferation of agencies may lead to overlap and 
duplication, to bureaucratic rivalries, and to important cases 'falling between 
the cracks'. The effective exchange of intelligence and operational information 
can be made difficult. Such lack of cooperation may often be to the advantage 
of offenders, who may be able to delay or avoid detection and prosecution 
through a lack of coordination on the part of law enforcement agencies. 
However, the increasing specialisation of economic life suggests that designated 
organisations may be appropriate in some circumstances. 
Cash transactions reporting 
The challenge of money laundering and tax evasion is made much easier when 
the offender is able to shift funds around undetected. To this end, a growing 
movement among nations around the world has seen the development of cash 
transaction reporting systems. Banks and other financial institutions are now 
required to report all transactions over a specified amount to a central authority, 
or any transaction of any amount which appears in some manner to be suspect. 
In those jurisdictions where cash transaction reporting systems are in place, it 
becomes that much easier to 'follow the money trail'. 
A free press 
The famous adage that sunlight is the best disinfectant has already been noted. 
To the extent that an open and free press exists within a nation, questionable 
practices will be subject to questioning. This is important across a range of 
offences, from bribery and corruption to consumer fraud and fraud against 
shareholders and directors. This is not to suggest that the media are always 
virtuous and responsible in their coverage.It could be said, however, that the 
best antidote for irresponsible speech is more speech. 
An adequate regulatory system 
Freedom of expression does not extend to the freedom to publish false or 
misleading advertising or spurious commercial claims. A regulatory system 
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which can identifY such misconduct and respond to it effectively will help 
ensure the integrity of markets is maintained. This need not be the exclusive 
province of government. Private remedies such as civil litigation, and self-
regulatory regimes by individual companies and industry associations, are no 
less important than government agencies. A regulatory system which combines 
private and public remedies is likely to be more effective than one based solely 
on government or on self-regulation. 
Mechanisms for building public awareness 
By no means should knowledge about fraud and fraud risks remain a monopoly 
oflaw enforcement agencies. Because the first line of defence against fraud can 
and should be self-help, appropriate knowledge should be shared with private 
citizens, businesses and public sector agencies. All prospective victims of fraud-
and this includes almost everyone-should be aware of the types of fraudulent 
activity to which they are most vulnerable, the 'red flags' or indicia of fraud, 
the most appropriate means of prevention, and best avenues of response when 
they detect an offence. New developments in communications permit not only 
the dissemination of basic fraud control information, but also the reporting of 
suspicious activity to appropriate authorities. The internet abounds in materials 
on fraud control; some industry-specific, others focusing on certain vulnerable 
groups such as senior citizens. Other sources of information are medium-
specific-sites are dedicated to warning of fraud on the internet. Moreover, 
many law enforcement and regulatory agencies have established hotlines which 
are available to fraud victims or civic-minded third parties to report illegal or 
questionable conduct. 
Freedom for individuals to form non-government organisations 
Some of the most effective actions to combat economic crime are implemented 
by citizen groups. Before the rise of the modern state, citizens performed a 
number of functions (including policing, prosecution and imprisonment), 
which later became functions of government. Even in modern times, citizens' 
groups undertake activities that complement the work of government agencies. 
Two examples are victim assistance and prison aftercare associations. The control 
of corruption is facilitated by organisations such as Transparency International. 
Consumer groups and Better Business Bureaus remain vigilant against unfair 
trading. Citizens' crime commissions are vigilant against activities as diverse as 
abuse of power by law enforcement agencies, bribery and electoral fraud. 
Responsible banking 
In addition to their role in the prevention of money laundering, banks and 
other financial institutions have an important role to play in the prevention 
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and control of economic crime. Prudent lending practices will deny 
opportunities to the unscrupulous. The challenge facing governments today is 
to allow sufficient flexibility in the financial services industry to permit the 
economy to flourish, but to provide sufficient safeguards to protect against 
irresponsible or predatory conduct. 
Commercial third parties 
A variety of other third parties can complement the work of governments in 
the prevention and control of economic crime. A burgeoning industry in 
information security can assist clients in the public and private sectors to ensure 
the integrity of their systems. All of the large multinational accounting firms 
offer fraud control services to clients anywhere in the world. Many have 
established departments or subsidiaries specialising in fraud prevention. Their 
products range from a total review of risk management practices to more 
narrowly focused issues such as security of information technology systems. 
Private fraud control services are by no means limited to prevention. Private 
organisations which find themselves the victims of fraud may retain their own 
in-house investigators or may engage specialised private sector fraud 
investigators. These private investigators may conduct an entire investigation, 
handing the matter over to the police for prosecution. This is common in the 
Australian insurance industry in response to insurance fraud. 
Market forces themselves may exert positive effects from time to time on 
the behaviour of some public and private organisations. There are opportunities 
for the second-order operation of market forces through the guidance provided 
by financial and insurance institutions, and by institutional investors. 
Open political system 
An open political system permits individual citizens, interest groups or an 
organised opposition the freedom to question policies and programs. A viable 
political opposition can be alert to financial irregularities in the public and 
private sectors and can make them more difficult to conceal. 
International cooperation 
Because many fraud offences do not involve face-to-face interactions in their 
commission, it is possible for offenders and victims to be located in more than 
one jurisdiction. More sophisticated conspiracies may involve individuals in 
three or more jurisdictions within Australia or overseas. Few remedies are 
available to the unfortunate individual who might fall victim to such activities. 
The transnational dimension of many economic crimes requires unprecedented 
multilateral international cooperation, from formal treaties and mutual 
assistance arrangements to informal liaison between and exchange of law 
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enforcement personnel. Transnational electronic crime will require very timely 
cooperation, involving the capabiliry of contacting overseas authorities at a 
moment's notice. 
Sanctioning of offenders 
While some would argue that severe penalties do not always deter crime, or 
that increasing penalties is unlikely to achieve a commensurate decrease in 
crime, one should not ignore the potential usefulness of punishment for 
economic crime. Economic crime is often based, to an extent greater than in 
other areas of crime, on rational decision making. Embezzlement does not 
occur in a moment of passion; corrupt payments are not made in an alcoholic 
rage. Penalties proportionate to the seriousness of the crime can send a message 
to would-be offenders, and educate the public that economic crime is serious 
and will not be tolerated. 
Economic crime prevention 
None of the solutions presented here is guaranteed to prevent economic crime, 
but each helps reduce the risk of such crime. The greater the number of 
preventative measures in place, the more difficult it is to perpetrate fraud and 
other forms of economic crime. It may be useful to use the analogy of a web. 
Anyone strand of a web may be insufficient to support a load. But many 
strands, interwoven, may be very strong indeed. 
The prevention and control of economic crime should not impose unrealistic 
burdens on commerce or on agencies of the state. Absolute integrity may be 
unattainable, and its pursuit may have counterproductive consequences. One 
might speak of 'burning the house to roast the pig'. It is ultimately the overall 
health of the economy and the integrity of its markets which are of greatest 
importance. Initiatives for the prevention and control of economic crime should 
be undertaken according to a risk-benefit calculus. This would see the most 
stringent controls operating where there is significant vulnerability to 
catastrophic loss, with fewer controls in place when risk is correspondingly 
less. The challenge for the future lies in implementing systems which will reduce 
opportunities for fraud, while at the same time allowing commerce to flourish. 
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Use of information technology 
to address institutional failure 
Asim Barman 
This chapter describes the experience of deploying information technology 
(IT) in Calcutta Municipal Corporation to arrest corruption in the 
municipal administration of Calcutta, a bustling metropolis in India. In 
the face of apparently insurmountable problems, IT was used as a means of 
institutional strengthening in the public sector organisation. Introduction 
of IT in Calcutta Municipal Corporation has had many benefits, including 
fast and accurate flow of information, increased revenue generation, 
decentralised planning, effective operational control, a paperless 
environment, and strengthening of both intra-organisational and inter-
organisational communication systems. 
The chapter specifically focuses on how the introduction of IT checked 
corruption, and helped improve efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with 
• property tax assessment and collection 
• expenditure management 
• solid waste management. 
The Calcutta Metropolitan Area is 1,380 square kilometres in area, and 
has a population of about 12 million (about 59 per cent of the urban 
population of West Bengal) . It has three municipal corporations (Calcutta, 
Howrah and Chandannagar), 35 municipalities, three notified areas, and 
540 rural units. The city of Calcutta itself is 187 square kilometres in area, 
with a population of 4.38 million (at night) , which increases by 2 million 
floating population during the day. With an average population density of 
23,381 persons per square kilometre, there is tremendous pressure on land 
as well as civic services and amenities available for residents in the city. 
Calcutta Municipal Corporation's area of jurisdiction and population offer 
many challenges in providing efficient and effective municipal services across 
the city limits. 
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• financing projects in the sector through a well-developed 
secondary debt market 
• consolidation of gains already achieved in creating the best 
possible regulatory framework 
• introduction of information technology to aid governance. 
This chapter examines the introduction of IT in Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation beginning in 1994-95, and the effects it has had in 
streamlining the Corporation's dealings with the citizens. Information 
technology became the crucial lever for dramatic change. 'Lead us from 
captivity to freedom, from darkness to light and from despair to hope' was 
how the role of IT was envisaged when the change began. Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation was captive because it could not share its information with 
citizens of the metropolis. Its staff was captive because they had no access 
to information about the outside world. Citizens were in the dark about 
the Corporation's functions, as they had no access to information about the 
Corporation. Taxpayers and others directly or indirectly associated with 
the Corporation did not know what was in store for them, due to the 
Corporation's poor data and knowledge bank. In the pre-IT scenario the 
effectiveness and efficiency of any organisation depended, among many 
other factors, on the quality of personnel it possessed. In other words, human 
resources used to be the biggest asset to a vast organisation like Calcutta 
Municipal Corporation where the establishment cost, inclusive of wage 
bill, was more than the development cost. 
Unfortunately, for various reasons, Calcutta Municipal Corporation had 
been deprived over the years of the services of the best talents available in 
the market. As a result, the Corporation was overstaffed and generally 
underskilled. In the absence of new recruitment at middle management 
level or lateral transfers in the Corporation's services, supervision, monitoring 
and evaluation of programs were poor. This was primarily because creativity 
and innovation could not be expected from the people who had risen from 
the ranks and also because they were not respected by their juniors. 
Consequently, municipal services suffered from poor supervision and 
management skills. 
Calcutta Municipal Corporation's databank was very weak. The citizens 
at times fell prey to the unscrupulous elements of the organization. 
Manipulation of data, and distortion of information, exploitation and 
extortion of the citizens in general, were common. Consequently, the 
negative image of the city was firmly anchored in the minds of both the 
citizens and the outside world. This negative image emboldened the 
Corporation's staff to engage in corrupt practices. Institutional failure thus 
propagated varying degrees of corruption. 
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The primary task for top management in the mid 1990s was to address 
this institutional failure. It was not possible to replace existing staff, within 
the existing framework of the staff policy, with quality personnel. Nor was 
it desirable to create many new posts and recruit quality staff in addition to 
the existing employees. Therefore, the only remaining option was to 
introduce information technology into the Corporation in a phased manner. 
In introducing information technology in Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation, political factors had to be kept in mind. Calcutta was a centre 
of opposition and protest during the age of automation of the early 1970s. 
The state government lead by Leftist parties was initially not favourably 
inclined towards automation. The employees of the state government, 
including the staff of Calcutta Municipal Corporation, feared job losses 
with the advent of automation. 
Information technology implementation-three case 
studies 
Information technology was progressively introduced in 1994-95 in 
Calcutta Municipal Corporation's three key areas of operations-property 
tax assessment and collection, expenditure management, and solid waste 
management. 
Case 1 Property tax assessment and collection 
The main areas of revenue generation within Calcutta Municipal Corporation 
are its Property Tax Assessment and Collection and Property Mutation 
Services. Under these, major activities undertaken include 
Annual tax billing 
From 1993-94 to 1999-2000, the Corporation's assessee base for property 
taxation grew from 350,000 to 400,000 households. Consolidated annual 
tax bills for assessees owning property in their name are payable in four 
instalments (one bill for each quarter) for each financial year. These bills are 
based on an annual valuation made by the Corporation for each assessee 
through a standard legal assessment procedure. 
The need for automation 
There were many reasons for automating this service. 
• The volume of bills is huge-ensuring they are correct using 
manual methods is nearly impossible. Currently, consolidated 
tax bills are computerised and mailed under certified post from 
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the data processing department. If an assessee claims that they 
have not received the tax bill, an information database can be 
accessed to verifY the complaint and a duplicate tax bill can be 
generated at the counter. 
• Corruption inherent in the system had led to tampering of data 
in case of high valued property. Previously, discrepancies could 
be noted only at the time of general revaluation after evety six 
years. By automating the business process of the hearing 
system, the immunity of the annual valuation is ensured. 
• If the tax bill cannot be served, the assessee cannot be declared 
in default even if the due date of payment lapses. Therefore, the 
mailing address is vital to ensure that the collection is proper 
and the Corporation's revenue claims are valid. 
• To ensure functionality, the areas under the Corporation are 
marked as wards. A ward has a number of streets under its 
jurisdiction; a street has a number of premises; and a premise 
can have a number of assessees (for example, multi-storied 
buildings). Identification of assessment backlogs are impossible 
manually but are successfully handled using IT. 
• Once the bill is generated successfully, the problem shifts to 
collection and reconciliation of payments. Manual procedures 
produce huge gaps, which result in improper updating of 
assessee's records. Also, Calcutta Municipal Corporation can 
never ascertain the defaulter list. The Corporation has around 
18 consolidated tax collection centres where the counterfoils of 
the bills are retained, on the basis of which manual summaty 
information and computerised information summaries are 
tallied. The Corporation's counter clerks often receive a tax with 
rebate even after the rebate date has lapsed, leading to loss of 
revenue. This bottleneck has been removed by using collection 
software at the counters. It has also assisted in reconciliation of 
the non-realisation of payment made by cheques by providing 
receipts only after the cheque has been cleared. 
Introducing automation 
A system of progressive automation was incorporated in the following areas. 
• Present demand bills. Previously, present demand bills were 
printed quarterly and mailed separately. In cases where the bill 
did not reach a person on time, was lost, or not paid on time, 
the person had to come to the Corporation's head office to get 
the bill details or to have the penalty interest calculated 
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• 
• 
manually. The computerisation of present demand bills has 
resulted in one-time printing and mailing of the bills for all 
quarters, thereby reducing expenses. Reprinting of bill and 
interest calculation has also been automated and has reduced 
corrupt practices. Taxpayers' addresses are kept on file, hence 
reducing the chances of the bill being lost. Accurate 
reconciliation of the payment due and the amounts received is 
also possible. 
Supplementary bills. Previously, re-evaluation of property was 
manual and subsequent applications from the taxpayer and the 
hearings were supervised by local councilors. This generated a 
lot of corrupt practices. The system has now been automated 
and the assessee numbers are being generated by the system, 
which means that re-evaluation can be done accurately and on 
time. 
Fresh bills. New assessees register with Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation after mutation and the fresh bill is raised to 
calculate the amount due between date of registration and the 
next financial year. 
Streamlining the hearing system 
The hearing system was also streamlined in the following ways. 
• A proposed annual valuation is intimated to each assessee for 
general or intermediate revaluation through hearing notice. In 
the manual system, the assessee was often never informed and 
the backlog cases therefore used to rise. The annual variation 
proposed in the intimation was not known to the assessee, and 
he was thus trapped in a situation where a higher annual 
variation could be intimated to him, which he was required to 




On completion of the hearing, the assessee received a rate card 
in which the confirmed annual valuation was written along 
with the surcharge (if any). There were no controls on the 
number of adjournments provided to an assessee or the gap in 
the hearing dates, which resulted in a lengthy hearing cycle. 
There was also no control on the number of cases heard, 
number of adjournments, or the number of hearings done. 
If the annual valuation for any completed general or 
intermediate revaluation quarter is fixed on a subsequent 
quarter, then the difference of taxes between the previously 
• 
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fixed annual valuation and the newly fixed annual valuation is 
collected through a supplementary bill. This bill is handed over 
to the assessee along with the new annual valuation (rate card) 
after completion of the hearing. The supplementary bill was 
never updated in the manual system and the assessee had great 
difficulty in getting his records cleared. 
By automating the full cycle of the hearing system through the 
use of an online integrated information system, the process is 
reduced to a few hours, incorporating the following activities 
i) generation of hearing notice on the proposed annual 
valuation 
ii) generation of a computerised rate card after the rate is 
confirmed 
iii) handing over the rate card to the assessee 
iv) generation of fresh/supplementary bill 
v) immediate payment by the assessee at the receiving counter 
vi) online reconciliation of the fresh/supplementary bill 
demand 
vii) simultaneous updating of the tax register and all related 
records . 
The automation of the hearing system has greatly increased the assessee's 
confidence. It has also saved time and money. Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation is now able to complete the backlog of bill payments and also 
maintain the general revaluation cycle. 
Property records 
Under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, maintallllllg property 
records is one of the statutory functions of the organisation. Mutation is 
the process by which the name of the property owner is changed when 
ownership of a property is transferred. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation 
keeps a record of these changes and ensures that the change is reflected on 
the assessee's consolidated tax bill. Under the old manual system, effecting 
this change in records was a cumbersome procedure that was inconvenient 
for the assessee. 
Developing integrated software, where the mutation is classified under 
various heads, and business rules are provided in a logical information 
database, has resulted in the registration process being a short single-window 
process (simple mutation). 
A variant of mutation is Suo-Moto, a mutation process initiated by the 
Corporation to bring a new building into the tax net quickly. This process 
has resulted in a significant increase in revenue for Calcutta Municipal 
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Corporation, and there are plans to attach the Building Department's 'Issue 
of completion certificate' process, which is the new building sanction authority. 
The taxpayer has benefited from computerisation of property records in 
several ways. Payments can be made across the counter at any of the 14 
counters located in the city. Even if the assessee does not receive prior 
payment notice, he/she can approach a payment counter with his/her 
assessee number or residential address and the computer will provide the 
information on the exact amount due. Calcutta Municipal Corporation 
staff have also gained. The replacement of the obsolete cash register system 
with the computerised system has relieved staff of the drudgery of work, 
freeing up time to devote to their other activities. It has also led to a reduction 
in overtime and better utilisation of staff. 
Table 10.1 shows the increase in revenues over the period 1993-200l. 
During this period, as a result of automation, the realisation figures increased 
substantially-from around 45 per cent in 1993-94 to about 65 per cent 
in 1999-2000, thus lowering the gap between dues and recoveries. 
Challenges faced 
Due to lack of automation in this function, Calcutta Municipal Corporation 
had not been able to monitor tax collection or mutation proceedings. Manual 
procedures propagated currupt practices, resulting in large monetary losses 
for the Corporation and harassment of taxpayers at the hands of the 
Corporation's clerks. 
In carrying out its activities under this function, Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation faced several challenges. 
• The manual system was highly personnel-dependent. 
Knowledge was concentrated among a small group of 
employees who had a lot of power. In addition, due to the 
Table 10.1 Annual demand (Rs. Crores) 
Calcutta Tollygunge Jadavpur s.s. Unit G.R . Unit 
1993-94 57.93 5 .27 0.72 0.84 0.64 
1994-95 62.68 5.26 0 .94 1.08 0.76 
1995-96 68.16 6 .08 1.24 1.24 0 .8 
1996-97 80.08 6.64 1.44 1.58 0 .8 
1997-98 88.4 7 .2 1.68 1.84 0.84 
1998- 99 99.99 7.6 1.91 2.29 0 .88 
1999- 00 107.71 8 .29 2.22 3.22 0 .81 
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system of lateral transfers, it was difficult to retain this 
knowledge across departments. Further, in the absence of a 
centralised repository, there were no standards, and business 
rules varied widely across the wards. In effect, the small group 
of employees took advantage of this state of affairs and indulged 
in corrupt practices. There was the case of an employee whose 
services had to be extended for 12 years simply because he 
could not be replaced. 
• Calcutta Municipal Corporation must obtain the correct valuation 
that is to be billed for a financial year. Generally, this figure is 
revised once every six years (general revaluation) or in any instance 
when the value of the properry changes dramatically, for example 
through Mutation, addition of a new area, alteration or 
amalgamation of property (intermediate revaluation). 
• Maintaining the correct name of the owner. The name printed 
on the tax bill is of paramount importance as the bill is 
considered an authentic document for proof of ownership. 
• Maintaining the mailing address to ensure that the bill is served 
correctly and remains authentic evidence of the property premises. 
When the new municipal commissioner took charge at Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation, this was the first area to become computerised. This activity is 
now fully computerised and maintained in an online database. 
Cost and time implication of automation 
It took roughly two years to automate the system. Investment expenditure 
was about Rs 1.50 crores for hardware and software (for the headquarters, 
treasury and suburban centres) and another Rs 1.00 crore for associated 
infrastructure (buildings, electrical cabling, air conditioning, and so on). 
Case 2 Expenditure management 
The need for automation 
When the new municipal commissioner took charge, Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation's accounting records were hopelessly behind schedule-some 
accounts were in seven years arrears. The manual system was not efficient 
in tracking the enormous volume of data and transactions generated daily. 
Accordingly, the budgeting was based on the system of estimated values of 
allocations and expenditures, and there was no method of collecting 
information on actual expenditures incurred under different accounting 
heads during the year. Further, while the accounting period was supposed 
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to close at the end of March, payments to external parties continued to be 
made as late as September or October of the next financial year. One of the 
major concerns was that it was impossible to track expenses vis-a-vis the 
budgetary allocations of various departments. Hence, many expenses were 
booked more than once against the same order. This was not only due to 
oversight on the part of the Corporation's staff, but also due to devious methods 
adopted by contractors in collusion with some officials in the Corporation. 
Introducing automation 
One of the foremost goals of the municipal commissioners was to fix the 
accounting system, and establis,h a system of financial discipline. This 
involved introducing budgetary control, introducing a system of checks 
and balances, as well as making the accounting system accurate and up-to-
date. Now the processing of bills ceases around 10 March each year in 
order to ensure accounts are finalised by the end of the month. 
Expenditure management has been improved by creating budget heads, 
which are maintained on the system. All expenses are booked against work 
order numbers generated by the system and the total expense against any 
head of account in a financial year is fixed. The cash book and the journal 
have been automated. The list of vendors is also maintained in the system, 
preventing favouritism towards select vendors. An inventory of the 
Corporation's assets has been published for the first time in many years. 
Challenges faced 
To overcome resistance to the introduction of IT, the system was introduced 
progressively and focused initially on the critical applications. Enormous 
effort was required to bring about this financial discipline among employees. 
In effect, close monitoring of expenditures became possible and, for the 
first time, actual expenditure statements for the previous year began to be 
recorded in budget statements, 
Cost and time implication of automation 
It took about two years to automate the system and involved an investment 
of about Rs 70 Lakhs in hardware and software. 
Case 3 Solid waste management 
The need for automation 
Previously, the city's garbage collection system was not only inefficient but 
also corrupt. Garbage was irregularly picked up from several areas of the 
city. In addition, since garbage collectors were paid bonuses based on the 
Use of information technology to address institutional failure 169 
number of trips made and the amount of garbage collected, they would 
make false trips and state incorrect tonnage. It was common practice to 
make false trips, make trips with half-full trucks, or even use the same load 
of garbage and show multiple trips in the records. While garbage used to 
pile up in the city, records showed remakable diligence amongst the city's 
garbage collectors, with some trucks making as many as many as 1200 
garbage disposal trips per day. This resulted in excess expenditure on petrol 
bills and wages. Further, the garbage dump was controlled by a mafia group 
who encouraged this malpractice. 
Introducing automation 
The municipal commissioner sought to improve this state of affairs. During 
a tour to Chicago in 1995, he learned how IT had been deployed in Chicago 
to correct these types of failures in garbage management. He decided to 
adopt a variation of the Chicago practice in Calcutta. 
As the first stage of IT implementation, a Foxpro-based rudimentary 
system was introduced in the garbage dump at Dhapa. This system would 
note the garbage trucks' time of entry to, and exit from, the dump. T his 
simple measure streamlined the system significantly. False trips by particular 
trucks were reduced and the average number of trips fell to roughly 700 
per day. 
Three other initiatives were also introduced. Despite stiff opposition, private 
garbage collection was introduced to complement the CMC's system. This 
was based on the fact that, even if the CMC's own system of garbage collection 
and disposal was fully operational, it could only ensure disposal of 60 per 
cent of the total garbage generated daily in the city. Second, the incentive 
system was rationalised. The tonnage of garbage dumped was used as the 
measure of productivity rather than the number of trips made. This rapidly 
reduced the number of trips made. Finally, a weighbridge mechanism was 
introduced so that the weight of each truck's contents could be easily 
determined, and payments made on that basis. Thus, measurement of the 
weight and number of trips made by each vehicle has been automated, 
reducing the scope for falsification of data. This has also resulted in more 
efficient garbage removal, a cleaner environment, and greater resident 
satisfaction. Currently, CMC and private contractors' vehicles make an average 
number of 500 trips per day, and the trucks always carry a full load of garbage. 
Challenges faced 
It initially appeared that the workers at the garbage dump-who were 
controlled by the mafia-would not allow the new system to be 
implemented. Garbage was dumped next to the computer centre, and the 
170 Corruption and Anti-corruption 
road leading to the dumping site was deliberately lined with lorries to 
prevent smooth movement of the garbage trucks operated by private 
contractors. In addition, the electric power lines did not extend all the way 
to the rather remote garbage dump, which meant there was no way of 
powering the new system. Initially, the system was implemented using 
generators. Senior officials of Calcutta Municipal Corporation had to keep 
a vigil to ensure that the system began without any hitches. 
Cost and time implication of automation 
The system took about one year to automate, and involved an investment 
of about Rs 30 Lakhs (computers and weighbridge), Rs 50 Lakhs (building, 
electrical cabling and air conditioning) and roughly Rs 2 crores on road 
development within the dumping yard. 
Incorporating Information Technology-how did it 
happen? 
Introduction of IT was based on a three-pronged strategy adopted by the 
new municipal commissioner. The aims were to 
• improve employee morale 
• raise revenue 
• control expenditures. 
Gaining employee confidence 
A series of free and frank dialogues with various employees' unions was 
initiated to win the employees over to the computer program. The dialogues 
centred around the following points. 
• The process of computerisation would not pose any immediate 
threat to the staff as far as their tenure in Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation was concerned. 
• Automation did not necessarily imply diminished job opportunities. 
• Computerisation was being introduced to aid their efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
• Manual compilation and tabulation processing of these data 
was fraught with risk. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated 
against some staff for mishandling of data. 
• The entitlement of staff in terms of disbursements of Provident 
Fund could not be properly ascertained due to the volume of 
transactions. As a result, many staff suffered. 
• It was impossible to meet the growing establishment costs, 
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number of Calcutta Municipal Corporation staff, if the resource 
base was not augmented. It was not possible to bring more 
citizens into the tax-net through traditional manual methods. 
Moreover, raising huge numbers of bills manually was not 
possible. The necessary decentralisation and mechanisation was 
only possible through computerisation. 
If Calcutta Municipal Corporation staff did not become 
acquainted with modern technology they would become 
redundant as the massive changes in IT occurred all over the world. 
Institutional pride amongst staff is the essence of any 
organisation. Only through such pride could the negative 
image of Calcutta Municipal Corporation be countered, and 
that was only possible if computerisation-devoid of any 
discretion or favouritism-could be introduced, particularly in 
the public service oriented departments. 
Calcutta Municipal Corporation has a big role to play in 
making Calcutta environmentally-friendly, citizen-friendly and 
investor-friendly. Only through that process can more job 
opportunities be created in the city. Therefore, the staff of the 
Corporation have a big responsibility in ensuring a better 
future for Calcutta. 
Dialogue with employees' unions can only yield results when it is 
accompanied by concrete action. Several steps were taken to restore employee 
confidence in the organisation by making it clear that the authority meant 
business and had no intention of replacing manpower with machines. 
A special training institute was set up to train all Corporation staff in 
the new system. Training programs ranged from orientation courses to three-
month and one-year courses, and were successful in making the staff 
extremely computer-literate . A new environment, favourable to 
computerisation, was gradually established. 
Calcutta Municipal Corporation has 18 treasury counters. They used 
to handle cash and calculate the transactions using cash register machines. 
At the end of the financial year, and on many other occasions, staff were 
required to work until late evening counting cash and processing 
transactions. It was felt that computers should be introduced at the treasury 
counters to make the work more accurate, smooth and effective. Where 
before there were heated arguments between Corporation staff and 
ratepayers regarding delays in the collection of money, and incorrect 
compilations and tabulations, the introduction of computers in Treasury 
improved customer-staff relations. A sense of institutional pride was also 
established among CMC staff. 
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There were other benefits from computerisation. 
• Staff were concerned that the compilation of their contributions 
to Provident Fund was incorrect. The accounts of Provident 
Fund had been in arrears for a long time. As a result, staff were 
unsure about their entitlements. The introduction of 
computers in Provident Fund dispelled staff fears. 
• It was very difficult to prepare cash journals involving large 
amounts of bill and cheque transactions in the Finance and 
Accounts Deptartment. Even with their best efforts, they could 
not prepare proper accounts on time. At one point, CMC 
accounts were more than seven years in arrears. Hence, 
Corporation staff in the Finance and Accounts Department 
welcomed computerisation. 
• Previously, the process of promotion and transfer of staff was 
inefficient. Manual preparation of gradation lists and issuance 
of promotion orders through traditional methods took a long 
time. Corporation staff in the Personnel Department welcomed 
the introduction of computerisation to ease this problem. 
• With the gradual introduction of production incentives to 
Corporation staff, staff confidence grew. But preparation of 
correct incentive bills for the huge number of staff was a major 
problem. Moreover, the clerical staff who were to prepare the 
incentive bills were reluctant to do so because they were not the 
beneficiaries of the incentive program. Therefore, the field staff 
welcomed the computer program for making the preparation 
and disbursement of incentive bills smoother and more 
accurate. 
• Printing and electronic media was effectively utilised in gaining 
public confidence in the Corporation's computerisation 
program. The benefits that accrued to citizens through the 
computerisation process were highly publicised. The response 
from the citizens was so encouraging that both the 
management and the employees' unions proceeded to 
implement further computerisation in other departments. 
Gaining political support 
Calcutta Municipal Corporation is run by a democratically elected Mayor-
in-Council system. Judging the public mood and assessing the benefits of 
computerisation both for revenue collection and expenditure management, 
the members of the Mayor-in-Council became ardent suporters of 
computerisation. Some of the members of the Mayor-in-Council thought 
that computerisation was a panacea for all the evils of administration. 
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Being elected representatives, the members of the Mayor-in-Council 
have many responsibilities to the citizens . Therefore, they were very 
concerned about the image of the organisation. They wanted to introduce 
transparency and accountability and thought that computerisation would 
achieve this. 
Because Calcutta Municipal Corporation is a vast organisation, the 
directives of the management were not always strictly adhered to by its 
staff. This could be attributed primarily to the lack of proper supervision 
by middle management, and also to the lack of knowledge in interpreting 
various circulars issued by the management. Close scrutiny of the 
transactions in various departments revealed that actual field operations 
differed within various sections of the same department, not to mention 
other departments, and contravened both the objectives and the spirit of 
the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act. Essentially, a huge gap existed 
between the statute and rules and what was actually practiced. The Mayor-
in-Council believed that the only way to bridge the gap was to analyse the 
business rules through development of proper computer packages, and 
enforce them with uniform implementation. They thought that 
introduction of proper business logic and uniform application of various 
packages would enable Calcutta Municipal Corporation to create greater 
transparency. For example, raising supplementary bills on account of 
property tax and providing facilities in terms of rebates and instalments in 
a uniform manner was welcomed by taxpayers and also helped the CMC 
raIse more revenue. 
Streamlining operations 
The municipal commissioner felt that for any new institutional strengthening 
initiative to succeed it was vital that the endemic problems of generating 
resources for the cash-starved Corporation, controlling avoidable expenditure, 
and gaining public confidence needed to proceed in parallel. Accordingly, 
the specific areas in which IT was to be introduced were chosen with care. 
Targets and objectives of the IT Implementation Program were defined in 
a phased manner. The main hindrances were ambiguities associated with 
the business rules definition, information on data availability, and assigning 
responsibilities to ensure the process worked smoothly. 
Developing a vision 
Keeping these constraints in mind, the following objectives were set 
• incorporate transparency into the system 
• reduce process completion time 
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add control and audit trails to the system 
simplifY the business process for faster decisions 
Increase revenue 
reduce multiple data capture points (reduce data redundancy) 
• ensure better management control 
• enforce standards (like usage of pre-printed stationery). 
To achieve these objectives, a high-level task force was set up under the 
direct supervision of the municipal commissioner. Use of the latest reliable 
hardware and software was encouraged and high quality networking solutions 
were adopted . Within three years, a huge computing resource was 
established. 
Implementing the action plan 
As expected, the implementation of the IT system encountered strong 
resistance from many quarters. One of the main sources of resistance was 
employees. This was manifested in the form of non-cooperation or slow 
response, but commitment of the management team and the strong support 
of the municipal commissioner have gone a long way to solving this problem . 
. Initially, the new system was implemented through contract staff. This 
was slowly changed, and the system is currently run by the CMC's own 
employees. In order to train its own staff to use computers, the CMC has 
started a computer-training institute. Education and computer awareness 
among employees has had a positive effect on the management's pro-IT 
stand. Fresh recruitment of IT-oriented staff and IT training of staff in key 
managerial positions has also helped. 
Lessons learned and recommendations 
Computerisation of CMC processes is not simply a matter transferring of 
the data in paper documents to electronic media. The process has sought 
to introduce logic into the system. This logic is based on fixed parameters. 
At the Corporation, much work used to be done without any logic or well-
defined parameters. Therefore, under computerisation, establishing the 
parameters with uniform logic was the greatest challenge. Computerisation 
thus necessitated the initiation of a series of administrative and financial 
reforms. 
T he management felt that the reforms could be undertaken alongside 
computerisation. T he informal practices originally followed by CMC staff 
for their personal aggrandisement gave way to stratified uniform business 
rules. Transparency has been the key parameter in the administrative reforms, 
and there has been a major transformation in the work attitude of the staff 
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and the attitude of citizens and other external entities, such as suppliers 
and contractors, towards the Corporation as a result. 
The implementation of IT has eliminated many unscrupulous aspects 
of the system. The uniform policy prescription, coupled with the attitudinal 
change of the top and the middle management, gave a new dimension to 
the dealings between the Corporation and its clients . It enabled the 
Corporation to augment its resources and establish a new image. 
Upon its deployment, IT became an important tool for better governance 
and institutional strengthening in the hands of the Corporation's 
decisionmakers. An analysis of how the IT intervention brought about 
institutional change delivers certain interesting insights. Reforms and 
improvements can be initiated in a system irrespective of the extent of its 
existing malaise. It is necessary to draw up a strategic plan and 
implementation program, secure top management commitment and build 
stakeholder buy-in. In addition, IT can be an effective mechanism to arrest 
institutional failure and provide good governance in public sector/ 
government organisations interfacing with citizens. Finally, implementation 
of IT to arrest institutional failure is most successful when adopted in a 
progressive manner, with sufficient prior work on planning, pilot 
implementation, organisational development and discipline enforcement. 
At the Corporation, the process was implemented under a five-stage model. 
Stage I-set strategic agenda. The success of deploying IT in government 
organisations such as municipal corporations is dependent on a sponsor 
setting a strategic agenda for implementing IT and showing commitment 
to a program of institurional change. In the case of the CMC, it was the 
organisation's municipal commissioner who, upon assuming responsibility, 
ensured that he understood the benefits of IT in establishing better 
governance in critical municipal services and took an active interest in the 
project, reviewing its progress at regular intervals. 
Stage 2-launch pilot project. Rather than deploying IT all at once across 
the entire organisation, it is preferable to launch the IT project on a pilot 
basis. At the Corporation, IT was initially introduced in one critical area-
property taxation and assessment. 
Stage 3-reconfirm strategic agenda. At this stage, based on the successful 
results from the initial pilot implementation, the sponsor reconfirms the 
priorities and benefits of IT implementation and pledges support for it. 
The scope of the pilot project is then widened. In CMC, this stage included 
reaffirmation of the Commissioner's commitment to the IT initiative and 
inclusion of a number of other critical functions in the implementation 
program. These functions were-budgets and expenditure and solid waste 
management. 
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Stage 4-project roll-out. By this stage the results of computerisation are 
evident. At the Corporation, this stage involved parallel implementation of 
the IT program in the three chosen areas and increased coverage of the 
organisation's employees. Thus, from its beginnings at the headquarters, 
the program was extended to the Corporation's eighteen nodal receipt centres 
and the waste dump-yard at Dhapa. 
Stage 5-drive benefit s and ch ange. Finally, it is imperative for the 
organisation to distribute the benefits throughout the organisation and 
reaffirm support for an organisation-wide process of IT-enabled change. 
The Corporation is currently undergoing such change and has ambitious 
plans to expand its IT base in its core business operations. 
11 
Depoliticising key institutions 
for combatting corruption 
t he new Thai const itution 
Borwornsak Uwanno 
Corruption has been rampant in Thailand for many decades. It has been 
one of the pretexts used by the Thai military to legitimise coups against 
civilian governments. Thailand's most recent coup, enacted by the National 
Peacekeeping Council (NPKC) in 1991, was justified by coup leaders on 
the grounds that members of Chatichai's government were greatly corrupted. 
A committee for asset inspection was formed to investigate the assets of 
'unusually wealthy' ministers. The case ended with the Supreme Court 
annulling the NPKC's Order No. 26 on account of its unconstitutionality. 
Following that, the movement for political reform became widespread 
among opinion leaders and the media. This led to the amendment of the 
1991 constitution by the NPKC's nominated National Assembly, creating 
the 99-member Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) to prepare a new 
constitution for reform. The drafting committee of the CDA was chaired 
by Anand Punyarachun, a former liberal Prime Minister. The drafting 
committee proposed three main directions for reform 
• increased people-participation in government at all levels, and 
stronger guarantees of human rights 
• the creation of 'watchdog' agencies and emphasis on more 
transparent and accountable decisionmaking processes 
• the creation of mechanisms to ensure government stability and 
efficiency. 
After nationwide hearings and consultations, the CDA prepared a draft 
constitution which was sent to the joint sitting of both houses of Parliament 
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for consideration. Parliament voted to adopt the draft without amendment. 
The new constitution received royal assent and, with its publication in the 
Royal Gazette, came into effect on 11 October 1997. 
This chapter highlights key constitutional institutions that have a direct 
or indirect mandate to fight corruption. It then assesses practical difficulties 
surrounding the creation and operation of these organisations. 
Depoliticisation of key constitutional institutions and procedural 
reforms 
It has been generally accepted that a holistic approach is needed to fight 
corruption. It has been pointed out that' [a]lthough anti-corruption 
strategies should focus on priorities, they should also be comprehensive. 
All the agencies designed to fight corruption-prevention, investigation, 
research, education and enforcement bodies-have to work in concert, 
harmonise their efforts and complement each other to develop one strategy' 
(Stapenhurst and Kpundeh 1999). 
This holistic strategy highlights the institutional aspect of anti-corruption 
efforts. No single agency can effectively combat corruption alone. Various 
organisations need to be created and/or mandated to perform corruption-
fighting tasks . The drafters of the present Thai constitution decided to 
adopt comprehensive institutional reform by creating new 'watchdog' 
agencies and modifYing existing institutions' methods of operation. This 
'national integrity system' has, for the first time in Thai constitutional 
history, been installed to create a 'clean' government. 
The national integrity system in the Constitution 
The 1997 Constitution has been labelled the 'anti-corruption constitution' 
because it has created a comprehensive national integrity system. Within 
the constitutional innovations, there are eight 'pillars' of integrity, as 
presented in the national integrity system model developed by Langseth, 
Pope and Stapenhurst (1997) (Figure 11.1) . 
Political will. Political will, or the determination to fight corruption, is one of 
the pillars that creates good governance. Countries such as Hong Kong (Speville 
1998) and Singapore (Quah 1988) that have been successful in fighting 
corruption are proof that political will is one of the most important factors . 
Quah proposed a matrix to demonstrate four characterisations of 
government anti-corruption strategies, depending on commitment of 
political leaders and adequacy of anti-corruption measures. With strong 
commitment and adequate measures, the strategy is considered to be most 
effective. In contrast, weak commitment and inadequate measures will result 
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Figure 11.1 The pillars of integrity 









Note: 'Ant i-c orruption agencies: Ombudsman; Auditor-General. 
Source: Langseth, P., Pope, J. and Stapenhurst, R., 1997. 'The role of a national 
integrity system in fighting corruption', National Integrity System Country Studies, The 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
in a 'hopeless' strategy. Strong commitment with inadequate measures, 
and weak commitment with adequate measures will both yield ineffective 
strategies (Figure 11.2). 
Quah (1988) concluded that Singapore had succeeded in minimising 
the problem of corruption because its anti-corruption strategy was 
characterised by several key features. These included 
• commitment by the political leaders, especially Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew, to eliminating corruption both within and 
outside the public bureaucracy 
• adoption of comprehensive anti-corruption measures designed 
to reduce both the opportunities and need for corruption 
• creation and maintenance of an anti-corruption agency with 
honest and competent personnel to investigate corruption cases 
and enforce the anti-corruption laws. 
The Thai Constitution tends to follow these same principles. In respect 
of political will, the charter in Chapter V on Directive Principles of 
Fundamental State Policies sets forth various provisions to forge political 
will and to assess annual performance of political leaders in all governments 
in relation to the battle against misconduct in the administration of the 
country. These mandates are 
• the duty of all governments to ensure rule of law, efficient and 
expedient administration of justice, and equal opportunity to 
justice (Section 75 § 1) 
• the requirement for all governments to adopt and enforce moral 
and ethical standards for politicians and public officials in order 
to prevent corruption and misconduct and create efficiency 
(Section 77) 
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Source: Quah, J.S.T., 1982. 'Bureaucratic corruption in the ASEAN countries: a 
comparative analysis of their anti-corruption strategies', Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 13(1):175. 
• the mandate to promote and encourage public participation in 
checking the exercise of state powers at all levels and in all 
decisionmaking processes (Section 76), including public 
participation in natural resource management and the 
protection of the environment (Section 79) 
• the obligation to allocate sufficient funds to independent 
watchdog agencies (the Election Commission, the 
Ombudsman, the Constitutional Court, the National Human 
Rights Commission, the Courts of Justice, the Administrative 
Courts, the National Counter-Corruption Commission and the 
State Audit Commission) (Section 75 § 2) 
• the requirement to adhere to the market economy and the 
mandate to deregulate, with prohibitions on the expansion of 
the public sector in the market (Section 87). 
These requirements are to be guiding principles in legislating and forming 
policies and platforms for all Thai governments. They are not intended to be 
enforceable through courts of law. As the Constitution requires the 
government to state clearly in its declaration to the joint sitting of both 
houses at the beginning of its term the strategies and activities to enact these 
requirements, each newly elected government has to take these constitutional 
mandates seriously. Failure to do so will induce severe criticism from members 
of parliament (MPs) and the media for lack of commitment and clarity of 
purpose. This political sanction is important in forging political will. 
Moreover, the Constitution imposes a duty on the government to submit 
an annual report to the joint sitting of both houses of Parliament indicating 
the results of its policy implementation, including a description of problems 
and obstacles encountered during the year. This accountability mechanism 
created by the charter seems to be very effective in promoting debate on 
the floor of the houses. The annual report also serves to draw the attention 
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of the media and the general public to the operation of government and 
provides a good incentive for the government and state agencies to review 
their plans and put more effort into achieving their mandates. Opposition 
criticism of the current government in the past two annual report joint sittings 
has been described by the press as the equivalent of a no-confidence debate. 
In any case, improvements are possible in two areas. Before taking office, 
coalition parties should seriously prepare an action plan to address each 
mandate. Plans should identify attainable, manageable and measurable 
targets. The practice of allowing bureaucrats to draw up the plan (as is the 
case with the present government) should be strictly avoided, as such a 
practice allows bureaucrats' agendas to prevail, as in the past. Both houses 
of Parliament should ask their relevant committees to monitor the initial 
declaration and the annual report. A monitoring system would enable the 
houses to effectively oversee agencies throughout the year. 
Administrative reforms. The new constitution has brought about many 
reforms in the Thai public sector. There is now an emphasis on the duty 
to act impartially in compliance with the law in order to protect public 
interests and provide convenience and services to the public; in other 
words, the necessity of separating personal matters from the duty of 
office (Section 70). Conflict of interest provisions in the Organic Law 
on Counter Corruption, 1999 have been imposed on public office 
holders and their spouses (see Appendix 1). These include restrictions 
on concurrent and post-employment, prohibitions on contractual and 
monopolistic concession with the state and local governments, and 
restrictions on holding shares in corporations and on accepting gifts 
(Sections 100-103 and 122 of the Organic Law on Counter Corruption, 
1999 and Sections 110 , 118, 126, 128 , 208 and 209 of the 1997 
Constitution applying to MPs , senators and ministers). Prohibitions 
have been imposed on MPs and senators from interfering or intervening 
in the recruitment, appointment, reshuffle, transfer, promotion or 
elevation of salary scale of government officials. Members of parliament 
and senators who violate these provisions will be removed from office 
(Sections 111 and 128). The Constitution requires adherence to ethical 
codes by political figures and permanent staff of the state (Sections 77 
and 191). Improvements have been made to the pension scheme for MPs, 
senators and ministers (Section 229 § 2). Finally, the requirement for an 
efficient system of administration to meet people's needs has been 
recognised (Section 75). 
Parliament. The third pillar of the national integrity system is the reformed 
Parliament. The changes are dramatic, to ensure more effective, efficient 
and accountable chambers. 
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The first feature that needs to be addressed is the Senate (the upper 
chamber). For many decades, appointment was the manner of selection for 
members of the Senate. The Prime Minister proposed a list of military 
officers, important public officials, and leading businessmen for royal 
approval. For this reason the Senate was considered a group of government 
'supporters'. The Prime Minister's power to nominate was severely criticised 
for creating a 'winner-takes-all' situation. In addition to forming government, 
parties that won a majority in the lower house were entitled to distribute 
all senatorial posts among supporters. This encouraged particularly fierce 
competition in general elections, often manifested as vote-buying. 
The drafters of the constitution decided that the upper chamber should 
be directly elected. However, the electoral mechanisms used to select 
members for the two chambers differ greatly. First, each candidate to the 
House of Representatives (the lower house) must be a member of a political 
party so that they can promote party discipline for the sake of efficiency 
and government stability. Lack of efficiency and stability have been serious 
impediments to the continuity of national management under the civilian 
regime. However, candidates for senatorial seats must not have any party 
affiliation. Those with past affiliation must have resigned from their parties 
at least one year before registering candidacy in a Senate election. This 
measure of depoliticisation was introduced to render senators non-partisan 
so that they could exercise their control over political figures and high-
ranking officials more impartially (in this context, depoliticisation means a 
de-linkage of candidates from political parties). 
Furthermore, while political campaigning is permitted during House 
of Representative elections, it is not allowed during Senate elections. Senate 
candidates are only permitted to ' introduce' themselves to the public using 
posters and pamphlets, the contents of which are prescribed by the Election 
Commission. The Election Commission also provides radio and television 
fora for candidates' introduction. Although this method has been criticised 
as being unnatural, it resulted in less electoral spending than in previous 
elections, and an absence of the usual 'mud slinging' among candidates. 
Constituencies for the Senate election are provincial and are typically 
multi-member, though some low-population provinces select only one 
senator. This contrasts with the single-member constituencies of MP 
elections. Despite the fact that many Senate election constituencies are 
multi-member, each elector has only one vote. For example, Bangkok has 
18 senators but each voter can only cast one vote for the candidate of his or 
her choice. Though strongly criticised, this method offers advantages because 
it basically gives all citizens' votes equal weight and allows the realisation of 
a pluralist Senate. Such pluralism is in sharp contrast to the majoritarian 
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politics of the House of Representatives (see Figure 11.3). The true 
representation of various groups within Thai society can help provide civil 
society groups-historically dominated by eIites drawn from the 
bureaucracy, the military and big business-with a more equitable share of 
legislative and administrative power. 
The constitution bars senators from running for two consecutive terms. 
This rule was instituted out of concern that senators' political ambition 
would induce them to affiliate discreetly with political parties. As 
compensation, the term of office for senators is six years, two years longer 
than for MPs. In addition, while the House of Representatives can be 
dissolved, the Senate cannot (Sections 126(3) and 130) . 
Senators are not eligible for appointment to ministerial posts or other 
political positions. A former senator may be nominated for such a position 
only after one year has elapsed since he or she vacated office. This prohibition 
aims to prevent the possibility of senators being bribed with offers of 
government positions (Section 127). 
Efforts to de-link the Senate from party politics were undertaken to make 
the institution central in the fight against corruption. The Senate is armed 
with two important powers which the House of Representatives lacks. 
• the power to vote for nomination of Constitutional Court 
judges, Supreme Administrative Court judges, Ombudsmen, 
members of the National Counter Corruption Commission, the 
State Audit Commission, and the National Human Rights 
Commission 
• the power to impeach political figures, including the Prime 
Minister, ministers, MPs, senators, presidents of the 
constitutional control bodies mentioned above and other high-
ranking officials. The impeachment power can only be exercised 
after an investigation is conducted by the National Counter-
Corruption Commission which must recommend that the case 
for impeachment is a prima facie one. The vote for 
impeachment should receive the support of not less than 60 per 
cent of the Senate's 200 members. 
Depoliticisation in this case theoretically guarantees impartiality and 
neutrality of the Senate in its quasi-judicial function. 
Some political observers are not confident about this institutional 
neutrality, arguing that in reality many candidates would have links with 
the parties. Some candidates would be former MPs, many would seek 
support from parties' canvassers, and so on. Figute 11.4 shows an estimate 
of the possible affiliations between the senators elected on 4 March 2000 
and political parties. 
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In fact, personal connections between some senators and MPs are natural. 
This, however, does not imply a direct link to the parties of those MPs. 
Even in cases where party connections exist, they will not be formal. No 
party line can be legally imposed on the theoretically free members of the 
Senate. In matters of little importance, lobbying by MPs and parties can 
occur. When the Senate is considering high profile issues, however, the 
public will be able to observe closely, and such pressure should prevail over 
secret affiliations. The proceedings of the CDA are an illustration of this 
safeguard. On important policies opposed by political parties, such as the 
incompatibility of ministerial function and parliamentary representative 
function, the majority of Assembly members who had personal ties with 
parties voted against the parties' preferred policies. 
The House of Representatives-chamber of partisan politics. Unlike the 
Senate, the House of Representatives is designed to be a politically partisan 
institution. No candidate or MP is allowed to be independent from a 
political party. Strict party discipline stands as the ultimate sanction, through 
expulsion from the party and loss of the office of MP (Section 118(8)). This 
is intended to entrench the stability of Thai civilian governments which 
historically have an average term of office of 1.2 years. 
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Source: Matichon, 6 March 2000. 
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Figure 11.4 Senators' possible relationships with political 
parties 
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The interesting feature of the election system is the combination of 
proportional representation and a simple majority system. One-hundred 
seats are allocated by proportional representation to candidates drawn from 
national party lists , and 400 seats are allocated on the basis of first-past-
the-post single-member constituency contests. The aim of this innovation 
is to avoid vote-buying and electoral fraud. The party list system should be 
especially effective because the national constituency is too large to allow 
efficient voter bribery to take place. 
Furthermore, compulsory voting is prescribed in order to render vote-
buying more difficult-it makes it very difficult to buy all or even a majority 
of votes. Furthermore, in the past, ballot counting took place at the polling 
stations and was thus easily controlled by party canvassers. Now, ballot 
counting takes place at a central counting venue in each constituency, as 
specified by the Election Commission (Section 104 §4). 
Two aspects of the 'rationalised parliamentary system' prescribed by the 
new constitution are particularly striking. The first is the incompatibility 
of ministerial and parliamentary function. Members of parliament who 
become ministers must resign from their offices as MPs within one month 
186 Corruption and Anti-corruption 
after the royal command of appointment is issued (Sections 118(7) and 
204). MPs resigning from single-member constituencies are replaced through 
by-election. Resigning party-list MPs are automatically replaced by the 
next candidate on the list. In opting for this choice, the drafters of the 
constitution seemed to favour party-list MPs as ministerial appointees. This 
strict separation of powers adopted in the French Fifth Republic 
Constitution is, for Thais, a means of enhancing the monitoring function 
of the lower house over the government. The logic is simple: the controlled 
(ministers) cannot concurrently be the controllers (MPs). Moreover, this 
measure should contribute to government stability because rebelling 
ministers (not uncommon in Thailand's coalition governments) will not 
have parliamentary seats to retreat to if they are sacked by the Prime Minister. 
The second constitutional measure is the requirement that when accusing 
any minister of corruption, unusual wealth, malfeasance or intentional 
violation of the law or constitution, the opposition must first launch an 
impeachment accusation before submitting a motion of no-confidence to 
the House of Representatives (Sections 185, 186). This condition is laid 
down in order to avoid a frustrating situation where the opposition may 
present convincing evidence of ministerial corruption during a no-confidence 
debate, but the House still votes in support of the government and there 
are no lasting repercussions for seemingly corrupt ministers. Under the 
new mechanism the National Counter-Corruption Commission must 
become involved in the impeachment investigation, so, regardless of the 
outcome of the no-confidence vote, impeachment proceedings will take 
place and corrupt ministers will be subject to punishment. 
'Watchdog' agencies. Before the new constitution came into force, all control 
institutions were quite politicised in the sense that political interference 
could be real and effective. For example, the Constitutional Tribunal was 
chaired by the speaker of the House of Representatives. The speaker of the 
Senate, the president of the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor general 
were ex officio members. Other members were elected by the sitting 
parliament and remained in office only during the life of that parliament. 
The Tribunal was, in this respect, more of a political institution with political 
biases than an impartial judicial body. The Counter Corruption and 
Malfeasance Commission (CCMC) and the Office of the Auditor General 
were under the Prime Minister's responsibility. The Council of State, which 
decided on administrative disputes between individuals and state officers, 
was also under the Prime Minister's direct control. In order to remedy this 
problem, the new constitution adopted four principles for the creation of 
watchdog agencies: comprehensiveness, depoliticisation and independence, 
reinforcement of powers, and checks and balances. 
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Comprehensive control institutions. Thailand has a huge bureaucracy which 
includes 15 ministries, 207 departments including public enterprises, and 
2,668,000 public servants, as well as 585 acts of Parliament that enable 
these entities and officials to act. The risk of abuses of power resulting in 
violation of people's rights and freedoms is therefore high. Previous control 
agencies were limited to courts of law and the non-independent bodies 
mentioned above. It was therefore the task of the constitution to create a 
comprehensive system of control bodies that could oversee all aspects of 
state administration so as to uphold the principle of rule of law. Nine such 
bodies were established. 
• The Election Commission (Sections 136-48)-empowered to 
organise and control elections at different levels, tasks which 
were formerly executed by the Ministry of the Interior which 
had long been accused of having a bias towards the party in 
power 
• The National Counter Corruption Commission (Sections 297-
302)-entitled to verifY the asset and liability declarations 
made by political figures and high-ranking officials, and to 
conduct investigations into cases of unusual wealth, corruption, 
malfeasance in office and intentional violation of laws and the 
Constitution 
• The Supreme Court of Justice's Criminal Division for Persons 
Holding Political Positions (Sections 308-11)-instituted to 
adjudicate cases in which political figures are declared prima 
facie corrupt or unusually wealthy by the National Counter-
corruption Commission (NCCC). This first and last-instance 
criminal court is composed of nine Supreme Court judges 
elected by the plenary session of the Court; criminal procedure 
is inquisitional but bears due process to ensure the accused's 
right to self defense 
• Three Ombudsmen (Sections 196-98) entrusted with the 
power to investigate cases where public officials are suspected of 
failing to perform their duties, or to have exercised powers 
beyond their official prerogative 
• The State Audit Commission (Section 312) oversees and audits 
public spending of all public organisations including 
constitutional independent control institutions 
• The National Human Rights Commission (Sections 199-200) 
investigates human rights violations by both public and private 
entities and reports to the Cabinet and Parliament 
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• The Constitutional Court (Sections 255-70) controls the 
constitutionality of bills and acts of Parliament and is the 
supreme arbitrator in cases of constitutional disputes among 
constitutional bodies 
• The Administrative Courts (Sections 276-80) judge cases of 
illegalities committed by the administration or its agents 
• The Courts of Justice (Sections 271-75) judge civil, 
commercial and criminal cases. 
These independent bodies have different mandates and powers so as to 
avoid redundancy and duplication of jurisdiction. They have to work in 
concert to fight aberrant behaviours. 
Depoliticisation and independence of watchdog agencies. Independence is 
a fundamental aspect of effective control institutions . To achieve 
independence, eradication of political interference is essential. Past failure 
proved that the work of the CCMC was quite deceptive. One of the reasons 
for the CCMC's lack of achievement was that the institution was under the 
pressure and control of the government. 
The new constitution tries to cope with this problem by depoliticising 
the process of nominating members of the watchdog agencies to make them 
independent vis-d-vis their clients. The selection process is basically the 
same for all these agencies. 
A depoliticised method of nomination. Members are chosen by a selection 
committee comprising, on one hand, representatives of political parties 
and, on the other, non-partisan judges or academics. 
In the case of the NCCC, the selection panel consists of 15 persons: the 
president of the Supreme Court ofJustice, the president of the Constitutional 
Court, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, seven rectors 
self-selected from among all state higher-education institutions and five 
self-selected members from among all political parties that have at least one 
MP in the House (Section 297). The selection committee prepares a list of 
18 qualified persons for submission to the Senate (Section 257 applied 
mutatis mutandis). After receiving the list, the Senate, through its 
investigation committee under Section 135, scrutinises past records and 
behaviours of the 18 candidates and then votes to select the nine most 
qualified persons to be appointed by the King as members of the NCCC. 
The vote is by absolute majority in the first round and by simple majority 
in the second round, which is necessary only if an absolute majority is not 
obtained in the first round. 
This complicated method has two merits. It ensures the legitimacy of 
the selected members because they are chosen by the elected representatives 
of the Thai people in the upper house. In addition, it minimises political 
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interference and partisanship. This method proves to be effective and 
efficient because NCCC members selected in this way can perform their 
function freely without allegiance to parties. 
Guarantee of independence. The constitution has various other mechanisms 
to ensure the independence of watchdog agencies. These include 
• single-term, non-renewable offices of long duration: nine years 
for NCCC, seven years for Election Commission, six years for 
Ombudsmen, the National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) and the State Audit Commission 
• incompatibility of these offices with other public and private 
offices (examples in Sections 139, 141, 256 and 258) 
• an independent secretariat attached to each agency, entitled by 
organic laws to freely conduct personnel management, 
administration and financial operations without being bound 
by laws and regulations applied to the government (Section 
270 for the Constitutional Court, Section 275 for Courts of 
Justice, Section 280 for Administrative Courts, Section 302 for 
NCCC, Section 327(8) for Election Commission, Section 
330(4) for Ombudsmen, and Section 333(3) for State Audit 
Commission) 
• the fact that sufficient funding for the operation of these 
agencies is prescribed by the Constitution for fear that the 
government and parliament may try to jeopardise the agencies' 
operations through budgetary constraint (Section 75 § 2) 
• the chairmen of these bodies are in charge of the control and 
execution of the organic laws creating the bodies, to avoid 
political pressure. 
Reinforcement of powers and capacity. The charter reinforces powers of 
the controllers. The Senate is empowered to impeach high-ranking politicians 
and officials. The Election Commission can annul elections which are not 
free and fair. The NCCC can freely conduct investigations in cases of unusual 
wealth or corruption, including verification of public figures' asset and 
liability declarations. The State Audit Commission can audit agencies under 
the government, the Parliament and all independent bodies. 
Apart from powers specific to the functions of each agency, the watchdog 
agencies all have the power to order government agencies, officials, the 
police, prosecutors and courts to supply assistance and evidence as required 
in the course of agency activity. The penalty for non-compliance varies 
from disciplinary to criminal action. 
Checks and balances. Bearing in mind the adage 'power corrupts, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely', the drafters of the constitution did 
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not allow any agency to have supremacy without controls. Every watchdog 
agency is controlled under a comprehensive system of checks and balances. 
All holders of office, including senators, ombudsmen, members of the 
NHRC and State Audit Commission, and judges of the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Court ofJustice, 
must declare their assets and liabilities to the NCCC. Members of the 
NCCC must make asset and liability declarations to the president of the 
Senate. This method allows verification of declarations and the investigation 
of unusual wealth cases if declarers cannot justifY unusual increases in their 
assets . Questionable assets are subject to confiscation by the Supreme Court 
of Justice's Criminal Division. 
All holders of offices are impeachable after investigation by the NCCC 
and a vote of impeachment by 60 per cent of the Senate. All holders of 
office may be charged with the criminal offence of malfeasance. Penalties 
for members or officials of the NCCC who are found to be corrupt are 
double those normally provided for by the law concerning such offences. 
All agencies and their officials are under the jurisdiction of other watchdog 
agencies-that is, the NCCC will be audited by the Supreme Administrative 
Court, and be controlled by the Ombudsmen and the Administrative Courts 
in matters of maladministration and illegal acts. 
The classical notion of separation of powers into the three branches of the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary is necessary but not sufficient. 
The Thai Constitution goes further in instituting a fourth branch-various 
constitutional controllers have been established in such a way as to give them 
legitimacy to control, and have been vested with substantial control powers 
with which to perform their duties . These bodies are the fourth power to be 
added to the Montesquieu Doctrine because they exercise substantial and 
effective checks and balances over the other three classical branches. 
The judiciary. The Thai Constitution accounts for the importance of the 
judiciary as the central pillar of rule of law. The Constitution attempts to 
reform the judicial process in three respects: the destruction of monopoly 
control of judicial function by a single institution, reinforcement of the 
independence of the judiciary, and provision of an efficient and fair judicial 
process. 
De-monopolisation of judicial powers. Formerly, the Courts of Justice 
monopolised judicial power over public and private law cases. This situation 
was unsatisfactory due to lack of expertise and delay in the judicial process. 
For example, cases disputing lower house election results took years to reach 
a conclusion. The majority of cases ended with the dissolution of the House 
and the dismissal of the cases on the grounds that there was no need to 
annul election results because dissolution had produced the same outcome! 
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To de-monopolise judicial power, the Constitution separates judicial 
functions to be vested in different jurisdictions. The Constitutional Court 
will be in charge of constitutional disputes, while the Administrative Court 
will adjudicate administrative cases opposing individual and state agencies, 
except for election cases, which are under the Election Commission's 
jurisdiction, and taxation cases, which are heard in the Courts of Justice. 
The Courts of Justice will have adjudicative powers different from those of 
the other two courts and will decide mainly private law and criminal cases. 
This separation of judicial function ensures greater relevance and should 
improve the quality of decisions rendered, as well as creating a speedier process. 
The separation of functions also allows the possibility of comparative evaluation 
of the judicial processes and outputs from the three main court systems. 
Reinforcement of independence. The independence of judges is the central 
feature of justice. The Thai Constitution reinforces this feature through 
various means, including 
• depoliticisation of judicial nomination. In this respect, the 
Courts of Justice have been recognised as being independent 
from political interference since their establishment. The 
Judicial Commission, which is vested with the power to 
appoint and promote judges to judicial offices, is composed 
solely of judges (Sections 274 and 279). Furthermore, there is 
no external appointment; all judges are career judges and their 
promotion is determined by seniority 
• sufficient remuneration for judges-in accordance with Section 
253-and preventing application of the salary scale or 
emolument for civil servants. This is to ensure not only 
adequacy of salaries and emoluments, but also to prohibit the 
use of promotion criteria and schemes practiced in the civil 
service, which may jeopardise judges' security in office 
• installation of independent secretariats for the various courts 
(Sections 270, 275 and 280) and guarantee of adequate 
funding (Section 75 § 2) are required by the charter. 
Efficient and fair judicial process. Good justice needs not only qualified 
and independent judges but also efficient and fair trial. The Constitution 
sets forth many principles for this purpose. Discriminatory process (Section 
75) is prevented by not allowing special courts or special procedures for 
particular cases (Sections 234 § 2 and 235). A full quorum of judges is 
required in all types of cases; judges may not serve as judges in their own 
cases; only judges who sit and hear the full case are entitled to decide that 
case (Section 236). In performing their functions, judges are independent 
and must decide each case according only to the Constitution, the law and 
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their consciences. Judges are not subject to any hierarchical or supervisory 
pressure. They cannot be transferred, removed or promoted without their 
prior consent (Section 249). 
In criminal cases, suspects and accused are presumed innocent until 
proven otherwise. They are entitled to a speedy, continuous and fair trial 
(Section 241). They are also entitled to legal assistance from the state (Section 
242) and to the opportunity for bail during the process, except in certain 
cases provided for by law. Even after final decision, the accused can have 
recourse to retrial if substantial new evidence emerges that can prove his or 
her innocence. In this case, the state must pay compensation to the 
wrongfully convicted party (Section 247). A detainee has the right to habeas 
corpus and, if he or she is proven innocent by the final decision of the court, 
he or she will be compensated by the state (Sections 240 and 246). 
Injured persons and witnesses must be properly protected by the state 
(Sections 244 and 245). To ensure transparency in all cases where the public 
prosecutor decides to drop the prosecution, the injured person has the right 
to examine facts and opinions employed by the prosecutor and the police. 
This right is also granted to suspects and accused (Section 241 § 3, 4). 
The three remaining pillars for integrity-public awareness, the media 
and the private sector-will be discussed in the next section. 
Procedural reforms to enhance participation, transparency and 
accountability 
Institutional reforms to create a comprehensive system of checks and balances 
may be ineffective if the work processes of the institutions lack people's 
participation, transparency and accountability. Introversion and internal 
collusion could make the institutions prone to failure. The Constitution 
tries to create an environment to help them survive and grow by opening 
up the process. There are three main directions in this endeavour. 
Public awareness and public participation. In the new era, public affairs 
are the domain of all citizens, not only the government or state as the 
public provider of services. If the aim of public affairs is to improve the 
wellbeing of all citizens, then all citizens should be in a position to participate 
in those affairs. 
Understanding this changing climate, the drafters of the constitution 
decided to place emphasis on public participation in public affairs at all 
stages of decisionmaking processes and at all levels of government from 
national to local. 
Section 76 requires that the state shall promote and encourage public 
participation in policymaking, decisionmaking and planning processes, 
together with public involvement in controlling the exercise of state power. 
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Various types of public involvement are described in the Constitution. 
Access to public information is guaranteed in order to keep people informed 
of the progress of the ongoing process. This right has been exercised in 
many cases-disclosure of notes for the entrance examinations of various 
public schools and universities; disclosure of an NCCC investigation 
concerning a drug scandal; disclosure of contracts concluded by the Debt 
Restructuring Agency and foreign consultants; disclosure of letters of intent 
to the International Monetary Fund; and revelation of a toxic substances 
scandal in Hua-Hin, among others. Corruption, normally imbedded in a 
'closed and secret' environment, should decrease with increased public access 
to information. 
Freedom of expression is guaranteed so that censorship cannot be 
imposed. Closure of printing houses and radio and television stations is 
unconstitutional. Independence of reporters and columnists vis-d-vis 
employers in both the public and private sectors is guaranteed (Section 
41). This should be the central part of free expression of facts and opinions 
through media. If the media is theoretically and practically free from state 
intervention, but falls into the hands of corrupt private owners or 
shareholders with only pecuniary interest, who will ensure 'freedom of 
expression'-reporters or owners? If it is the latter, freedom of expression 
would only be freedom for them to propagate commercial and selfish interests! 
This situation is as undesirable as advocating government control of 
information. 
In order to achieve impartial radio and television and eliminate 
government monopoly over these two media, Section 40 requires that 
transmission frequencies were to have been be redistributed by 11 October 
2000. Redistribution is to be done with consideration for public benefit in 
education, culture, state security and other public interests. Television and 
radio broadcasting business should be conducted on a free, fair and 
competitive basis under the supervision of an independent regulatory body. 
The right to public hearing and consultation in decisionmaking processes 
that affect the interests of the people is assured (Sections 56, 59 and 60). 
Autonomous civil service entities are created under the Constitution to 
provide public authorities with opinions on environmental impact 
assessment (Section 56 § 2) and law, regulations and measures to protect 
consumers (Section 57 § 2). Moreover, the National Economic and Social 
Advisory Council will be established to consult with the government on 
economic and social development plans (Section 88). Laws are now being 
drafted to establish advisory institutions to represent the relevant factions 
in civil society. Hopefully, the advisory institutions will contribute to more 
balanced decisions in important areas. 
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The Constitution guarantees that citizens have the right to propose 
bills to Parliament by producing a petition with the signatures of 50,000 
voters. Local bylaws can also be initiated in this way(Sections 170 and 
287) . Civil society groups are now preparing at least two bills-one on 
public welfare and one on community forestry. This action bodes well as an 
indicator of this mechanism's effectiveness as an instrument for participatory 
democracy. 
Co-management of the environment and natural resources is a central 
aspect of participation. The Charter enables at least five groups to be 
involved-individuals (Section 56 § 1), traditional local communities 
(Section 46), autonomous environmental organisations (Section 56 § 2), 
local administrations (Section 290) and the state itself. Section 79 stipulates 
clearly that the state shall promote and encourage public participation in 
the preservation, maintenance and balanced exploitation of natural resources 
and biological diversity, together with protection of the quality of the 
environment. It is now clear that these affairs are no longer the domain of 
the government, but are public affairs that call for the involvement of all 
parties. The issue is now one of how to orchestrate these participatory efforts 
to achieve the goal of genuine co-management. 
Lastly, the Constitution empowers voters to launch impeachment 
accusations against politicians and officials suspected of corruption, again 
through the 50,000-signature petition mechanism (Section 304). Similarly, 
this power can be exercised at the local level (Section 298). This power has 
already been exercised at the national level during a drug scandal. The 
result was the resignation from office of two accused ministers. In addition, 
all individuals who feel they are victims of maladministration, corruption 
or illegality are allowed to bring cases before the Ombudsman, the 
Administrative Court, the Court of Justice and the NHRC. 
If the way is paved for public engagement, strong civil society 
organisations should lead the journey. In fact, Thailand is lucky enough 
to have a tradition of involving civil society in various important changes. 
The tradition is exemplified in the student uprising of October 1973 led 
by the Thailand Student Center, the Black May incident involving pro-
democracy groups that led to the overthrow of General Suchinda's 
government in 1992, the political reform movement led by Dr Ptawase 
Wasi and networks of the Central Organisation of Poll Watch, and very 
recently the network of Rural Doctors and People's Counter Corruption 
group that successfully revealed drug-procurement corruption. Moreover, 
a group of important opinion leaders has been formed as a national chapter 
of Transparency International. Led by former Prime Minister Anand, its 
task is to monitor and report corruption, and to protect good public 
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officials who do not yield to corrupt practices of their superiors or 
colleagues. It is hoped that joint citizen-state action will bring about 
changes in society. 
Transparency, accountability and the media. The new Thai charter focuses 
on transparency and accountability at all levels. It prescribes freedom of 
information and freedom of expression. Furthermore, it imposes an 
obligation for disclosure of important information useful to fighting 
corruption, such as the assets and liabilities of the Prime Minister and 
other ministers, their spouses and children (Section 293 § 2) . Already, six 
cases of false documentation in such declarations have been sent to the 
Constitutional Court by the NCCC. The Constitutional Court has judged 
three cases and the remaining three are pending, including that of Sanan 
Kachornprasart who has resigned from his posts of interior minister and 
deputy Prime Minister over the issue. False declaration is grounds for 
dismissal from office and imposition of a five-year ban from politics, in 
addition to any criminal penalties. Other information subject to disclosure 
includes voting records in Parliament, political parties' expenditures and 
sources of income, including names of donors, and electoral spending by 
candidates and parties. 
The media have an important role to play in monitoring information 
that can be disclosed and drawing public attention to questionable matters. 
A free press is therefore crucial because it can expose and make accountable 
those suspected of corruption. Figures suspected of corruption are obliged 
to defend their conduct before the public and the press. In many cases, 
public declarations and press interviews have been used as evidence in NCCC 
corruption investigations and as grounds for political debate during no-
confidence motions in the lower house. 
In practice, the press reveals most corruption cases in Thailand. Examples 
include mega-project kickbacks such as in the HDS project, and corrupt 
practices surrounding MPs' fund for provincial development. Examination 
of daily newspapers indicates how strong and free the Thai press is in fighting 
corruption. 
Three issues, however, should be addressed. First, a free press needs to 
exhibit responsibility and accuracy in reporting. Some newspapers do not 
distinguish between 'news' and 'views' and, by failing to do so, distort 
issues. Even worse, this failure can bring disgrace to innocent and honest 
persons. If reporters and columnists do not verify their information, innocent 
people's reputations could be injured. It seems that two remedies can be 
effective-strong commitment by the press to a code of ethics sanctioned 
by an autonomous professional press association, and libel action in the 
courts. The Thai press has united to create the Press Council to address 
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grievances of individuals who believe they have been wronged. The Press 
Council has in many cases pointed out malpractices of their colleagues. 
Hopefully this institution can render members of the press more responsible 
for their statements. 
Second, the commercial interests of the media should be monitored 
closely. Even if the media is free from state intervention, it may not be free 
from interference by owners or businesses with personal or institutional 
interests that may not coincide with the public interest. As an example, 
advertisers can exert influence on owners and reporters . For this reason, the 
new charter guarantees employees of the media freedom in their reporting 
of news and opinion in the hope that this can protect them from the private 
interests of their employers. 
Third, corrupt practices by journalists should be carefully explored. 
Journalists, like all human beings, may be tempted by greed. Politicians 
and public figures try to befriend journalists by offering benefits such as 
travel, luxurious meals and gifts. This may bias reporting. Therefore, it is 
necessary that the Press Council enforce a code of conduct to discourage 
and punish corruption in the press. 
Private sector and good corporate governance. Corruption often involves 
two principal actors-the government and the private sector. When cases 
involve the provision of goods and services, consumers are typically the 
victims. Private monopolies established through corrupt practices will take 
advantage of consumers. Business leaders who have access to high-ranking 
politicians and officials are able to offer 'discreet support' to parties in return 
for business advantages. Measures to discourage the corrupt practices of 
individual officials have already been discussed. To discourage corruption 
at the party level, the Constitution calls for a scheme for the state financing 
of political parties (Section 328 (5)) . The Organic Law on Political Parties 
established the Fund for Political Party Development under the control 
and supervision of the Election Commission. Hopefully this mechanism, 
in conjunction with controls on party spending, can help free parties from 
dependence on private funding. 
Even so , corruption in business cannot be eradicated without major 
reform of corporate governance. One reason for Thailand's economic crisis 
was poor governance in the private sector. Corrupt directors and private 
auditors contributed to corporate weakness. Corporate governance reform 
should be a priority, especially for companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand. Private auditors must overhaul their practices because only 
audit institutions with integrity can guarantee corporate transparency and 
accountability and protect shareholders. 
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Suggestions for improvement to the integrity system 
While the pillars of integrity exist in Thailand, some improvements should 
be considered in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the 
institutions. Qualitative changes in three areas will improve the integrity 
system engendered by the Constitution considerably. These areas are-
institutional improvement, commitment to public and private sector reform, 
and enhancement of public awareness and involvement. 
Institutional improvements 
In order to make the eight pillars of integrity more effective, various strategies 
should be adopted. 
Measures to ensure the integrity of watchdog agencies. The nine watchdog 
institutions should be improved to ensure they operate successfully. Though 
members of the watchdog agencies are chosen by the Senate, the selection 
process is still imperfect. Criteria by which the Senate assesses candidates 
proposed by the selection panels should be clear, open and impartial. Over 
the past two years, the Senate Investigation Committee has had no clear 
review criteria. Some candidates have been rejected merely because they 
were former constitution drafters. This was the case in the selection of 
Constitutional Court judges, where at least three prominent and well-
respected scholars were rejected on these grounds (perhaps an act of revenge 
against those who abolished the nominated senate). Anonymous letters 
accusing candidates have been taken into consideration, and calumnies have 
also played an important role in undermining candidates. 
Moreover, investigations were conducted-contrary to practice in the 
western world-in camera. Even the debate on the floor was secret for the 
purpose of protecting the dignity and reputation of the candidates! 
Questionable practices described above are known only because some 
senators have chosen to speak out. It is true that secrecy may protect 
candidates from public criticism, but it can also engender bias and abuse of 
power. We can hope that the newly elected Senate will amend rules and 
procedures to establish clear criteria for the scrutiny process as well as open 
that process up to ensure impartiality. This would further ensure that 
members of the watchdog agencies are truly honest and able to perform 
their important functions . 
Remuneration and other emoluments are equally important for 
guaranteeing the integrity of control institutions. In Thailand, only senior 
watchdog organisation members elected by the Senate and nominated by 
the King are well paid. Most staff are paid according to the government pay 
scheme, which is inadequate. This creates the risk of anti-corruption officials 
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becoming corrupted themselves. The problem of inadequate pay should be 
addressed quickly before systematic corruption permeates the new system. 
A continuous training program should be implemented to ensure high 
quality work skills. Technologies should be introduced to increase ease of 
work; millions of pages of asset and liability declarations can only be managed 
successfully with the help of information technology. 
Internal organisation of agencies. Each agency should be designed to fulfil 
its multi-dimensional role. To this end, a number of specialist divisions 
should be present in each agency, such as 
• a public relations division. Public relations and promotion 
campaigns are important in the prevention of malpractice and 
illegality. A public relations and campaign division (for 
example, the ICAC of Hong Kong) is needed to inform 
communities, the private sector and public officers about 
correct and clean behaviour. 
• a coordination unit. This body should be created to nerwork 
and work in concert with other bodies whose operations are 
related to the agency's function. Coordination units can help 
eliminate duplication of work and avoid potential conflict. 
• a monitoring unit. The monitoring unit would oversee 
potential sources of corruption and conduct secret checks to 
gather information to suggest sui generis action by the agency. 
• a research unit, which would supply facts, figures and policy 
options to support the policymaking process. Comparative 
studies of tools, practices and experiences of similar institutions 
in foreign countries would be valuable for improving agency 
performance. The research unit could also make suggestions for 
improving government processes to avoid corruption. 
Adequate staff and funding. Staff and funding are critical factors in agency 
performance because control agencies cannot operate effectively without 
qualified personnel and adequate resources. Even though the Constitution 
requires sufficient funding for the watchdog agencies, the budgetary process 
is under the direct control of the government. The Budget Bureau under 
the Prime Minister's Office prepares all public expenditures for Cabinet 
approval. After approval, the budget is tabled in the lower house and 
government whips try to pressure coalition MPs to vote in support of the 
Budget Bill. Even at the committee stage, the Minister of Finance 
traditionally chairs the scrutiny committee. Traditionally, the government 
uses its majority in the House to control budget allocations to all state 
institutions, including Parliament and the overseeing institutions. Budgetary 
independence for the latter is more theoretical than real. 
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AB long as this situation prevails, true independence and effectiveness 
of watchdog institutions is jeopardised. Serious correction measures must 
be taken immediately, beginning with revolving fund and standard unit 
cost together with block grant and direct access to Parliament as first 
priorities . 
Adequate numbers of qualified personnel are also a success factor. 
Inadequacy results in delays in the work process. Unqualified personnel 
can damage cases under investigation. This problem is linked to inadequate 
funding and remuneration. 
AB an example of the staffing situation, the NCCC, with its wide mandate 
for combating corruption, has only 346 officials. This compares poorly 
with the ICAC of Hong Kong, which has approximately 1,200 staff. 
Furthermore, the number of personnel is not in proportion to the number 
of cases the NCCC has to investigate 
• 5,741 asset and liability declarations of politicians and high-
ranking officials 
• 530 accusations launched against holders of public office 
• 1,967 cases of corruption transferred from the now defunct 
CCMC 
• 19 criminal cases transferred from investigation and prosecution 
police in the Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Persons 
Holding Political Positions 
• 73 cases of unusual wealth 
• 48 urgent cases. 
Furthermore, a law has been passed to criminalise cartel practices in 
government procurement of military supplies. The NCCC is charged with 
the cumbersome task of pursuing these cases even though this work may be 
more suited to public prosecutors. 
Without adequate funding for new staff and an appropriate pay scale, it 
is difficult to imagine how the NCCC is to operate effectively. If the situation 
is not improved the NCCC risks being labeled a 'paper tiger'-an appellation 
often assigned to the CCMC. In such a case the blame rests squarely on the 
shoulders of the government. 
Priorities. Good strategies must be adopted in advance to cope with 
corruption. Prevention is likely to be more effective than suppression. Petty 
corruption is less problematic than large-scale corruption in huge government 
projects. Hence, piecemeal graft should draw the attention of overseeing 
institutions less than systematic corruption. Each agency should focus on 
meaningful and significant corrupt practices. The most severe forms of 
corruption should be attacked first. 
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Privatisation and decentralisation are two important areas for attention 
because they have great potential for harbouring corruption. Control 
institutions should coordinate and subscribe to the principle of division of 
labour in order to cope adequately with the potential corruption. 
Transparency required. Overseeing bodies must be prepared to open up 
the investigation process at appropriate times. The media and the general 
public must have the opportunity to observe important sessions so as to 
stay informed about what is going on. This practice, which has proven 
effective in Australia and Hong Kong, has two merits. It fosters public 
awareness through public debate, and it pre-empts undue pressure from 
powerful individuals or groups under investigation. Furthermore, public 
proceedings help protect the watchdog agency's staff from the temptation 
of corruption. 
Public sector reform accelerated 
The success of the political reform movement, which resulted in the 
adoption of the Constitution against the will and interests of 
parliamentarians who nevertheless voted for it was the result of three 
factors-strong research back-up, public campaigning and public 
involvement, and political will. 
Reform must be based on good strategies and produce mechanisms, 
tools and techniques to be adopted. Successes and failures from other 
countries serve as good examples. Research is fundamental for producing 
good policy options in any reform endeavour. 
Public campaigns and involvement create awareness that, in turn, puts 
pressure on policymakers and prevents vested interests from resisting reform. 
The constitution drafting process involved wide public participation to 
raise public awareness and to put pressure on the government and Parliament 
to approve the draft despite their opposing interests. Political will comes at 
the end because it can be forged by public pressure. 
In public sector reform, weakness stems from the fact that reform has 
been conducted only within the government circle. This is not conducive 
to good results because the reformed agencies and officials can stage active 
or passive resistance. Moreover, the reform package was not comprehensive. 
It would have been rejected if it had been too great an assault on the 
status quo and the vested interests of those involved. Thailand has been 
preaching administrative reform for a long time, but with limited results. 
In order to accelerate the process, continuous campaigning and public 
participation should be of the highest priority in order to overcome internal 
resistance and produce the political will to push for rapid reform. 
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Public awareness 
Since corruption often involves two actors-the individual and the public 
official-both should be informed of the costs of corruption from legal and 
economic perspectives. In many cases, actors involved do not even realise 
that what they are doing is an act of corruption. For example, gifts offered 
without anything asked in return are considered customary and thus 
acceptable practice, regardless of worth and occasion. Personal relations 
between individuals and law enforcement officers are commonplace in 
Thailand's patron-client oriented system. Worryingly, the study Corruption 
and the Thai Democracy (Pongpaijit and Pirijarongsan 1994) indicated that 
70 per cent of those questioned thought that giving a minor tip after receiving 
a service is not a form of corruption. 
The situation would improve if the public and officials were informed 
that these behaviours are illegal. Campaigns not only help prevent 
unintentional corruption but also to create new values. Subsequently, 
emphasis should be placed on continuous public relations campaigns at all 
levels. This has not yet been done to promote government anti-graft 
strategies and the overseeing agencies. 
At the domestic level, indicators for integrity, participation, 
transparency and efficiency in various public agencies are one of the most 
powerful tools for drawing media and public attention. Indicators also 
enhance the image of agencies with good records and encoutage all agencies 
to improve their services. Corrupt agencies are vulnerable because they 
are forced to reveal their service records. Unfortunately, most existing 
indicators are international ones. They measute on a comparative basis 
and, in the majority of cases, are predicated on subjective perception 
rather than objective evaluation. It is of the utmost importance that 
relatively objective tools be used in order to arm the media and the public 
against corrupt agencies. 
Conclusion 
Thailand has already gone a long way down the path of fighting corruption. 
Much, however, remains much to be done. This chapter does not suggest 
that the tasks are too difficult or too trivial to perform. Instead, it insists 
that there is interdependence between all eight pillars of integrity and that 
those pillars should function in concert. The Constitution is only the 
beginning of a new era. It is not, and cannot be, a perfect instrument 
unless it engenders a continuous process for improving efforts to end 
corruption. 
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Appendix 1 
Excerpt from Organic Law on the National Counter Corruption 
Commission (Chapter 9) 
Conflict between personal interest and public interest 
Section 100 No state Official shall be allowed to do the following acts: 
(i) to be a party or have an interest in the agreement entered into 
with a government agency in which the State Official acts as 
the official who has the powers to direct, supervise, control, 
audit or take legal action; 
(ii) to be a partner or shareholder in a partnership or a company 
which has entered into the agreement with the government 
agency in which the State Official acts as the official who has 
the powers to direct, supervise, control, audit or take legal 
action; 
(iii) to obtain concession or hold the concession from the State, a 
government agency, a state enterprise or local administration or 
entered into the contract with the State, a government agency, 
a state enterprise, or local administration which has a 
characteristic of monopoly, whether direct or indirect, or be a 
partner or a shareholder in a partnership or a company which 
obtains the concession or be a party to the above; 
(iv) to have an interest as a director, consultant, agent, worker or 
employee of a private enterprise which is under the direction, 
supervision, controlling or auditing of the government agency 
in which the State Official acts as the official by the nature of 
the interest of private sector conflicts with the interest of public 
or government interest or affect the independent of the State 
Official. 
State Officials who are prohibited from carrying out pursuant to the 
first paragraph shall be as prescribed by The National Counter Corruption 
Commission in Government Gazette. 
The provision of the first paragraph shall apply to the spouse of the 
State Official pursuant to the second paragraph and the business of the 
spouse shall be considered as the business of that State Official. 
Section 101. Section 100 shall apply to business activities of former State 
Officials who have vacated their offices within the last two years, mutatis 
mutandis with the exception of shareholdings not exceeding 5 per cent of 
total shares sold by a limited-liability public company, not a party in the 
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agreement entered into with a government agency under Section 100(2) 
licensed permitted by stock and stock market regulation. 
Section 102. Section 102 shall not apply to a State Official carrying out 
the business in which they have the powers to direct, supervise, control, or 
audit limited companies or public companies limited assigned to perform 
duties in the limited company or public co., Ltd. where government agency 
has its shareholder or joint venture. 
Section lO3. State Officials shall not be allowed to receive assets or benefits 
from any person, apart from those given and receive within the law or rules, 
regulation by virtue of statutory provision law with the exception of assets 
or benefits justly received by according to rules and amounts issued by The 
National Counter Corruption Commission. 
Provision in first paragraph shall apply to former officials for two years 
after the date of vacating office, mutatis mutandis. 
Section 119. Any State Officials who intentionally fail to submit the 
declaration of assets and liabilities and its supporting documents to The 
National Counter Corruption Commission within issuing date of the organic 
law designated, or intentionally submit the same with false statements or 
conceal facts which should be revealed, shall be sentenced to imprisonment 
or fine not exceeding 10,000 Baht or imprison and fine. 
Section 122 Any state official who violates the provisions in Section 100, 
Section 101 or Section 103 shall be sentenced to imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 years, or fine not exceeding 60,000 Baht, or imprisonment 
and fine . 
In cases of wrongdoing in accordance with Section 100, third paragraph, if 
the State Official can prove him or herself innocent of, or unconnected 
with, the spouse's wrongdoing, that official shall be deemed not guilty. 
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Combatting corruption in the 
Philippine Customs Service 
Guillermo Parayno, Jr. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Philippine Customs Service undertook anti-
corruption campaigns to combat the perceived defects in the inherent 
character of the Customs personnel. They used a combination of negative 
reinforcement, value formation, and attitudinal change which have all been 
found to be ineffective . The programs entailed the establishment of 
specialised government watchdog, investigative and prosecution agencies 
against corruption. Generally, however, all ended up being the same tools 
of the corrupt practitioners against the government officials whose mission 
it was to combat this social malady. 
On the other hand, recent programs, implemented from 1992-98, had 
as their focus the reengineering of the environment within which customs 
officers operate. By reducing the opportunities for corruption, heightening 
the risk for committing corrupt acts, and reducing the rewards thereof, 
they achieved better results in curbing, if not totally eliminating, negative 
bureaucratic behaviour. In the reengineering process, information technology 
was employed as the essential tool for lifting customs administration into 
the realm of electronic governance. 
There are, however, limits to the effectiveness of these environmental 
approaches to combating corruption in customs. The most significant and 
real limitation was that the measures were perceived by Customs itself as 
external temporary stopgap impositions to be supported only when their 
main patron was still occupying the seat of power. The leadership recognised 
this and designed contingencies to ensure sustainability of the reform. The 
business sector was extensively involved in the reform process and was 
repeatedly made aware that the responsibility of ensuring continuity rested 
upon them. To date, this 'friendly force' is still responding to the challenge 
and is helping to ensure that the reform program does not become a brief 
shining moment in the history of the Philippine Customs Service. 
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Public perceptions of the Customs Service 
The general impression that the Philippine Customs Service is one of the 
most corrupt government agencies dates back to the time of Spanish colonial 
rule. 
More recently, in August 1990, the Social Weather Station-the most 
reliable survey agency-conducted a survey on the perceived extent of 
corruption in a number of government agencies. The Bureau of Customs 
was viewed as the most corrupt agency, with 74 per cent of respondents 
considering the extent of corruption to be large (24 per cent perceived the 
level to be small and 1 per cent had no opinion) . In the same survey report, 
Customs ranked alongside the police force in registering the lowest margin 
of satisfaction-negative 49 per cent (dissatisfied 56 per cent; satisfied 7 
per cent; undecided 36 per cent)-on the issue of actions in place to reduce 
corruption (Dayag and Laylo 1994:2) . 
Many published reports show huge customs revenue losses due to 
corruption. The extent of smuggling in the Philippines is widely believed 
to be between 12.2 per cent and 53 per cent of recorded imports. Figures 
from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (1990) show that, at 11.59 per 
cent, the Philippine has the second highest level, after Thailand, of import 
undervaluation as a percentage of total imports. 
In a privilege speech before the House of Representatives, a Congressman 
reported that for a six month period alone (first half of 1992), an estimated 
one billion pesos ($37 million) in duties and taxes were lost by government 
from goods either diverted or illegally withdrawn from Customs Bonded 
Warehouses. Over 100 such warehouses were involved and were closed 
accordingly. 
The nature and causes of corruption in Customs 
Many factors predispose the Customs Service to a high incidence of 
corruption. Almost all of these are environmental in nature rather than 
inherent defects or flaws in the character of the Customs officers. It is only 
fitting, therefore, that the anticorruption programs be focused on addressing 
these environmental factors, but without neglecting the psychological 
underpinnings of corrupt acts. The more important contributors to the 
incidence of corruption in the Customs Service are as follows. 
Abundant opportunities 
This is the single most important cause of widespread corruption in Customs. 
About 1.5 million import entries, the same number of export entries, 
200,000 requests for goods transfers, 500,000 liquidations of raw material 
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imports, 500,000 bond applications and tens of thousands of other transactions 
(duty drawback, accreditation, accountability clearances, licenses renewals, 
and so on) are filed each year. Face to face interaction in these transactions 
is essential owing to complex and bureaucratic procedures exacerbated by 
the still restrictive and complex foreign trade regime. This provides fertile 
ground for corruption. Opportunities for corruption are as numerous as 
the total number of transactions, which is easily 4 million. Multiplying 
this by the number of processing stations-which, conservatively, is 10-
yields a potential 40 million opportunities for corruption each year. Special 
mention must be given to the many exemption laws and the absence of 
clear guidelines and procedures for the grant of such exemptions. Billions 
of pesos have been lost to syndicates and their conspirators through the 
granting of undeserved or questionable exemptions and refunds. 
Irresistible rewards 
The legitimate salary of Customs officers pales in comparison to the rewards 
they receive from their corrupt practices. Smugglers share their profits with 
their conspirators and, since the profits are magnified by the high tax and 
tariff walls and the inflationary valuation method, the attraction is almost 
irresistible. Even legitimate business is disposed to giving attractive rewards 
because the cost of the delay in the clearance of goods can be more than the 
financial cost of illegally accelerating the process. Although the majority of 
businessmen would want to deal with the government above board, many 
are forced to pursue illegal channels and methods in order to stay in business. 
Low-risk endeavour 
In addition, insurance is often provided by smuggling syndicates to their 
conspirators in government. Conniving officials are provided the best legal 
counsel money can buy and, in the rare case that one is found guilty, he or 
she is well provided for during his incarceration. 
Damaged values system and culture 
'Everyone is doing id' There is pressure to do what everybody else is doing. 
Even before a Customs officer joins the organisation, he or she already has 
the preconception that corruption is a ticket to riches. This is confirmed on 
entering the organisation. There is practically no indignation against 
corruption in Customs, probably because it is perceived as an open crime 
without a victim, and hence not considered much of an offence . 
Professionalism is utterly lacking in the Customs Service. The organisation 
offers its staff very little in terms of status and pride in being part of the 
organisation. 
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There is also the 'live and let live' culture -and the code of omerta or 
silence. Officials and businessmen who are unwilling to live by these rules 
are subjected to discrimination, and are even ostracised. 
Weak controls and justice system 
There is a dire need for effective systems that make it difficult for officials to 
engage in corrupt practices and make detection of corrupt acts more likely. 
The chance of being found guilty after being caught is also low due to 
ineptness and corruption in the justice system. All these factors encourage 
officials to behave in a corrupt manner. Syndicates even offer insurance to 
their conspirators in government by footing the cost of their defence and 
taking care of their families while they are undergoing investigation, trial, 
or serving punishment. 
Lack of means and support 
Many men and women who join the organisation do so with the right 
ideals, but they quickly realise that sincerity and dedication alone are not 
enough. For example, they may strongly suspect that a shipment is 
undervalued or that it is wrongly classified but since they are not technically 
trained or equipped to prove this, they may ignore it. The easiest thing is 
to go along with everybody else. 
Insincere and opportunistic media 
Many in the media are using their facilities to share in the fruits of corruption 
instead of performing their role as neutral observers in a democratic society. 
Their modus operandi ranges from threats, coercion and intimidation 
through media exposure to blatant participation in illegal activities. 
Unfortunately, corrupt officials have no difficulty keeping these media 
practices alive. It is just considered an additional expense. 
Typical acts of corruption 
Being or threatening to be difficult 
These are actions not involving the commission of a criminal act. They may 
involve threatening to take actions, under the guise of performing official 
duty, that would create difficulties to the subject of the action, such as the 
issuance of Alerts, Hold Orders and Mission Orders; Submission of 
Derogatory Information; Recommendation to Stop the Operations; 
Uplifting of Values, or sending the shipment for laboratory examination; 
requiring additional supporting documents, such as a eRF, price list or 
product brochure. 
208 Corruption and Anti-corruption 
They may involve the threat of submitting derogatory reports (valid or 
otherwise) that could create difficulties for the subject of the report, or of 
submitting exaggerated assessments/audit findings coupled with 
recommendations for punitive measures as a means to extort certain sums. 
Further, they could involve delaying initiation or completion of official 
action until a favour is given or promised. For example, attending to those 
who have given favour first; being absent when the requested action is much 
needed; prolonging hearings in seizure cases; conducting detailed 
examinations; asking for documents that are difficult to produce. 
Sins of omission 
This includes not performing one's duty in order to give favour. Examples 
would be not acting on violations that come to one's attention; dereliction 
of duty, such as when an examiner does not conduct examination of a 
smuggled shipment or releases the same norwithstanding the violations 
observed; officers who allow goods to be illegally withdrawn; customs guards 
who allow shipments to be removed without the duties and taxes having 
been paid; hearing officers deciding a case in favour of the offender. 
Direct participation in criminal activities 
These acts are the most risky but also the most rewarding. Examples include 
assisting the introduction of spurious documents leading to fraudulent release 
of a shipment; grant of a license to operate a CBW (radio) which is clearly 
to be used as a conduit for smuggling; non-remittance of collections or 
delayed remittance coupled with the illegal placement of the fund; pilferage 
of goods from security warehouses, shipments or public bonded warehouses. 
Previous initiatives to curb corruption 
Previous initiatives were mainly focused on the customs personnel-their 
shortcomings, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Underpinning these initiatives 
was the belief that acts of corruption spring from a character defect or lack 
of moral fibre. Thus, anticorruption activities were centred on establishing 
specialised offices and agencies which were charged with altering the character 
of a customs official through punishment or threat, as well as through 
value formation and attitudinal change programs. 
Large-scale investigations, prosecutions and purges had limited effect, 
and many of those who were removed from the service managed to rejoin 
the organisation through their connections to officers with power. The legal 
proceedings that attended the dismissal procedures only served to drain 
top management's strength and time. Some effort was taken to reduce the 
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opportunities for corruption by streamlining the cargo clearance process 
and by limiting the number of signatories to the clearance documents, but 
the initiatives failed. 
Martial law and the dictatorship years 
Common knowledge that the Customs Bureau was one of the most corrupt 
government agencies was probably the reason that it was one of the first 
to undergo large-scale purges during the early days of the Martial Law 
Years (1972-86). On 29 September 1972, seven days after the declaration 
of martial law, some 200 senior customs officers were dismissed by the 
President (244 if those performing customs-related functions in other 
offices in the Department of Finance are included). This was followed on 
1 November 1972 by a second wave of dismissals involving some 111 
senior personnel. These two purges cleared out more than 8 per cent of 
the Bureau's workforce. 
The 1972 purges also took place in several other government offices and 
formed part of the nationally-implemented emergency measures, such as 
the midnight to dawn curfew, the warrantless arrests and seizure orders, 
the operation of military tribunals, the assignment of military supervisors 
in sensitive government offices and the campaign against loose firearms. 
For a short while they had a positive impact in reducing the level of 
corruption in government, including the Customs Bureau. 
By 1976, it became clear that the impact of the emergency measures 
had waned-particularly in Customs-prompting a third wave of purges. 
The impact of this was even more short-lived. 
In 1977, faced with a return to the old ways-so-called 'backsliding'-
the President appointed for the first time a military man as head of Customs. 
The new Commissioner brought with him a small number of young, highly 
educated military officers who later assumed sensitive positions in the 
Intelligence, Investigation and Police departments of Customs. They also 
assumed leadership in the two most sensitive ports, the Port of Manila and 
the Manila International Airport. 
The tenure of the military officers saw the introduction of a number of 
initiatives against bureaucratic corruption, albeit on a limited scale. Cargo 
clearance procedures were simplified not only to remove the system's 
vulnerabiliry to fraud and also reduce the number of steps and signatories 
required to complete the process. The system remained fully manual, 
however, and all transactions went through the same 'one size fits all' 
clearance procedure. The result was that new steps crept in almost as quickly 
as other steps were removed by management. Consequently, the 
opportunities for corruption remained widespread. 
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The nine-year military administration did produce significant results 
in restricting fraud against government revenue. This was partly because 
there was much opportunity at the time for engaging in illegal trade and 
the rewards were substantial. Tariffs were high and were placed on many 
essential consumer and producer commodities . Coupled with very tight 
foreign exchange controls, these 'incentives' pushed a significant segment 
of trade underground. 
While the success of the military leadership in the fight against 
corruption was noteworthy, it was the economic restructuring undertaken 
by the national government in the 1980s that laid the foundation for the 
gradual reduction of the rewards and opportunities for fraud against 
Customs revenue. The two major reforms instituted-the Tariff Reform 
Program and the Import Liberalisation Program-were not actually even 
intended as anticorruption measures. 
The revolutionary government years 
The change of government following the February 1986 People's Power 
Revolution, which toppled the 14-year old dictatorship, sparked a renewed 
effort to rid society of graft and corruption. Initially, the campaign was 
limited to information drives such as poster displays in government offices 
calling for an end to graft and corruption in government. Subsequently, a 
program based on the theory that corruption thrives most in an environment 
where the rewards are high and the risks low was launched. Responsibility 
for this national anticorruption program rested upon a national committee 
called the Public Ethics and Accountability Committee (PEAC) . 
Spearheaded by the Development Academy of the Philippines, PEAC Task 
Forces were establ ished for each Department and measures were 
implemented to reduce the rewards and opportunities for corruption as 
well as heightening the risk of detection. In the Customs Service, several 
orders were issued limiting the level of control officials had over the clearance 
of goods, as a means of reducing corruption in the Bureau. 
Actual government behaviour deviated from this progressive view of 
fighting corruption, particularly at the Customs Bureau. As with the Martial 
Law Years, over 300 customs personnel-many of them senior officers-
were purged under the guise of reorganising the Bureau. Concerned officials 
challenged the legality of the purges in court. The ensuing legal battles, 
which went all the way to the Supreme Court, effectively prevented the 
customs leadership from making significant headway in its anticorruption 
campaIgn. 
While measures were initiated to streamline the cargo clearance process, 
to limit the number and participation of law enforcement agencies, and to 
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curtail the discretion of customs personnel in assessment, these measures 
were too little and too late to make any significant dent on corruption. The 
overall result was disappointing, particularly since reputable surveys showed 
that the Customs Bureau and the national police were the two most corrupt 
government agencies by mid 1992. 
National government agenda to curb corruption, 1992-98 
The three national anticorruption programs of the Ramos Administration 
were the Moral Recovery Program (MRP), the Resident Ombudsman 
Program, and the Presidential Commission Against Graft Commission. 
The Moral Recovery Program (MRP) 
The MRP became established on 18 September 1987 when the Senate 
passed Resolution No. 10 on the urgent need for an MRP and decided to 
inquire into the strengths and weaknesses of the Filipino character with a 
view towards solving social ills and strengthening the nation's moral fibre. 
It became a national program on 30 September 1992, when Presidential 
Proclamation No. 62 was issued declaring an MRP and enjoining active 
participation of all sectors in Filipino society. 
The aim of MRP was to strengthen those values and attitudes in society 
that would make it difficult for corruption to persist. One particular 
prescription in the program was to establish a more efficient bureaucracy, 
with a minimum of red tape. The focus of the drive, however, remained the 
individual and the means was value formation. 
The Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption 
The Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, a three-man 
special commission, was to investigate administrative complaints against 
presidential appointees in the executive department, including those in 
government-owned and controlled corporations. It was a failure, and was 
actually utilised by syndicates to file harassment charges against government 
officials who were forcefully doing their work and hurting the syndicates in 
the process. 
The Resident Ombudsman Program 
Resident ombudsmen were assigned to several sensitive government agencies. 
A significant drop took place in the number of cases filed against officials of 
the agencies where there was a resident ombudsman. It is not clear, however, 
whether the presence of resident ombudsmen contributed to a reduction 
in corruption cases filed or if the program actually contributed to a reduction 
in the level of corruption. 
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Customs Anticorruption Program, 1992-98 
The common focus of all three national government programs was the 
individual. The array of measures were likewise similar-investigations and 
prosecutions supplemented by behaviour modification through value 
formation. As Professor Jon Quah of the National University of Singapore 
pointed out during the 1999 Manila ADB/OECD Workshop on 
Combating Corruption, however, the Philippines has had the greatest 
number of these anticorruption agencies. Because of what he termed a 'lack 
of political will', these and similar initiatives in the past have not been 
effective in curbing corruption. Experience shows, however, that negative 
bureaucratic behaviour will continue, irrespective of strong political will 
for change, as long as the customs officer continues to work in the same 
poor environment. 
General principles and strategies 
The Customs leadership under the Ramos Administration had a running 
start in its anticorruption program. A Blueprint for Customs Development 
for the Year 2000 was immediately drafted in consultation with many 
interested parties (organisations and individuals), both in the business sector 
and in government. The document analysed the changing environment 
within which the organisation will operate in the coming years. It defined 
the demands on Customs from the government, the business community, 
and the rest of society. It anticipated the realities or constraints that the 
Customs Service faced. Finally, the environment of the Customs Service 
was examined for opportunities that could be harnessed to support the 
developmental thrust. Only after that were the objectives clearly determined 
and the general strategies for the attainment of such objectives laid down. 
Particular care was taken to make the document look more like a 
development plan than an anticorruption program. This was done to gain 
the organisation's support for the plan. The only reference to corruption in 
the plan was a general statement that a 'climate that promotes involvement, 
commitment, integrity and professionalism shall be cultivated'. 
Reengineering of the Customs environment 
The main philosophy underlying the Customs Service anticorruption 
program from 1992-98 was the same as during President Aquino's tenure-
reducing the rewards to corruption, emphasis on reducing the opportunities 
for, and increasing the risks of, engaging in corrupt acts. During this period, 
however, there was a massive reengineering of the environment in the 
Customs Service. 
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With information and other technologies as essential enablers, customs 
systems and procedures and the work environment were re-engineered with 
the goal of attaining 
• full automation of the processes (no officer intervention) for 80 
per cent of transactions, with the percentage to be gradually 
increased to 95 per cent 
• repositioning of controls to where they are most effective 
without obstructing business and trade (before goods arrival 
and after their release), as well as the removal of queues and 
choke points 
• provision of remote lodgment facilities to enable the public to 






complete paperless and cashless processes 
privatisation of certain operations 
electronic linkage of all the participating agencies in the system 
the development of clear and simple rules. 
Measures addressing systemic weaknesses and vulnerability to 
fraud 
To ensure that revenue generation is not sacrificed while bureaucratic 
corruption is being addressed, short and long-term revenue enhancement 
programs were set in place to remove system weaknesses and vulnerabilities 




Concerned private sector associations were empowered, 
enabling early detection of violations as they police violations 
within their own ranks. 
Friendly and constructive competition was encouraged among 
the various law enforcement units. 
Extensive information and encryption technology was 
introduced into the electronic transmission and utilisation of 
payments, release instructions, exemptions and other sensitive 
data. 
• Advanced technology, such as a global positioning system, was 
introduced to allow tracking and accounting of transit cargo. 
• Customs warehouses, container yards, freight stations and other 
customs facilities used as conduits for smuggling were closed, 
and the regulations for the licensing of new facilities were 
tightened. 
214 Corruption and Anti-corruption 
• The auditing process was strengthened. 
• Investigation, prosecution and hearing offices were strengthened. 
Electronic governance 
Electronic governance is the creative application of information technology 
in government operations to allow more effective delivery of services to the 
citizenry. Information technology was applied extensively in a range of 
Customs operations. 
Collection system 
Project Abstract Secure. Project Abstract Secure ended the losses in Customs 
revenues arising from the introduction of spurious payment documents in 
payment abstracts and official receipts delivered to Customs by the bank's 
couners. 
The project was conceived after the discovery in 1992 of shipments 
released with the use of spurious bank documents by a syndicate in collusion 
with bank and Customs personnel. Estimated losses of duties and taxes ran 
into hundreds of millions of dollars. 
The main feature of Project Abstract Secure is the use of security software 
in the encryption of payment data by the agent banks, their transmission 
to the Bureau in an electronic form, and their decryption at the Bureau 
offices. The software provides a highly sophisticated data security system 
and cryptographic algorithms to protect data and prevent unauthorised 
access to sensitive information. Data cannot be decrypted without a smart 
card and the cryptographic keys. The transmission process was overhauled 
and only electronic card-bearing personnel from the Bureau can gain access 
to the system. The Bureau also developed a feedback process designed to 
catch break-ins in case the security system is breached. 
Automated collection from special accounts . Raw material imports for 
Customs manufacturing warehouses are released without duties and taxes 
but are charged fees. Prior to the reform, five separate fees were collected by 
five different collecting officers. These were the cost-of-entry forms, 
documentary stamps, processing fees, boarnote and overtime charges. The 
face-to-face interaction at each of these payment stations presented 
opportunities for extracting grease money and creating delays in the clearance 
process. Further, problems were discovered in the handling of these collections, 
with cashiers running away with their collections to 'kiting' operations 
(collections are placed in high yield financial instruments in the name of the 
collecting officer instead of being immediately remitted to the Treasury) . 
Under this reform, manufacturing companies open up special accounts 
in an in-house Customs bank from which the above fees are electronically 
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debited. The greatest benefit is the speed of the electronic processing. In 
addition, the various illegal practices of collecting officers were curtailed as 
these officers no longer handle cash. A further benefit to the Customs Service 
is that some companies make payments up to three months in advance to 
ensure they have sufficient credit from which their payments can be debited. 
Mandatory payment to the authorised agent banks and in-house banks. 
Prior to this reform, only shipments covered by letters of credit were required 
to pay dury and tax through the banks. Taxes for the majoriry of shipments 
were paid directly to Customs collecting offices. As with the payment of 
the various fees for warehousing entries described above, a number of 
anomalies were discovered in the direct payments to Customs. Spurious 
checks took place, and cheques were often diverted to other accounts. 
Under the reform, mandatory payments of duties and taxes had to be 
made to the banks for all shipments as the first step in the clearance process. 
As a convenience for those living far from Customs House, in-house banks 
were established in each district port with computer workstations directly 
connected to the Customs port servers. With this reform, Customs collection 
operations became papedess and cashless, thus eliminating many of the anomalies 
arising from a collection system which was based on cash and cheque 
payments and where payments documents were handled by numerous staff. 
Projects Recon cile 1 and 2. Electronic filing of payments under the 
computerised collection system made possible the replacement of the old 
manual system of reconciling payments collected by the banks and bank 
remittances to the National Treasury with an electronic reconciliation 
process. The manual process rypically had a four-month backlog, whereas 
the electronic reconciliation process can be completed within a day. Thus, 
agent banks that fail to remit any collection are immediately detected and 
penalised. Under Project Reconcile 1, the amounts collected by the banks 
and electronically transmitted to the Bureau under Project Abstract Secure 
are matched with the amounts actually remitted to the National Treasury 
through the Bangko Sentral. 
Under Reconcile 2, the electronic files of payments, with which the 
assessments are compared prior to the release of the goods, are regularly 
compared with the Central Headquarters filex that received directly from 
the banks. This can show whether tampering of electronic records occurred 
at the ports. 
Declaration proceSSing 
Automated Customs Operating System. The implementation of this main 
Customs operating software drastically changed the processing of clearance 
documents and declarations. Under the system, Customs works with the 
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electronic record of a clearance document, thus rendering the process virtually 
paperless. With electronic declarations, the entire process has been fully 
automated for most of the transactions from entry reception to assessment, 
collection, and release of the goods. Record-keeping and the generation of 
both operational and management reports have likewise been automated. 
Remote lodgement of declarations. The electronic record can be created 
and lodged by the importer himself through computer workstations linked 
to the Customs network. Following the Direct Trader Input (DTI) procedure 
or the alternative Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) procedure, importers 
can file declarations from their own office. Under the DTI system, importers 
make use of the declaration module of the main Customs software to compose 
the declaration and then lodge it electronically by establishing a direct 
connection with the Bureau's computer system. Under EDI, declarations 
composed in the EDIFACT message format are likewise electronically lodged, 
but via a commercial communication network. From there, the message is 
forwarded to a gateway which converts the message into a data declaration 
stream that the Customs system can process. 
Private sector operated service centres. Importers who are not capable of 
using either DTI nor EDI must go through service centres operated by the 
Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Through these facilities, 
the declarations are digitised and then electronically transmitted to the 
port computer system for automated processing. As with DTI and EDI, 
there is no face-to-face interaction between an importer and a customs 
officer in the service centres, thus removing opportunities for corruption at 
this stage of the Customs clearance process. 
Risk assessment, selectivity and green lanes. At the heart of the Automated 
Customs System is a computer program called Selectivity. It analyses the 
risk profiles of shipments and categorises them as high, medium or low risk 
by comparing their particulars with some 18 reference tables and files. 
Low-risk shipments are diverted by the computer system to a Green Channel 
where the only activity undertaken is the automated calculation of tax payable 
and matching of the calculated amount with the amount paid. Only when 
the declaration is considered to be of high risk is it necessary to conduct a 
physical examination and a verification of submitted documents. 
These interrelated measures represent a shift in strategy for reducing 
corruption-from reducing the number of steps and signatures required in 
the process to reducing the number of transactions. These measures allow 
customs authorities to focus limited enforcement resources on a manageable 
number of shipments and thus allow greater depth of Customs intervention. 
Just as important is the application to the majority of trade, to reduce the 
cost and extent of corruption. 
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Customs-cargo handler computer systems interface in the release of 
goods (Online Release System) . One of the weakest links in the cargo 
clearance chain is the handover of the cargo release authority from Customs 
to the cargo handler. This stage of the cargo clearance process is where 
spurious release documents usually appear. In most cases, investigations to 
pinpoint responsibility for the introduction of such documents and the 
fraudulent release of goods are unsuccessful. 
The first version of the initiative to address this weak link was the Online 
Release System (OLRS) . This system facilitates and makes secure the final 
release of shipments from Customs control. For the in-dock OLRS, 
Customs is connected online to the cargo handler for the simple matter 
of removing a stop flag and for red channel shipments, the lowering of 
the examination flag. The off-dock OLRS utilises the public telephone 
system to download the encrypted release instructions to the computers 
of the container yard-container freight station, located away from the 
ports. The off-dock OLRS removes the need for messengers to physically 
carry the release authorisations . In the past, traffic congestion in the 
metropolis meant that authorisations took at least a day to deliver. Fraud 
and corruption frequently took place in the physical handling of the release 
authorisations by messengers. 
Unfortunately, the first version of the OLRS had weaknesses. OLRS 
clerks were commonly given spurious matching documents and fraudulently 
lifting the duty stop. The release procedure has subsequently been 
strengthened further. The results of the computer matching of payables 
and payments are automatically down loaded into a communications gateway 
from which the cargo handler computer can draw release authorities. With 
this interface, the entire process from reception to assessment and collection 
and thence to cargo release has become seamless. 
Tax exemption system 
The manual system for issuing and transmitting tax exemptions has been 
breached many times , resulting in the introduction of fictitious or 
tampered exemption papers and fraudulent release of shipments . The 
solution adopted was to computerise the receipt and processing of 
exemption applications at the Department of Finance and to provide a 
secure electronic communication channel for transmitting the approved 
exemptions to Customs. The work flow system, on top of a lease lines 
network, removed many if not all of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of 
the operation. Now that the notes can be encrypted, the process is secure 
and has been dramatically shortened-much to the delight of the business 
community. 
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Use of VTS to secure the transfer of cargo 
A highly political issue in Customs corruption involves the control of goods 
in transit from the various ports of entry to the special economic zones (SEZs), 
most notably to the former American military bases of Subic and Clark. 
Domestic producers and manufacturers have drawn attention to the diversion 
of goods destined for these SEZs as a source of competing smuggled goods. 
Since the use of guards has not worked, vehicle tracking using global 
positioning system technology has been put in place. The movement of goods 
is tracked via computers and reported on a real time basis in order that 
emergency response teams can take immediate action in case of diversions. 
Customs Service- Federation of Philippine Industry Data Link.up 
The Federation of Philippine Industry Data Link is a partnership between 
the government and the private sector to enforce Customs laws. It is also a 
showcase for the provision of easy access to Customs data for businesses. 
Through this data link, business is able to access records of sensitive imports 
as they enter the system so that an analysis can be immediately undertaken 
as to possible violations committed. Cases of undervaluation, and even mis-
classification, can be detected through this link-up. The objective is to establish 
a level playing field and bring about transparency in the conduct of business. 
Results and lessons learned 
The overall results of the ACI were positive for the Bureau and for the 
country. The achievements were also recognised internationally by such 
prestigious organisations as the World Customs Organisation, UNCTAD 
and by numerous customs administrations and customs regional groupings. 
Probably the best testimony to the success of the 1992-98 
anticorruption program is the passion and commitment with which the 
business sector and other concerned groups-including many in the 
executive and legislative areas of government-are now fighting to preserve 
the gains captured during the period. There is also strong support from 
such international organisations as UNCTAD, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. The Asian Development Bank in Manila also 
showed its appreciation for the gains produced, by organising symposium 
workshops on the reforms. 
Following the 1998 national elections, the new administration not only 
slowed the reform process but caused setbacks for some components of the 
program. The Direct Trader Input system at the Ninoy Aquino International 
Airport was discontinued for almost a year and was resumed only after the 
business sector-particularly the Semiconductor and Electronics Industry 
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Federation Inc.-and other private sector groups strongly pushed for its 
resumption. The business sector, led by the Philippine Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry and the Federation of Customs Brokerage Companies of the 
Philippines, is strongly advocating the removal of manual procedures that 
have been added to the once fully-automated and paperless system. 
The experience of the Philippine Customs Service shows that 
anticorruption initiatives that promote good governance and provide a 
working environment with limited opportunity for corrupt practices are 
most effective in bringing about a significant reduction in the incidence of 
this social malady. Experience also indicates that the successes and difficulties 
encountered in implementation of these initiatives were strongly influenced 
by a number of factors, some of which were within the ambit of management 
influence and control. 
Leader's role 
The most important determinants of the success of an anti-corruption 
program are related to the extent to which the leader 'owns' the program 
and displays 'hands-on' management. He or she can demonstrate these 
qualities by participating in the design, development, implementation, and 
monitoring of the project, and by dealing with the problems encountered. 
Also important are the rewards and recognition given to those contributing 
to the success of the program and the sanctions meted out to those who 
refuse to cooperate. Perhaps most important, however, is leadership by 
example-the extent to which he or she actualises the program and conducts 
himself, officially and unofficially, throughout the program. 
Private sector role 
The business sector can be the Customs Service's strongest ally in the 
development and execution of the initiatives. While material and 
technological support are important, the private sector can be of most help 
in change management and sustainability. Efforts must be made to involve 
the CEOs of businesses affected by the program. They must ensure that their 
own organisations work with the Bureau on the various components of the 
program, instead of simply relying on 'representatives' and 'agents'. They are 
the ones in contact with the top government officials and are hence in the 
best position to impress upon them the necessity and value of the reforms 
and the need for continuity and sustainability. The private sector must be 
vigilant and courageous in demanding improved services and higher ethical 
standards from government civil servants. Customs management must protect 
them, and it must be made known to the internal staff that it is policy to 
encourage the private sector to speak its mind on the reforms. 
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Role of the IMF, World Bank and other international organisations 
At times, donor and international organisations are more forceful than the 
private sector in calling for vigilance, sustainability and continuity in the 
reform program. In undertaking an assessment of their respective projects 
that directly or indirectly relate to the anticorruption initiatives, these 
organisations must objectively report any deviations from the program. 
Managers of the reform process must be able to work with these institutions 
to ensure continuity. 
Negative reinforcement 
While it is highly desirable to obtain support and commitment for the 
anticorruption program from the formal and informal leadership in the 
organisation, it is not realistic to expect real commitment and support when 
the organisation's interest is not properly aligned with the program objectives. 
Audit 
Related to the readiness to apply negative reinforcers is the need for strong 
monitoring and auditing of the reform progress. The leadership must make 
use of external assistance in this activity, given the propensity of internal 
staff to fail to present an objective picture of the level of corruption and to 
cover up for one another. It is desirable to have an independent auditing 
unit reporting directly to the top leadership. The business sector should also 
endeavour to conduct their own surveys to provide independent feedback. 
Resource availability 
In bringing about reforms, availability or adequacy of resources is not the 
issue. The issue is availability of sectors concerned or interested in the need 
for the reform. If there are enough concerned groups, there will be enough 
resources. 
Some factors are beyond the control of the reform managers and are better 
addressed at the national policy level. Complex tax and tariff systems which 
create many rate bands and exemptions and entail numerous non-tariff barriers, 
such as licenses, approvals, quotas and permits, make for complicated 
administration and create opportunities for corruption. The Philippine 
government is aware of the ill-effects of such a policy framework and has done 
much to improve the situation, particularly on tariff and tax reforms. But 
stronger political will is required to ensure that vested interest groups do not 
jeopardise the positive things that have been accomplished in previous years. 
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Corruption as a social process 
from dyads to networks 
John Warburton 
The problem of corruption can be stated in relatively simple terms. What 
is it? How does it function? If we could answer these questions we should 
be able to discover ways of combating what is now perceived as the scourge 
of the modern world. However, every complex problem has a simple plausible 
answer, which is invariably wrong. The problem of corruption may be able 
to be framed in uncomplicated terms but this is where the simplicity ends. 
In general terms, corruption is an artefact of social and political 
organisation and, as such, is a phenomenon of infinite complexity. I have 
never seen a definition or paradigm that comprehensively describes 
corruption in all its guises and manifestations, nor do I propose one here. 
In this chapter I will argue that understanding corruption as a social process 
has implications and advantages that provide insights into the way corruption 
functions. I will be suggesting that such insights can also inform corruption 
prevention programs. 
The orthodox way to approach corruption these days is to examine the 
institutions and systems that allow corruption to occur. To some extent I 
am turning this on its head by suggesting that if we are to understand 
corruption as a social process then we need to understand the individual 
actors who are the participants in this social system. I'm not suggesting 
that the institutional approach is wrong but we are attacking the same 
problem from somewhat different directions. Larmour and Wolanin are 
right to point out, in the introduction to this volume, that the managerialist 
approach to corruption invariably fails because of a failure to address the 
atmosphere of integrity surrounding the institution. I would add that this 
approach fails to incorporate the cognition, motivations and actions of 
individuals. Addressing the individual seems to be out of fashion because it 
reminds some of the unsophisticated 'rotten apple theory' that was usually 
trotted out to explain corruption in simpler times. 
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We have now moved full circle with several contributors in this volume 
citing Zipparo's (1998) argument that deviance stems largely from the 
nature of the organisation rather than the nature of the individual. Instead, 
I would suggest that to come to some fundamental understanding of the 
way corruption functions it is essential to understand it firstly from the 
individual's perspective and to then build the individual into a complex 
social world. This has not been done to date, probably because it is such a 
difficult and complex task, requiring an interdisciplinary approach. In any 
case I will attempting to propose a different paradigm describing the way 
corrupt transactions occur and the way corrupt networks develop. 
Corruption as a social process 
Corrupt transactions occur between actors as the result of social interaction. 
For corrupt transactions to occur there must be communication between 
two or more individuals. Individuals intend to participate in corrupt 
transactions . They may not call them corrupt or they may have some 
rationalisation to hand to justifY their behaviour, but they intend to promote 
their interests over the interests of others. The precise nature of those interests 
and how actors come to have them is not my concern here. Actors have 
interests/goals/desires/needs/preferences 1 and they act to achieve them.2 
The most important factor is not the nature of the interests but the strength 
of the actor's desire to achieve them. Petri refers to the 'energy' inherent in 
motivation that drives actors to act (1981: 18) . 
Promoting your own interest is essentially identifYing and attempting 
to realise personal goals. In order for an actor to achieve her goals she must 
have 'power' (Lamberth 1980:295) . It is my contention that both parties 
to corrupt transactions are resource holders and power seekers. They possess 
differing resources of power that cannot easily be converted ro promote 
their own interests . The purpose of corrupt transactions is to conduct a 
swap, which converts resources into usable power. The participants in the 
transaction can then use the power they have obtained from the transaction 
to promote their own interest. 
In any such transaction each individual actor has to make a personal 
decision as to whether they will instigate or accede to an attempted corrupt 
transaction. If the actor participates in such a transaction then it can be 
assumed they have crossed a decisional threshold. I contend there are two 
competing forces acting on them as they reach the decisional threshold. 
Firstly, there are motivational, or excitatory forces, energising them toward 
participation in the corrupt transaction. Principally, they are fuelled by the 
strength of the actor's desire to promote the interest that the corrupt transaction 
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will satisfy. This strength of desire will be a function of the actor's dependence 
on the resource that the other actor in the transaction controls and is offering 
as part of the transaction. 3 Secondly, there are inhibitory forces lowering 
the tendency of the actor to cross the decisional threshold. These would 
include such factors as moral inhibition, perception of the risk of sanction 
and perception of the consequences of sanction. 
It becomes obvious from this discussion that the systemic effects of 
organisational culture are only one of the factors that affect the individual 
at the decisional threshold. It is true that organisational culture and systems 
change can affect the scale or opportunity for corrupt transactions. Such 
factors address the inhibitory forces acting on an individual actor's decision 
to behave corruptly. They do not however address the motivational forces 
impelling an actor to behave corruptly. I would like to address these forces 
and examine how they can lead to the corrupt transactions and the 
development of corrupt networks of exchange. 
Corruption and power 
The connection between corruption and power has been poorly understood 
to date, with few theorists explicitly drawing a connection. Rogow and 
Lasswell's Power, Corruption and Rectitude is one of the few works to link 
corruption and power but sheds little real light on the connection (1963). 
It concentrates on power in its broadest political sense and failed to place it 
in the context of individual transactions. 
It is my contention that corrupt transactions are a special form of power 
relations that involve a mutual swapping of the resources of power. The precise 
nature of power is contentious and I will only say here that I will draw on the 
Weberian causal concept of power,4 combined with Emerson's theory of 
resources dependency.5 My view is that power is a generic term used to describe 
the state of being of an actor,6 possessing, controlling, or having access to 
resources which allow them to potentially promote their interests over the 
interests of others. Resources refers to money, influence, personal charisma, 
sporting prowess, family ties, control of the media or any other personal or 
external assistance capable of being used to promote the actor's interests (Clark 
1968: 5 7). Power vested in public officials is more correctly described as 
authority, the defining characteristic of which is its political legitimacy. 
Authority refers to being given administrative control of decision making 
processes and scarce resources on behalf of 'the public' to be administered on 
their behalf. I now turn to the links between power and corruption. 
It is not the intention of this chapter to haggle over definitions of 
corruption. Most authors tend resignedly to accept the Transparency 
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International definition: 'the misuse of public power for private profit'.7 I 
propose to expand it slightly. 
Corruption refers to the actions of government officials, whether elected 
or appointed, who use power, in the form of the authority vested in them 
on behalf of 'the public', to promote their own interests over that of the 
public.8 Corruption also refers to the actions of private actors who conduct 
transactions of power with public officials, characterised by supplying the 
official with a convertible resource of power for the purpose of gaining 
access to government controlled resources that allow the private actor to 
promote their interests over that of the public. It will be noted that 
corruption has been the mechanism by which the authority possessed by 
public officials has been transformed into power that can be used to serve 
the private interests of both parties to the transaction.9 
The key point of this definition is that it focuses on the dichotomy 
between public versus private interests and the link between power and 
goal achievement (Etzioni 1970:19) . It becomes clear when you overlay 
the definitions of corruption and power that corruption is a technique of 
goal achievement, not an end in itself. Given that power is essentially a 
social process these definitions place corruption centrally within the ambit 
of all social and therefore power relations. 10 We are talking about the most 
fundamental human characteristics : cognition; goal achievement and the 
use of power; and, human relations in social networks. Which brings me to 
the basic building bloc~ of social relations, the dyadic interaction between 
two actors . 
Social relations and corrupt social networks 
The precise nature and conditions under which social interactions take 
place are the subject of much debate (Parsons 1951).1 will focus on only 
two aspects of social interaction crucial to corrupt transactions-secret 
communication and trust. 
Secret communication 
Corrupt transactions are by definition sanctionable. If they are sanctionable, 
whether legally or otherwise, those that participate in them know they 
must keep such participation secret from others. This raises the first and 
perhaps most difficult hurdle to overcome for actors wishing to instigate a 
corrupt transaction. They must open a channel of communication with the 
intended target of their corrupt approach. 
A channel of communication must have a medium by which 
communications are maintained. In normal social interactions this is simple 
to conceptualise. One person meets another in a restaurant and has a 
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conversation. They talk on the phone, send a letter or communicate by any 
recognised means. The opening of the channel of communication is a 
difficult dance for the instigator and the target. The approach can't be too 
obvious, lest the target denounce the instigator and expose them to sanction 
even before any benefit is possible. Nor can the approach be too abstruse 
lest the target misunderstands the true nature of the overtures being made 
and the opportunity is lost. The instigator doesn't want to be in situation 
where they have to spell out the nature of the approach to clear up 
misunderstandings. I would suggest, and experience bears this out, that corrupt 
approaches are usually made in face to face meetings where as much non 
verbal information can be conveyed and received in what is a highly complex 
social interaction. In my ten year's experience as a corruption investigator, I 
have never seen a first corrupt approach made by telephone or by letter. ll 
This is why interest groups are willing to pay huge amounts to have 'the 
ear' of political decisionmakers. They know that without a channel of 
communication there is absolutely nil prospect of influencing a decision 
maker's decision. Most modern political systems, which have safeguards 
against corruption, are still struggling to deal with the payment of large 
sums for 'access' to politicians. Indeed, in Australia, it is standard practice 
for political parties to hold policy 'forums' where interested business groups 
pay tens of thousands of dollars for guaranteed access to the Minister. 
Once a channel of communication has been established and one corrupt 
transaction executed, the nature of the communication changes between 
the two actors. There is no longer an instigator and a target, only two 
willing participants. The corrupt transaction is sanctionable and secret 
ensuring the channel of communication cannot be closed even if one actor 
decides they no longer want to participate. 
Trust 
The two actors are now locked in to a relationship that has its own 
demands. At any time they could be revealed and exposed to sanction. 
This requires that the corrupt relationship be conducted in total secrecy 
and with a great degree of trust between the participants. Luhmann (1979) 
describes trust as a generalised expectation that the 'other' will continue 
to behave in accordance with the way they have portrayed themselves. In 
essence, trust is the rational response of actors to increasing social 
complexity. It is impossible to have all the information we need to make 
decisions about the behaviour of others and where it will lead so we make 
an assumption of trust. Such assumptions vastly reduce the computational 
complexity of decision making in a social world. As Luhmann notes, one 
can reduce complexity and therefore the need for trust in modern society 
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by relying on structure. Trust in most commercial relationships has been 
to some degree displaced by complex legal and normative frameworks, which 
govern the way business is conducted (Luhmann 1979:34) . 
In corrupt transactions there is no such structure to rely on. The secret 
and sanctionable nature of the transaction ensures that the actors must 
'trust' each other. 12 Once trust is established, the actors are locked into a 
complex social interaction in which trust must be nurtured and maintained. 
Therefore, the channel of communication between the actors must be of a 
nature that nurtures and maintains such trust. I would argue that this is 
why personalised relations are so important to ongoing corrupt transactions. 
It is often the case that corrupt actors must meet face to face, socialise and 
generally enjoy some sort of empathy that engenders trust between them. 
Face to face personalised relations actually affect the nature of the corrupt 
relationship. Trust, empathy and desire to fulfil the actors' personal interests 
interact in complex ways. 
The need to build and maintain trust through face to face relations may 
explain the fact that in many corrupt transactions the target will accept a 
resource as the bribe which is vastly lower than the 'rational market value' 
of the publicly owned resource they are swapping. Public officials simply 
sell out for a lower than expected price. This is particularly evident in police 
culture where police will risk their reputation, career and superannuation 
for a few cartons of alcohol, a free night at a brothel or a very small amount 
of money. The annals of the New South Wales Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC) are full of examples. 13 
Corrupt networks of exchange 
Most of the theorising about corruption is based on the corrupt dyadic 
exchange. With a few notable exceptions very little work has been done on 
corrupt networks. 14 Corrupt networks of exchange highlight the essentially 
social nature of corrupt transactions. I will now attempt to outline a model 
of how corrupt dyadic transactions can develop into corrupt networks of 
exchange. It should be noted this is a theoretical model in its infancy and 
much further work is needed. To assist in the understanding of corruption 
as a social process I draw on insights from a mode of inquiry which uses 
networks to understand social interactions. This approach goes under many 
guises but is commonly known as Social Network Theory (SNT) .15 SNT 
focuses on actors as nodes in a network and the importance of connections 
between actors (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). SNT sets out to understand 
the patterning of actor's interactions. It is based on the intuitive idea that 
the patterns of interactions between actors in a social network have a strong 
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affect on the way that actors live their lives (French 1956). This approach 
combined with increased computing power has led to the development of 
a way of visually representing social networks that allows comprehension of 
their complexity in terms of space and over time. 
Imagine that every person in the world is a node in one gigantic network. 16 
Every actor has links with other actors in the nerwork, which form complex 
sub networks. Some have a few links and some have many. Some actors 
have high quality connections through which high quality communications 
flow. Some have low quality connections and their communication with 
others will be degraded and unsatisfactory for their lifetimes. A feature of 
this social network is the interconnectedness of the actors who form the its 
nodes. Social researchers have been continually surprised by the 
interconnectedness between actors, even in a huge and complex society like 
the United States. 17 
This system is not static but dynamic. Connections are constantly 
growing, connecting, and dying. These social connections are modified by 
the experiences of each individual actor. Social connections require energy 
investment to be maintained. If individual actors do not invest in each 
connection then eventually they will atrophy. 18 Unlike biological neural 
networks, social networks do not have a central organising principle, in 
response to stimuli external to the network. Actors in social networks grow 
connections according to their own needs, desires, environmental and social 
influences. They respond to the connections grown toward them in a similar 
manner. 
Typically, for each actor, they have strong, smooth, wide and well-serviced 
connections with their immediate family, mother, father, partner, siblings 
and children. 19 They will have connections of a different character with 
friends and acquaintances. Connections with family will generally stay 
constant throughout life. Connections with friends and acquaintances will 
grow and die in accordance with the particulars of each relationship. Each 
actor will have connections with their employer and other employees in 
the workplace. They may have a formal hierarchical relationship with the 
boss, but formal and informal connections with fellow employees (Argyle 
1988:174). Actors may have connections with other actors who share their 
interests.2o They may belong to a political party or a gardening club or be 
the local scoutmaster. They may go to a dance group on Thursdays and 
Church on Sundays. Everywhere they connect with other actors thus 
increasing the complexity of their relationships and their place within 
nerworks (Brown 1965:160). 
Generally the connections actors make are the result of circumstance 
and intention. 21 Actors join or become part of definable groups or less 
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definable networks.22 Initially their main connection with others in such 
groups is the common interest of the group. As connections grow and mature 
within the group, this changes over time, although the group interest will 
always be in the background providing an underlying structure for the 
group connections. 
Actors are intentional and can form connections in directions that suit 
their needs and desires. Actors do this to varying degrees and fall on a 
continuum between being passive and shaped by the forces acting on them, 
to actively forging connections strongly in the direction they want to go 
(Fischer 1977b) . The question then becomes what are their needs and desires 
and how much capacity does each actor have to achieve them? 
The precise mechanism of needs/desires/goal formation need not concern 
us here. Humans often act irrationally out of fear, greed, envy, jealousy or 
just plain stupidity. T hey do not act the same way all the time, in all 
situations . The complexity of human action falls within the realm of 
psychology the most that can be said is that humans act in accordance with 
their perceived interest at that particular time and place.23 Once needs/ 
goals/interests have been established in the mind of the actor they must 
then be sufficiently motivated to act. 
I have described a social network where every actor inhabits a location 
within the network connected to others. The connections are growing and 
changing and the actor can intentionally create connections to assist in 
achieving their goals . Actors can only achieve their goals if they have 
possession, control or access to resources that allow them to do so (Burt 
1977:269; see also Etzioni 1970:19). In the context of a social network, 
the possession, control or access to such resources gives the actor 'power' . 
In modern economies the most commonly possessed and used resource of 
power is money, however anything at all can be a resource of power if it 
assists an actor to promote their interest over the interests of others. 
Charisma, public speaking ability, media resources, advertising, and 
information that others don't have can all be resources of power (Olsen 
1970:5). 
Gathering resources is the way an actor gathers power. After all, power 
is a potential state, not an actual one. When an actor uses power and actually 
achieves their interest over the interest of someone else then power has 
been used. If the actor has the ability to promote their interest over another 
but they haven't actually done so then they have power but they haven't 
used it.24 Emerson goes one step further and suggests that power is not an 
attribute of a particular actor per se, but of the social relations between 
actors . If an actor controls resources that another actor is dependent on, 
then to that extent the first actor has 'power'. 
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Every actor controls resources that they can call upon to promote their 
interest. They also possess or control resources that can't be used to promote 
their interest. Money is such a useful resource of power because of its 
convertibility. It can be handed from one actor to another and be 
immediately converted to the use of the new owner. This analysis appears 
to lead to corrupt transactions being a straightforward market in resources. 
Rose-Ackerman is right to point to the allocation of scarce government 
controlled resources leading to the creation of a market, as being central to 
understanding corrupt conduct (Rose-Ackerman 1978:2). What Rose-
Ackerman and most economists fail to comprehend is that the market is 
merely a simplified representation of complex networks of social exchange 
and social action. The general population is so used to participating in the 
buying and selling of material goods that the layers of social exchange that 
underpin such transactions are invisible and instinctive (Jackson, Fischer 
and Jones 1977:43). Social exchange theorists propose that social exchange 
occurs between connected actors in relation to all transacted resources, 
whether material or non material. Such transactions are based on dependency 
relations, which lead to the operation of power (Cook 1987). 
The above discussion brings us to the dyadic corruption transaction 
which always includes an instigator and a target. Once the instigator has 
made the decision to make a corrupt approach they will attempt to contact 
the target and persuade them to comply. It will be obvious from the above 
discussion that this attempt at convincing another individual to be part of 
a corrupt transaction involves power from both the instigator's and target's 
point of view. This attempt at a corrupt transaction will either succeed or 
fail-there is no in between state. It can only have a chance of succeeding if 
the following conditions are met 
• The instigator has a channel of connection with the target 
(Dahl 1994:292). 
• The instigator has a resource the target wants or needs. 
• The target is dependent on this resource. 
• The target cannot easily obtain this resource another way. 
• The target has a resource the instigator wants or needs. 
• The instigator cannot easily obtain this resource another way. 
• The connection between the instigator and the target is of 
sufficient qualiry that allows 'trust' between the actors to 
support the transaction (Della Porta and Pissorno 1996:76). 
• The transaction can be conducted in secret (Alatas 1968). 
• The target will have no moral objection.25 
• The target perceives that the risk of sanction and the 
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consequences of sanction are low enough to allow the 
transaction. 
• The instigator perceives that the risk of sanction and the 
consequences of sanction are low enough to allow the 
transaction. 
Whether the instigator makes the attempt at a corrupt transaction at all 
will be contingent on a combination of the above factors accumulating a 
sufficient 'weight'. The acceptance of the corruption attempt by the target 
will also be contingent on the above factors accumulating a sufficient weight 
to allow receipt of the attempt. It is clear from the above discussion that 
any corruption/power attempt (ePA) involves excitatory factors that motivate 
the attempt and inhibitory factors that prevent it. 
If the ePA is successful then two consequences ensue. First, the connection 
between the actors is strengthened. Second the channel along which such 
ePAs occur will remain open. All the above conditions having been met, 
the instigator merely has to provide a resource that the target desires to 
continue such transactions. In addition the instigator has the power resource 
of information regarding the target's previous corrupt transaction.26 Gaining 
evidence of the original or subsequent transactions strengthens this. If the 
target is dependent on preservation of her good name, as all public officials 
are, then this resource further adds to the instigator's power in the 
relationship. This connection is now ready to be used in continuing corrupt 
transactions. 
For actors in the corrupt network the connection itself will have to be 
maintained and both actors in any transaction (either a power attempt or a 
corrupt power attempt) will have to expend resources to preserve the secrecy 
of their transactions. The two actors are now tied together in such a way 
that continuing trust is requiredY Although the transaction began with 
an instigator and a target, future transactions will be characterised by their 
mutuality. Further improvement of the connection by personalising relations 
via social means may take place. 28 
The instigator in a corrupt transaction can be either a government actor 
or a private actor. I would suggest that if a government actor has high 
motivational forces and low inhibitory forces then they will probably be 
the instigator. This is not usually the case in modern democracies where 
the rule of law is established and enforced. The rule of law and widespread 
education about the unacceptable nature of bribery ensures that moral 
inhibition, perceived risk and consequences of sanction are generally higher 
than in jurisdictions where the rule of law is not well established or 
enforced, such as in developing countries. In addition, public officials in 
developing countries, due to their poverty, are highly resource dependent 
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on material goods to just survive therefore ensuring they have high levels 
of motivation.29 
If the instigator's desire for resources to increase his power has been 
satisfied then their relationship may remain static. A non-government 
instigator may attempt further corruption attempts against other government 
actors, through the target, if the instigator has a desire for power that exceeds 
the ability of the target to satisfy. Corruption will tend to flow upwards 
through the authority hierarchy to the next level of management, in order to 
gain access to greater discretional authority. This is particularly significant in 
democracies and modern bureaucracies where authority is usually scattered 
among a number of actors. It is not usual for one actor to possess monopoly 
decision making authority over significant government controlled resources.3D 
An instigator may attempt to corrupt other public officials if other actors in 
the instigator's own network wish to access the instigator's connection to 
further their desires for resources of power. 
The key point is that the instigator (who we will assume is a non-
government actor) is unlikely to have a readymade connection with 
potentially corrupt government actors who can provide government 
resources that she desires. Having gained access to one corrupt government 
actor the instigator now has the ability to connect with all the government 
actors linked to the original corrupt actor. Through one connection there 
is potential for corruption to pervade the entire network. The process of 
opening up the network to corruption can repeat itself for as long as: 
there are targets in the government agency amenable to such an approach; 
the agency has resources of power desired by the instigator(s); and the 
instigator(s) have resources that can be converted to the use of the targets. 
In addition, any attempt has to satisfy the conditions specified above. 
This however is complicated by the fact that as the network grows, corrupt 
network actors are in the unique position of being able to use organisational 
power to negate some of the inhibiting conditions. 
It should be noted that prior to the establishment of a corrupt network 
there is no overriding organising principle patterning the actor's relations 
with the other potentially corrupt actors, with the exception of the pre-
existing organisational structure and informal social influences. Once the 
corrupt network has been established then it is subject to dual influences. 
Firstly the corrupt network is subject to the personal agendas of the actors, 
fuelled by the relative power of each actor in the network. Secondly the 
corrupt network is subject to the overriding influence of the whole corrupt 
network. The consequences of this is that actors in the network will fire 
power attempts and corrupt/power attempts in directions that promote 
the network as well as specific acts of corruption. 
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The result will be a continual firing of power attempts between actors 
in the corrupt network, and between actors in the corrupt network and 
other organisational actors. Organisational power, power attempts and 
corrupt/power attempts, will be used by corrupt network members to grow 
the network toward places in the organisation where discretionary power 
resides and can be utilised to the network's advantage. This will include the 
promotion of network members and the isolation and ejection of non-
network members. Individual actors will interact with this process in a 
complex manner, patterning the way the network grows. 
Internal motivating forces will drive or inhibit the corrupt actor's corrupt 
behaviour combined with external organisational factors such as low morale, 
poor leadership, lack of moral leadership, poor training, ambiguous 
organisational ethics and impractical policies and procedures which act to 
corrode moral inhibition. 31 Other factors such as poor accountability, 
internal audit review, performance management and supervision can lead 
to a perception of low risk of sanction and reduced consequences of sanction. 
Once a corrupt network of actors is established in an organisation then 
the use of power is expanded through resource transferral. The corrupt 
actors maintain and protect themselves and the network through the use 
power in all its forms. 32 Participating in a corrupt network places the actors 
within a group that possesses a collective interest-that of furthering corrupt 
transactions and protecting the network. 
Members of the corrupt network do not have to go outside the network 
to gain power in the organisational context. They all have access to 
organisational power to varying degrees, however the collective nature of 
this power means that as the network grows the organisational power 
available to its members grows exponentially. At a certain point the 
accumulation of organisational power reaches a critical mass and at this 
point the corrupt network has captured the organisation. It should be noted 
that the power of the corrupt network does not relate necessarily to the 
number of actors involved but the scale of organisational power available to 
the corrupt actors in the network.33 A few corrupt actors with a high degree 
of organisational power can capture an organisation as can a large number 
of corrupt actors with a smaller amount of organisational power.34 
Corruption networks and corruption prevention 
How does understanding corruption in terms of social interactions and 
social networks assist in preventing it? Firstly it provides a theoretical basis 
for the value of the organisational integrity approach. As Boardman and 
Klum note in this volume, 'unethical behaviour' is causally linked to a 
number of risk factors. Through experience and some descriptive research 
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it has become apparent that corruption can flourish where certain risk factors 
are present. An examination of the literature suggests that at present there 
is no theoretical understanding of the functioning of corruption which 
explains how these risk factors lead to corruption. 
The organisational approach can be successful because the culture of 
public sector agencies is to some extent controllable. Thtough education, 
corruption prevention and the promotion of corruption 'resistance' a 
powerful atmosphere of organisational integrity can be created. Such an 
atmosphere can contribute significantly to an actor's inhibitory motivational 
forces. The approach does however have its limitations as it fails to appreciate 
the other side of the equation-the excitatory factors that impel the individual 
to action. If such factors outweigh the inhibitory forces created by the 
organisational integrity measures, then corruption will still occur. 
Two examples will illustrate my point. 
1 A public official in a developing country could be still be 
strongly impelled to act corruptly, even if her agency has 
implemented successful organisational integrity measures, if her 
family is starving and corrupt transactions will feed them. 
2 In the United States of America narcotics interdiction officials 
are highly trained, well paid, and subject to strict codes of 
conduct, oversight, auditing and other measures. Corruption is 
still a problem partially because of the massive sums available to 
narcotics traffickers to bribe officials. Those that can't be bribed 
can be intimidated through threats to their families . 
It is not true to say that everyone has their price. It is however true to 
say that there will always be some individuals for whom the impulsion to 
act corruptly under certain circumstances will be stronger than the inhibitory 
forces resident in the institution to which they belong. The above examples 
highlight the importance of the effect of resource dependency on human 
action. Corruption prevention programs should strategically target resources 
available to corrupt private actors as well potential resource dependencies 
for government actors. Understanding resource dependency could inform 
programs of risk assessment targeted at vulnerable officials. 
The social networks approach alerts us to the importance of channels of 
communication. Without a channel of communication a corrupt transaction 
is impossible. Corruption prevention programs should include the 
monitoring of channels of communication with potential corrupters. 
Payment for access to public officials should be seen for what it is-an 
attempt to open a channel of communication that allows influence. 
Once a channel of communication is opened between two actors in the 
network which have conducted one corrupt transaction, it remains open, 
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even if the actor in the public sector agency moves to another position. 
Public sector officials suspected of corruption cannot be just moved or 
'promoted out' as so often happens with problem employees. Those 
suspected of corruption must be dealt with by the agency through the 
disciplinary process. If sufficient evidence is available strong steps should 
be taken to remove them. If this is not possible then they should be the 
subject of overt or covert surveillance to affect and monitor the suspect 
officer's behaviour. 
The social networks approach to corruption focuses on the way power is 
an integral part of the functioning of corrupt networks, both in terms of 
the gathering of resources for goal achievement, and as a medium of exchange 
in the network itself. Corruption is a technique used by power holders and 
power seekers to gain or maintain power. Corruption is not an end in itself, 
merely a technique of goal achievement and corruption is but one technique 
of gathering the power needed to achieve such goals. Actors willing to use 
corruption to achieve their goals are also willing to use more subtle 
techniques to achieve their ends. In particular, this approach suggests that 
the misuse of organisational power, even though it might not appear to be 
for private gain, is a clear indicator of the potential for corruption in an 
organisation. In corrupt networks, operationalising the network can, at certain 
stages, be a lot more important than the exchange of resources. The use of 
organisational power to facilitate nepotism may be of much more significance 
than traditional examples of corruption. Once a corrupt network has been 
operationalised in key areas of the organisation, the chance for discovery 
and change have been vastly reduced. 
Focussing on the interests of actors in corrupt networks suggests that 
the shared interests of actors in corrupt networks is a key issue. Any corruption 
prevention program should target the potential for strongly shared interests 
of public sector employees where such shared interests are not identical to 
that of the organisation. As we have seen, trust is a key component of relations 
between actors when the first corruption attempt is made and in ongoing 
corrupt relationships. Shared interests between actors facilitate trust and 
provide a common motivational stimulus that can override the inhibitory 
forces that may be active. 
Shared interests can provide a readymade network that contains its own 
culture, norms and goals, which can displace or negate organisational cultural 
norms. The most obvious example in Australian political life is the strong 
culture of political parties. This can lead to, and has in many cases, the 
corrupt elevation of party political shared interests over the democratic 
institutions of parliament, which the members of the party are supposed to 
serve. Any corruption prevention program would do well to identifY shared 
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interests of power holders in public sector employment and to focus on 
these as potential nodes of corrupt influence. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the social networks approach to 
corruption allows the corruption investigator to conceptualise the operation 
of corrupt networks in terms of power flows and relationships rather than 
the attributes of actors. The question to be asked by the corruption 
investigator is not whether actor A is corrupt. The question should be, 
what is the relationship between actor A and other potentially corrupt 
actors in the network. Understanding corrupt networks in this way allows 
us to comprehend that corrupt transactions can occur across the network 
between individuals who are not directly linked. Such transactions, on their 
face may not appear to be reciprocal and may be removed in space and 
time. It is only by understanding the relationships between the actors in 
the network that the true nature of such transactions can be revealed. 
Conclusion 
The problem for corruption prevention programs is that corrupt networks 
and social networks look similar to each other and function in the same 
way. We all operate in a world of differentiated social networks based on 
communication, personalised relations and shared interests. To act socially 
is a human need. It is simply not realistic to believe that rational 
managerialism can prevent the creation of social networks involving public 
sector agency officials. To radically restrict personalised human interaction 
would reduce efficiency in public sector agencies to such a low level as to 
make them non viable. Weber's totally rational bureaucracy is an idealised 
fiction that is not possible and not desirable. The challenge for anti 
corruption agencies is to attempt to formulate a model of bureaucracy and 
policy formulation that can integrate the reality of personalised relations 
and social networks whilst ensuring decisions are always made in the interests 
of the 'the public' alone. 
Notes 
I For the sake of brevity I will condense these concepts into the word 'interests'. 
2 This is a relatively uncontroversial view in modern psychology. See for example 
Lamberth (1980:295) and Atkinson, Atkinson and Hilgard (1983:317). 
3 I am utilising concepts of power dependence relations derived originally from social 
exchange theorist Richard Emerson. See for example Emerson (1962). 
4 Weber defined power as the ability to achieve one's goals despite opposition from 
others in a social relationship (quoted in Giddens (1971: 156)). 
5 Emerson wrote, 'The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional 
to /fs motivational investment in goals mediated by B and (2) inversely 
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proportional to the availability to those to A outside of the A-B relation' (1970:45). 
In essence, he is saying that A has power over B to the extent that B is dependent 
on resources controlled by A. 
6 Which can be an individual or an organisation 
7 Originally proposed by Joseph Senturia, 'Political Corruption', Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, Vol iv: p448. 
8 One problem with this definition is that the public official may rationalise that they 
have used their power in a way that benefits both themselves and the public 
interest. In this case they have promoted their interest in equal proportion to the 
public interest rather than over it. My view is that they intend to promote their 
interest regardless of the public therefore the fact that these interests may coincide is 
irrelevant. In addition, by promoting their interest they have distorted the process 
of achieving the 'best' policy, which in itself is against the public interest. 
9 It will also be noted that this definition faces the difficult problems of how you 
identifY the private interests of the public official/private actor and how you 
identifY the 'public' or 'common' interests of the populace? These are issues I don't 
intend to address here. 
10 It is almost self-evident that power can only be exercised in relation to others. See for 
example Bierstadt (1994). 
II An extraordinary example of this has recently occurred in Peru where it is estimated 
that 2400 video tapes were made of corrupt approaches between the head of Peru's 
secret police, Vladmiros Montesinos and politicians. All of the corrupt approaches 
occurred at video taped meetings in a hotel room. See Associated Press (2001). 
12 It should be noted that one off corrupt transactions which have no prospect of being 
repeated, such as the license providing official who extorts a 'fee' from the hapless 
applicant, have a somewhat different nature and are not included in the current 
discussion. 
13 Perhaps the best example is an investigation conducted into the unauthorised release 
of government information. Police were risking their careers for $10-20 per item of 
information even knowing their computer use could be audited. Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (1992). 
14 See Cartier-Bresson (1997) for one of the most thoughtful and interesting discussion 
on corrupt networks. 
15 'Social network analysis is not a formal or unitary 'theory' but rather a broad strategy 
for investigating social structure' (White and Brudner 1996). See also Leinhardt 
(1977). SNT also goes under the name of network analysis (Fischer 1977a). 
16 The concept of each individual as an actor enmeshed in a social network links to early 
work by sociologist George Simmel in 1922 (Fischer 1977b) . 
17 See for example Travers and Milgram (1969). They conducted an experiment to see 
how many people through personal acquaintances could transmit a letter from the 
West Coast of the USA to the East Coast. Approximately 30 per cent of the sample 
letters made it to the East Coast, travelling through a mean number of 
acquaintances of5.2. This was the basis for the so-called 6 degrees of separation 
where every person on the planet is only six acquaintances from knowing every 
other person. Obviously overstated, Milgram's research does illustrate how 
amazingly connected even complex modern societies are. 
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18 I am referring here to the importance of maintenance of interaction and the 
motivation to behave appropriately using social skills (Argyle 1988:52-56). 
19 Although within this network there will be considerable variation (Bott 1977) . 
20 There has been considerable work done on why people form relationships, apart 
from structural or environmental factors. The research suggests that one 
important factor is 'solidarity' or having similarity in characteristics and interests 
(Brown 1965) 
21 Theoretical approaches to this question vary along a continuum. The ratio of the 
effect of environment vs intention (and therefore formation of connection) is very 
much in dispute (see Fischer 1977b:3) . 
22 The difference between a network and a group is difficult to establish. Generally in 
the social sciences a group has members that have larger common aims, 
'interdependent roles, and a distinguishable subculture'. In networks, only some of 
the actors have social relationships and they don't form a recognisable definable 
social whole (see Bott 1977). 
23 This approach is in line with the more sophisticated versions of rationality outlined in 
the Social Choiceliterature, or as Jackson et al. (1977:42) call it, 'structured choice'. 
24 Defining power, potential power and influence is surprisingly controversial. For 
discussion of this debate see Martin (1994), Clegg (1979:41-49), Molm 
(1987:101) . 
25 Sometimes referred to in the economics literature as the 'moral cost' (see Groenendijk 
1997) . 
26 Information is clearly an important resource of power. In corrupt transactions it 
becomes crucial (Garson. 1977; Olsen 1970). 
27 Della Porta found, in her massive study ofItalian corruption, that 'honesty' was a 
valuable trait among corrupt actors. If you were generally known to be 'honest' in 
your corrupt dealings then you were a person that could be dealt with (Della Porta 
1996). 
28 In the author's experience as a corruption investigator with the NSW ICAC, this is a 
particularly common phenomenon. Della Porta (1996) also found that personalised 
relations were an important factor in ongoing corrupt transactions. 
29 It is axiomatic that low pay is one of the key causes of corruption in developing 
countries (see Palmer. 1983; Alatas 1990). 
30 Disagreement exists between the elitists and pluralists about how centralised decision 
making authority is. In Australian government, elites do exist and have significant 
power however it is mitigated (Higley, Deacon and Smart 1979). As Rose-
Ackerman points out, in modern democracies the power of elites is mostly to block 
or deny others, rather than to act or approve (1996:377). 
31 The effect of such factors in potentially promoting corruption is brought out in 
Zipparo (1998). 
32 Martens (1999) provides practical detail as to how this occurs. 
33 Warren (1977) notes that formal positions in the organisation may not relate to actual 
power structures. 
34 By organisational power, I am not referring to the resources available to the 
organisation. I am referring to the ability of the actor to influence the workings of 
the organisation itself 
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